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1

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
1.1

Introduction

Why do international humanitarian aid interventions by INGOs have sub-optimal results
in weak states? States matter to the success of humanitarian disaster relief efforts, yet the irony
here is that the weakness of the state is one of the criteria that both drives an international
intervention and exacerbates the humanitarian emergency in the first place. To be successful,
external humanitarian relief efforts need the presence of either an external actor such as the UN
which can supplant the state, or INGOs must work with local communities to supplant or replace
needed state functions. The key actors in this research are post-disaster weak states, INGOs and
UN peacekeeping operations. Post-disaster weak states are states which have recently
experienced either a natural or man-made disaster, such as an earthquake, hurricane or the recent
cessation of a civil war. INGOs are international non-governmental organizations which have
decided to intervene in this post-disaster area. In the cases discussed in this research, the United
Nations deployed a peacekeeping operation to augment the weak state.
This empirical puzzle of sub-optimal results of international humanitarian aid
interventions in weak states leads to a theoretical puzzle: in state building contexts amid complex
humanitarian disasters, what factors affect the efficacy of INGOs which engage in disaster relief?
The dependent variable being examined in this research are INGO humanitarian interventions
post-disaster, whereas the two independent variables are local community engagement and/or
empowerment along with a coordinating agency such as the United Nations creating a half-way
house scenario. If one of the two independent variables are present, the chances of interventions
being successful dramatically increases. On the other hand, if both of these variables are absent,
then these interventions chances of success drop precipitously.
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There are many methods and best practices INGOs use during humanitarian interventions
to create successful outcomes. These best practices are shaped by the various external and
internal pressures exerted upon INGOs. However, the key variable missing from these INGO
best practices is the state itself: the state can provide continuity, coordination and infrastructure
that INGOs are not equipped to provide. States in which these humanitarian interventions take
place are often very weak. Without a state which has both external and internal legitimacy and
can play a critical role in coordination and oversight, these interventions are unlikely to succeed.
However, there are two methods which can be used to increase the chances of successful INGO
interventions. The first method deals with INGOs working intensely with local communities:
those INGOs whose interventions involve intense consultations with local communities have a
higher chance of intervention success, whereas those that do not fail. The second method which
can be utilized deals with an external actor, usually a United Nations peacekeeping operation,
playing a bridging role between the weakened state and the INGOs which are intervening by
acting as a half-way house for the state itself. This allows the half-way house to engage in
legitimizing, coordinating and oversight functions which the state is unable to on its own.
Regarding the two cases examined in this dissertation, the Haiti and East Timor cases
demonstrate why interacting with and empowering local communities are key to supplanting
and/or supplementing the state which leads to more successful interventions. Regarding the
second method, one case (Haiti) shows what happens when there was no effective coordinating
mechanism, whereas the other case (East Timor) shows that the UN could create a coordinating
structure which replaced the state in a half-way house situation and that this coordination led to
more optimal INGO intervention outcomes. In some cases, INGOs are able to replicate state-like
functions and create successful interventions, but most INGOs lack the resources or the will to
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do this: instead, the state is needed to pick up the slack, so to speak. INGOs are also often not
accountable to the citizens of the communities they are intervening in, nor are they accountable
to the state itself. Instead, they are primarily responsive to their own donors, as there is no
reliable method to hold them accountable to the communities they work in or to the state itself.
However, a coordinating mechanism created by an external actor such as the UN could hold
INGOs accountable if the halfway house actor was willing to liaise with the state and police
INGOs. This is the idea behind a half-way house: a coordinating agency could replace and
augment some state-like functions while the state’s capacity is increased over time. Although this
would not be a panacea by any means, it would alleviate some of the massive accountability
issues present during these interventions.
1.2

Structure of this dissertation

This dissertation is structured to cover this large issue by breaking it down into three
inter-related topics: why INGOs are unable to adapt to low state capacity during disaster
scenarios; the importance of engaging with and empowering local communities during disaster
scenarios as a rough supplement for the state; and how the state can be substituted for by external
actors in a half-way house scenario during disaster scenarios. Each of these will consist of a
chapter of this dissertation. This chapter will lay the foundation for the study by proposing a
theory which will argue both the causes of INGO intervention failure, and two possible solutions
for this issue. This chapter will then continue with a brief summary and discussion of each of
these topics, followed by a discussion on case selection for the field research for this dissertation
along with a brief overview of the study location. The chapter will then close with the specific
portions of state capacity which are important during a humanitarian crisis.
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1.3

Theoretical Construction

Most best practices used by INGOs in disaster scenarios are predicated on a state being
present to engage in certain activities, such as security, coordination or knowledge of local
conditions. However, after a disaster, the state’s capacity to engage in these activities is either
weakened or nonexistent. Therefore, after a disaster, best practices of INGOs are not always
effective, as INGOs have adopted best practices which has been shaped by both internal and
external factors that are ancillary to the situation on the ground. These internal and external
pressures on INGOs constrains and contorts their approaches to disaster relief and state-building.
This in turn determines their ability and/or inclination (or lack thereof) to work with local
communities or to allow other external actors such as a UN peacekeeping operation to take on
more active coordination or oversight roles. In this research, the dependent variable being
analyzed will be the efficacy of INGO interventions in post-disaster scenarios where a weak or
non-existent state is present. The independent variables analyzed by this research are local
community empowerment and an external actor setting up a halfway house scenario to engage in
state functions as needed.
There is some literature on the impact of state capacity on service delivery with respect to
INGOs, but this literature must be interpreted with a critical eye as this literature is almost
entirely geared toward development work as opposed to disaster work. However, useful theory,
terminology and concepts can be gleaned from some of this literature. According to Krasner and
Risse, there are three factors which influence development success led by external actors such as
INGOs: legitimacy, institutional design and the complexity of the task at hand (Krasner and
Risse 2014). Legitimacy and institutional design are crucial to this research and this study’s
theoretical construction: these two factors lend themselves to post-disaster scenarios very well,
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and their research is transportable to post-disaster scenarios. Task complexity is also an
important component: simple services can easily be provided without a state, but the more
complex a task becomes, the more difficult it becomes to provide these services without a state
or a functional equivalent (Krasner and Risse 2014), (Schäferhoff 2014). To simplify this
variable, this research only looked at INGO interventions which revolved around only one or a
few specific service-oriented objectives: water systems, refugee and internally displaced person
resettlement, sanitation, hygiene, vaccination programs, and the like. Although the UN
peacekeeping operation in the two cases were multifaceted and dealt with a great many differing
objectives, most INGOs focused on only one specific objective. Although this does not eliminate
the issue of task complexity, this does allow this research to acknowledge its importance but
focus on the two objectives studied in this research, specifically legitimacy and institutional
design.
Legitimacy is a key factor regarding INGO intervention success, the dependent variable
for this research. Krasner and Risse make a strong case for discussing empirical legitimacy over
normative legitimacy, given that empirical legitimacy discusses voluntary compliance by aid
recipients as opposed to normative legitimacy which discussed some external moral or normative
standard (Krasner and Risse 2014). The key takeaway from this definition of empirical
legitimacy is the idea that the recipients of aid voluntarily accept the external actor’s
management or supervisory role. If local actors, such as local communities, feel the external
actor is legitimate, they will cooperate with that actor and interventions will be more successful.
Legitimacy is therefore one of the two independent variables for this research: INGOs which
engage in local community engagement or bottom-up empowerment can only do so if the local
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community or local actors voluntarily choose to believe that the INGO is legitimate in its work
(Beisheim et al. 2014).
The other key factor regarding INGO intervention success in post-disaster scenario is the
ability of an external actor such as the United Nations to take over state functions of the
weakened or absent state, such as coordination and security. How the UN chooses to set up or
design the institutions around which these state functions are supplanted is crucial to how other
actors will interact with the UN and other actors (Krasner and Risse 2014), (Beisheim et al.
2014). A UN peacekeeping operation can create linkages between INGOs and internal actors if
the external actor has designed institutions appropriately (Krasner and Risse 2014). With respect
to external actor development intervention successes, Beisheim et al specifically state that these
two variables are the keys to successful interventions (Beisheim et al. 2014).
From this brief overview and discussion, a theory for this research can be proposed. I
theorize that due to a number of external and internal factors, INGOs are unable to change their
established routines for disaster relief in order to accommodate state weakness. Without a state
with both internal and external legitimacy which can engage in coordination and oversight,
INGO interventions will fail. Therefore, state weakness must be supplanted or replaced for
greater INGO intervention success rates. There are two possibilities for this replacement: local
community empowerment and using an external actor to create a half-way house scenario. From
a theoretical perspective, this is an incredibly important question that has not been sufficiently
covered in the literature, as the literature focuses on development as opposed to disaster
scenarios and the idea of the state being present is not taken into account for best practices,
leaving a theoretical deficit which this research can remedy.
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1.4

The INGO trap: why INGOs can’t adapt to low state capacity during disaster
scenarios

INGOs have their own specific norms and procedures which they follow during disaster
scenarios. These procedures assume that a viable, capable state is present when this is usually not
the case. For instance, coordination is considered a key component of best practices, but without
a central, legitimate coordinator, this is extremely difficult or impossible to engage in. Security is
another excellent example: security cannot be assumed for INGOs, and this leads these
organizations to either not intervene at all or take draconian precautions such as hiring private
security due to the lack of this basic state function. Humanitarian interventions which attempt to
follow these best practices for disaster relief are doomed to sub-optimal results or failure because
there is no counterpart state to provide guidance to INGOs nor can they serve as a bridge
between communities and INGOs. Although this is an idealized version of the state, the second
INGOs hit the ground during a disaster they must take on some of these state functions: instantly
gaining knowledge of local contexts, power structures, formal and informal institutions, logistics,
and so on. There is an entity that can do these things: the state itself. Although INGOs do need to
engage in some of these activities, the state can make these activities far easier for INGOs. By
asking INGOs to act like states, they are unable to fully engage in the work they’re designed to
do.
1.5

The importance of local communities during disaster scenarios

Local community support is absolutely vital to intervention success. Unfortunately,
INGOs usually ignore or bypass local communities during their work. This is because local
communities have no feedback mechanism for accountability regarding INGOs, and INGOs have
no real need to consider the needs of the local community. A minimally capable state could
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impose accountability and transparency measures on INGOs, could act as a coordination
mechanism for humanitarian relief, and could also keep successful INGOs from having to
replicate state functions. This research will cover local community participation in East Timor
and Haiti, and the imperative need for local community participation during both of these
emergencies. The state, therefore, matters for emergency relief efforts as a connector and
mechanism for accountability between local communities and INGOs.
1.6

The half-way house: substituting for the state in disaster scenarios

A halfway house is an institution which allows people who have disabilities or a criminal
background to learn the necessary skills to allow them to reintegrate into society. This concept
can be applied to post-disaster states as well. During disaster scenarios, the state is sometimes
severely weakened or in some cases almost destroyed. There is precedent during these
emergency situations for the United Nations to act as a “halfway house” with respect to taking
over some state-like functions that can act as a template for future emergency scenarios. This
half-way house would supplement and supplant certain state capacity functions, facilitating
INGO intervention success. This is because an effectively designed half-way house scenario
would have legitimacy in the eyes of both INGOs and the state it is partially supplanting,
allowing the half-way house to act as the overarching external actor in the weakened state. The
half-way house can then act as a coordinating and oversight mechanism for INGOs to encourage
their cooperation with the half-way house, the weakened state and other INGOs. INGOs are not
designed for the purposes of supplanting weak capacity. UN peacekeeping operations, properly
mandated and legitimized, can supplant said capacity. This research will discuss the role the UN
played to facilitate refugee resettlement in East Timor after that country’s 1999 independence
referendum, where the UN played the part of a half-way house for the East Timor state and also
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served as a coordinating agency which provided central guidance to various INGOs and other
actors participating in humanitarian and relief work.
1.7

Research case selection

To ascertain how state capacity interacts with INGO interventions after disasters, this
study examines large international post-disaster intervention scenarios with as many similarities
between the cases as possible. In an ideal scenario, one state would be non-existent or badly
weakened after the disaster, while another state would be strong or only temporarily weakened.
Unfortunately, this perfect scenario does not usually exist. Because of this, a convenience sample
is truly the only viable method to use: however, the breadth of the conclusions drawn from these
analyses justify this methodology.
An examination of the universe of cases is in order here. The criteria for building the
universe of cases revolved around states or forming states which had a large UN Chapter 7
mandated intervention and an emphasis in their mandate on multifunctional state building. In this
universe of cases, the goal was to narrow down cases to missions which had disasters strike them
either directly before or during the mission itself, as what happened with Haiti and East Timor.
The reason for this is to find weak states which had an external actor intervene for an extended
period of time to supplant or replace the state itself. This is usually the case during the formation
of a new state or colony, or after a political crisis of some kind. These interventions were given
the authority to partially supplant or replace the state where the UN Security Council felt it was
needed. Below is a table of the missions which meet these criteria.
Table 1: List of UN Chapter 7 Mandate Missions
Mission
Name

Start - End of Mission

Mission Location

Generalized Mandate
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ONUC

July 1960 – June 1964

Republic of Congo

UNTAC

March 1992 – September
1993
March 1995 – March 1995

Cambodia

UNMIK
UNTAET

December 1995 – December
2002
June 1999 – Present
October 1999 – May 2002

Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Kosovo
East Timor

UNMISET
UNMIL
UNOCI
MINUSTAH

May 2002 – May 2005
September 2003 – Present
April 2004 – June 2017
June 2004 – October 2017

East Timor
Liberia
Cote d’Ivoire
Haiti

UNMIT
UNAMID
MONUSCO
UNMISS
MINUSMA
MINUSCA

August 2006 – December 2012
July 2007 – Present
July 2010 – Present
July 2011 – Present
April 2013 – Present
April 2014 – Present

MINUJUSTH

October 2017 – Present

East Timor
Darfur
D.R. Congo
South Sudan
Mali
Central African
Republic
Haiti

UNOSOM II
UNMIBH

Somalia

State-building, post-civil
war
Post-disaster state-building
State-building and aid
delivery
State-building
State-building
State-building, postdisaster
State-building
State-building
State-building
State-building, postdisaster
State-building
State-building
State-building
State-building
State-building
State-building
State-building

The chart details the mission name, the start and end of the mission, the location of the
mission, and most importantly the mandate of the mission as gleaned from the UN Security
Council resolutions creating the mission itself. After all of these missions were laid out and
scrutinized, there were only 5 missions which met the criteria of both a UN Security Council
Chapter Seven mandate which dictated state building and a disaster happening directly before or
during the mission itself: ONUC, UNTAC, UNOSOM II, UNTAET, and MINUSTAH. ONUC
was eliminated from the case selection due to the temporal distance of the mission from the
others in the universe of cases along with the highly unusual nature of the mandate. UNTAC,
although a promising case, was eliminated due to this mission operating directly after the end of
the Cold War, wherein INGOs had not institutionalized the current best practices which are
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examined in this research. UNOSOM II was eliminated for similar reasons. Haiti and East Timor
were the only two cases which were temporally acceptable and met the required criteria, leading
to these two cases to be selected for analysis. Haiti and East Timor both had a large-scale disaster
where large numbers of INGOs entered the region and the UN had a Chapter 7 mandate which
specified state-building and disaster relief.
The two cases analyzed in this dissertation are Haiti and East Timor. These are both cases
of a large-scale UN Chapter seven mandated mission with a large humanitarian disaster at the
same time, with many INGOs choosing to intervene during the mission and the disaster itself.
Both of these states were extremely weak or nonexistent, leading to INGOs needing an
alternative to the absent state. In Haiti, because of the kleptocratic state there, and why no
INGOs chose to work with the state. Instead, INGOs bypassed both the state and the
coordination agencies set up by the UN. This led to interventions which successfully interacted
and empowered local communities to create a proxy for state capacity, leading to intervention
successes, whereas those INGOs which did not work with local communities to supplant
inadequate or non-existent state capacity failed to produce successful interventions. The East
Timor case analysis shows how a halfway-house scenario can be successful. As the nascent state
formed, both INGOs and the UN wished to support and interact with this state. Due to the UN’s
insistence on creating coordination mechanisms with respect to this half-way house scenario, this
method led to successful INGO interventions in certain categories. These two cases when
discussed in detail reveal a greater understanding of the need for concerted state building which
has gained both local and international legitimacy and also empowering local communities to
continue work after the interventions end.
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The universe of cases for this dissertation is relatively small to begin with, as large-scale
UN-led international humanitarian interventions did not begin in earnest until after World War
II. Due to the small set if viable cases, some elasticity is required with respect to case selection.
Two cases have been selected which have as much in common as possible given the paucity of
cases and the unique nature of international interventions. These two cases are the international
response and intervention to the Haitian earthquake of 2010 and the international response and
intervention in East Timor after the withdrawal of the Indonesian military in 1999. Both
interventions have a great deal in common and this leads to a substantial number of variables
naturally controlled for: both were large international interventions after a very large disaster
(one natural, one man-made). Both interventions had a great amount of resources and attention
poured into them. Both interventions had a United Nations peacekeeping mission deployed
which was mandated to help augment institutional state capacity. Both interventions dealt with
former colonies. Both interventions took place on an island split via political lines with each side
speaking a different language from the other.
However, these cases have one major difference that is the key to their selection: East
Timor, after a long campaign of low-level insurgencies against the Indonesian military, had an
incipient state that the international community wished to work with and build: Fretilin, the
political arm of Falantil, the rebel force which had waged a long campaign against the
Indonesian military from 1975-1999. Fretilin and its successor were considered legitimate state
actors both internally and externally in East Timor. INGOs believe they would be working with a
new state in East Timor which had both capacity and legitimacy, and therefore they cooperated
with these political actors. The United Nations also deployed a peacekeeping mission to East
Timor which had a mandate giving the UN mission the ability to act as a half-way house for the
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emerging state of East Timor, leading to the UN taking over some state functions. The
combination of wishing to work with the nascent state along with the UN mission led INGOs to
work with this emerging regime and the political counterpart to the state which had both external
and internal legitimacy. East Timor did not qualify as a strong state; however, the trust placed in
it by the international community meant that an external actor, in this case the UN, was able to
establish a coordinating mechanism to create necessary state functions to facilitate interventions.
Haiti, on the other hand, has had a long history of kleptocratic governments since its
independence in 1804. The 2010 earthquake and its aftermath left a weakened state with even
further diminished capacity, as several government agencies and personnel had been damaged
were destroyed, killed or fled during the earthquake. Because of the kleptocratic history of the
Haitian government, almost all INGOs chose to either pay the state lip service or actively worked
around the state. Whereas in East Timor, some INGOs chose to actively cooperate with the state,
they chose not to in Haiti. The UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti did not have the same authority
as the mission in East Timor and this left a power vacuum there after the 2010 earthquake. Some
INGOs felt that bypassing the state was the most effective way to implement their mandates, and
other INGOs felt that there was no useful state counterpart in Haiti. The combination of lack of
trust in the state and of the lack of authority of the UN mission contributed to the failure of the
Haitian cases. In some cases, both of these issues overlapped, but the end result was the same.
1.8

Study Location

The East Timor case analysis was conducted with an extensive literature review, as
funding and temporal constraints prevented on-the-ground interviews. This intervention took
place after the 1999 independence vote: because of this, most if not all the INGOs left more than
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a decade ago, thereby complicating field research. However, an extensive literature review will
be sufficient to show the correlation discussed earlier.
The Haitian case research took place in Léogâne, Haiti from June – July 2015. The
research took place in a variety of variable sized communities in which an INGO intervened and
built a water system. These study sites were chosen due to the fact that most INGOs focused
their resources in Port-au-Prince and left the more rural portions of the affected areas alone.
Léogâne, however, was the very epicenter of the earthquake and a few INGOs chose to intervene
in this city as opposed to Port-au-Prince: Port-au-Prince is the largest city in Haiti and is also the
location of the international airport and seaport, making logistics for the intervention far easier
for INGOs who chose to intervene there. In Léogâne, on the other hand, there were fewer INGOs
intervening, but their interventions usually did not have any Haitian state support, whereas those
in Port-au-Prince did. While in the field, the researcher only engaged with communities which
had an intervention by an INGO who built a water system post-disaster, as these interventions
were motivated by the earthquake only and worked in the post-disaster environment. This led to
a very specific subset of interventions that could be compared with ease. As seen in Figure 1
below, the epicenter of the earthquake was very close to Léogâne, causing extensive damage to
the city.

Figure 1: Map of Haitian Earthquake Epicenter
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The data collection methods for the Haiti research is located in Appendix A. The field
work was carried out in Léogâne, Haiti to gain illustrative examples of INGOs ignoring the state,
ignoring or working with local communities and the general overall dynamics of these
interactions.
1.9

What parts of state capacity are important in a humanitarian crisis?

State capacity is a very large concept with many interlocking parts. It would be logical to
pare down what portions of state capacity are important and vital during a humanitarian crisis.
An excellent thought experiment would be to compare how a state with a high capacity responds
to a disaster versus a state with low capacity. How would a state with high capacity respond to a
disaster? What would be the difference from a state with low capacity’s response, given that the
definition for state capacity being used deals with the collection of tax revenue and creating and
maintaining public goods?
For a state with high capacity, such as the United States, the state in question would have
an emergency agency specifically mandated to deal with disasters, such as the United States’
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The defining trait of a high capacity state in
this regard is the ability to bend external actors to the state’s will, by coercion if necessary. If a
disaster strikes somewhere in the United States, FEMA is mandated to coordinate rescue efforts,
aid distribution, shelter construction, food delivery, and other responsibilities. If the disaster is of
a medical nature, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is specifically mandated
to quarantine affected areas, engage in triage, and other similar activities. Because of these
mandates, any and all aid or relief actors who wish to engage in work in the disaster zone must
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coordinate with these agencies: these federal agencies have the power to refuse any actors if they
see fit and can even have external actors barred from the disaster location if deemed necessary, if
they choose to do so.
The state with high capacity, therefore, forces coordination of disparate aid agencies and
other external actors with the rule of law, the use of police and if necessary military power to
coerce coordination, and most importantly the state has the capacity to engage in these actions:
these powers are not idle threats and cannot be lightly circumvented. The aid agencies and local
governments2 are usually dissatisfied with these agencies entering and usurping their authority,
but the argument can be made that this coerced coordination leads to decreased wasted resources,
non-duplicated efforts, and a more efficient response to the emergency in question. Although
none of the external actors like the coerced coordination or the threat of force, the external actors
are coerced into bowing to the will of the state, as there is no other alternative for them to operate
without negative legal ramifications for the external actor.
The procedures and the powers listed above for a state with high capacity are not feasible
for states with low capacity. External actors come to weak states with their own missions,
mandates, culture and specific ideas or procedures of how to accomplish their objectives,
effectiveness sometimes notwithstanding. Because the state with low capacity lacks the ability to
effectively coordinate, the external actors themselves must coordinate their activities, which in
the short term can lead to good results, but in the long term might not be in the best interest of
the communities in question or the state itself. After the initial push is over 3, many external
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Such as city, county and state governments
After a high-profile disaster, there is a rush for external actors to “hit the ground running” and show that they’re
“doing something”, regardless of whether that something is helpful or not. Due to a number of circumstances, this
initial push usually lasts 2-3 months before another disaster or the news cycle shifts away from the state, and the
emergency external actors that originally deployed begin to dial back their services and prepare for leaving the
country itself.
3
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actors, whose mandate only encompasses short-term scenarios, begin plans for withdrawal. Due
to limited resources, they do not have a choice: external actors are at the mercy of their donors
and will therefore be forced to go to the next emergency scenario, even if that means their work
in the current state is incomplete.
In a long-term emergency scenario, however, these short-term solutions can produce
long-term problems in the future: many of these external actors are not equipped to deal with
those long-term solutions. Therefore, when they do leave, they attempt to turn over some or all
of their programming to either the local government, the local community or the state itself. As
discussed above, a state with low capacity will not have the ability or the will to continue to
implement the programs put into place by the external actors, and when the external actors leave,
the programs or infrastructure built on a temporary basis fail or require repairs that are not easily
surmountable, leading to the communities in question being even worse off than they were
before and further diminished state capacity, as the population again takes note of the state not
fulfilling its obligations. Haiti and East Timor would both be considered weak states by these
definitions; however, the internal and external legitimacy of East Timor was higher than Haiti’s,
and the external actors in East Timor understood and respected the fact that it was an emerging
regime. This was opposed to Haiti, where the state was viewed as incompetent, corrupt and
kleptocratic. Both were weak states, but these are some differences which can be used for
analysis.
To continue with a discussion of the state and state capacity, it would be wise to define
and explore the state, and most importantly state capacity as it applies to international
interventions. The first step is to define, to the best of the literature’s ability, what a state is, its
functions, what the defining characteristics are of a strong and a weak state, and what conditions
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contribute to state capacity. How state functions are needed for effective INGO interventions is a
key component of this dissertation, along with which specific state functions are required for
effective INGO interventions. This will directly impact the discussion and the theoretical
implications of international interventions.
The first question to be asked, therefore, is: what is a state? Although this is one of the
oldest questions in political science, the literature has struggled to grapple with this question due
to several extenuating factors and circumstances: different theoretical underpinnings undergird
differing definitions of this ubiquitous entity. However, there are a few overall characteristics
that a state needs to possess to be considered a state. One of the first characteristics is the official
recognition of many other states. There are many quasi-states in the modern international system
today which are still attempting to gain recognition for statehood, such as South Ossetia and
Transnistria, the gold standard being recognition and a seat at the United Nations. Another major
characteristic is the monopoly of the use of force: this concept can be traced back to Thomas
Hobbes’ Leviathan. Hobbes discussed the idea behind a strong, centralized institution, showing
through intuitive logic that left to its own devices, a non-centralized society would collapse given
humanity’s inherent self-interest. To remedy the dilemma, each person turns over some of their
personal sovereignty to the state to guarantee their own safety, leading to a more stable society
for all (Hobbes and Gaskin 1998).
Therefore, the state exists to protect its citizens from both themselves and external
threats. The security of both the state and its citizens is one of the prime determining
characteristics of a state. This is also one of the basic tenets of the international relations theory
of realism. Keohane discusses the fact that the security of the state is the prime, overriding factor
for state actions in the international system, and that the continued existence of the state is the
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main objective of every state (Keohane 1986, 2005). This concept that the state is both the
central unit of the international system, and that the security of the state, both its territory and the
people residing in it, is the central reason for the state’s continued existence is also the reason for
realism’s concept of the security dilemma, wherein states feel the need to increase their security,
which paradoxically decreases the security of all other states due to other states’ needs to
compensate for the first state’s increased security: justifiable increased state security leads to
decreased security for all (Keohane 1986). This central concept of the state is continued by Max
Weber, who stated that the monopoly of the use of force is one of, if not the, defining
characteristic of the state (Weber 1965). This has become one of the major benchmarks of state
capacity: the ability to maintain and exercise the monopoly of the legitimate use of force.
An excellent list of criteria for a state are listed in Young’s work on postcolonial African
states (Young 2012). According to Young, a strong state should have the following attributes:
1) Have and maintain a monopoly on legitimate coercion,
2) An area of land over which the state has control,
3) Inhabitants within this territory,
4) Internationally recognized authority over said territory,
5) The capacity to exercise said authority, which includes but is not limited to the ability
to collect and spend revenue,
6) The ability to codify edicts and laws,
7) The concept of a nation for the people of this state,
8) A membership in a global community of sovereign states,
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9) And the abstract concept of the state itself, i.e. images, norms, and expectations in
social imaginary. (Young 2012)4
Therefore, by definition, a weak or fragile state would be unable to do one or more of the
list above (Carment 2010). Fragile states lack the authority to provide security, lack the
institutions to provide basic social needs and also lack the political legitimacy to represent their
needs both at home and abroad (Carment 2010). Indeed, Kraxberger discusses the theoretical
implications of a failed state, specifically the juxtaposition of de facto vs. de jure sovereignty
that highlights a number of the points listed above (Kraxberger 2007). After a disaster, a state
cannot engage in one or more of their basic functions. In the case of Haiti and East Timor, there
were a number of functions that these states were unable to engage in after their specific
disasters. From the list directly above, these would be condition 1: basic security, condition 4:
internationally recognized authority over territory, and condition 5: the ability to exercise
authority over said territory.
With respect to condition 1, neither state examined in this study had a monopoly on
legitimate coercion, as evidenced by the Chapter Seven UN peacekeeping missions assigned to
both countries. This basic condition for a state was clear both in the academic literature and in
the researcher’s field work in Haiti; East Timor was an emerging regime at the time of the
analysis, and security was instead provided by the UN peacekeeping mission UNTEAT while the
new domestic political regime emerged over 3 years. In Haiti, although the Haitian National
Police (HNP) patrolled the streets, it was clear that the UN mission, MINUSTAH, truly
controlled the security situation when it was able to, which at times it was not. In both Haiti and
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On page 35 of Young’s book, there is a chart that delineates these ideas.
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East Timor, this meant that the UN or other external actors had control logistics, not the state
itself.
With respect to condition 4, there is a key difference between these cases: Haiti was
considered a kleptocratic state that external actors did not wish to interact with due to its long
history of corruption and instability, leading INGOs to bypass the state. This meant that the
Haitian state did not have authority over its own territory from an international perspective, as
states which have such authority would be worked with instead of bypassed. In Haiti, the state
was both internally and externally considered to be very weak or beyond hope, leading to INGOs
bypassing the state without repercussion. In East Timor, on the other hand, the international
community actively worked with the emerging regime, giving the state both internal and external
legitimacy. This meant that INGOs felt the need to work with the emerging regime, which in
some cases led to more positive results.
With respect to condition 5, the inability to exercise authority within the state’s territory
itself was one of the major reasons for the interventions in the first place: the state lacked the
ability to coordinate differing organizations with differing objectives, and the state also lacked
the ability to bridge the gap between external actors and local communities. In Haiti, the UN’s
attempts at coordination failed as was made clear by the ease with which INGOs were able to
ignore both the UN and the state itself, and the fact that INGOs did not recognize the legitimacy
of the state. In East Timor, even though the state was still emerging during the intervention,
some INGOs in certain relief categories chose to work with the emerging regime and the UN to
fulfill their mandates.
State capacity is considered vital for post conflict scenarios in regard to keeping a lasting
peace in the state in question (Egan 1991; Kayitesi-Blewitt 2006; Krasner 2004). Yet, state
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capacity building is not considered a part of humanitarian interventions: instead of increasing
state capacity, these interventions often end up undermining whatever capacity the state has.
Usually after a disaster, external actors assume that the state can simply continue as it has before,
which is an unrealistic assumption given the fact that many weak states were unable to meet the
basic security needs of its citizens even before the disaster struck.
When a disaster of some kind strikes a state, that state may or may not have the resources
to respond to this disaster. If the disaster strikes a weak or fragile state, the already low ability to
respond is further diminished, sometimes strongly encouraging an international intervention.
Because of the magnitude of the disaster5, the weak/fragile state is unable to effectively respond
to the disaster, engendering international assistance. These international players, such as the UN,
INGOs, or other states have their own agendas, their own mandates and procedures to deal with
these emergency scenarios. Due to the emergency nature of the scenario in question, the state (be
it a strong or a weak state depending on the severity of the emergency), will lift certain barriers
for easier facilitation and logistical needs for the intervention in question. These might include
waiving of tariff/excise fees to allow for easy transportation of much needed emergency supplies,
expedited customs/passport control, and the like. If the international intervention was
concentrated on long-term development, the state would usually not waive these procedures, and
the development INGOs would negotiate with the state to ensure both sides are satisfied with the
arrangement.
During an emergency or short-term scenario, this is not usually the case. The emergency
situation overrides the state’s concerns regarding these specific issues: transparency and
accountability are not as important in an emergency scenario as there is widespread damage and

5

In this case a catastrophic natural disaster such as a tsunami, hurricane or earthquake or a man-made disaster
such as a civil war in the state or the neighboring state(s).
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lives at stake, therefore the state waives these issues regarding emergency scenarios, but not for
development scenarios. Because a weak state actually has less ability to enforce its taxation,
customs/excise taxes, and the inability to coordinate effectively, it is far easier for an INGO to
intervene as it wishes in a weak state when an emergency scenario takes place in said state than
in a state with high capacity. This is due to the weak state being unable to fulfill some of its basic
functions such as delivery of services to its citizens, the lack of a monopoly of the use of force,
the inability to coordinate distribution of resources, and the inability to effectively collect
taxation, leading to cronyism, corruption, and rent-seeking behaviors by those in the government
itself and other actors, such as political elites. This can lead these political elites to use the state
to give contracts or encourage friendly INGOs to intervene. Because of these weaknesses of the
state, INGOs are able to enter into an unequal relationship with the weak state during emergency
scenarios, allowing them to gain highly favorable terms for their intervention, being based upon
short term, emergency aid that the state itself is unable or unwilling to deliver. This gives the
intervener a large advantage that is exacerbated and reinforced by state weakness. The INGO is
not attempting to coerce the state in this case, however, and this should be made clear: the dire
need of the humanitarian emergency will lead the INGO to ask for and usually receive
preferential treatment regarding customs fees, taxation and the like, as the emergency, in the
INGO’s opinion, outweighs these considerations.
When the emergency scenario turns into a protracted scenario 6, those specific advantages
that allowed the intervener to easily enter the state and engage in short term interventions leads
to the failure of any long-term projects due to the exact same factors with respect to a lack of
state capacity. INGOs came in with their own missions, mandates, culture and specific ideas and
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A protracted scenario is a scenario which lasts longer than 6 months, as 6 months is considered the outer limit for
a short-term disaster scenario
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procedures of how to get things done, effectiveness sometimes notwithstanding. Because the
state lacks the ability to effectively coordinate, the INGOs themselves must coordinate their
activities, which in the short term can lead to good results, but in the long term might not be in
the best interest of the communities in question or the state itself.
1.10 Conclusion
This chapter has detailed the research question being discussed and answered in this
dissertation, namely why do international humanitarian aid interventions have sub-optimal
results in weak states? This introductory chapter summarized the overall structure of this
research, the layout of the chapters for this dissertation, and then the specifics of the field work
done for this research.
To be successful, external humanitarian relief efforts require the presence of a minimally
effective state. Most of the literature on humanitarian relief and what is wrong with it focus on
the shortcomings of the INGOs themselves and the aid/donor systems in which they are
embedded. These explanations certainly have some explanatory power toward why INGO
interventions produce sub-optimal results. However, the key variable missing is the state itself:
the state can provide continuity, coordination and infrastructure that INGOs are not equipped to
do. These state functions are needed in order to design, implement and sustain INGO
interventions. For an INGO intervention to have a higher chance of success, the specific
capacities of a state needed would be the ability to coordinate between actors, the ability to
provide logistics and infrastructure support where possible, and the ability to act as a bridge
between local communities which INGOs which to serve and the INGOs themselves.
This dissertation will now turn to a more detailed explanation of the reasons why best
practices fall short during disaster scenarios: although there is some explanatory power in
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external and internal pressures on INGOs, a case will be made that these do not have sufficient
explanatory power for INGO intervention failure. Instead, the state itself is a variable which must
be considered. This dissertation will then discuss how INGOs can replicate state-like functions
with local communities to enhance the chances of success, but a viable, functioning state would
make it far easier for INGOs to produce successful interventions with examples from Haiti and
how ignoring both local communities and the state in East Timor and Haiti led to failure. This
research will then then discuss the concept of the halfway house, where an external actor briefly
steps in to replace the state until an emerging regime is able to take over sovereignty.
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2

THE PROBLEM: THE INGO “TRAP” AND WHY INGOS CAN’T ADAPT TO LOW
STATE CAPACITY DURING DISASTER SCENARIOS
2.1

Introduction

Although there are billions of dollars given for post-disaster international humanitarian
relief every year, there are a number of issues that unfortunately lead to sub-optimal results for
INGOs trying to help those in need. This chapter’s purpose is to discuss the external and internal
issues that INGOs face when they engage in post-disaster international humanitarian
interventions. Due to these internal and external issues, INGOs have adopted specific methods
and best practices which do not always take the lack of state capacity into account, leading to
INGO intervention failures. By discussing these issues, the problems which INGOs face both at
home and in the field can be laid out and examined in detail before proceeding to solutions. This
chapter will act as a helpful set up for what the specific issues INGOs must deal with, showing
the constraints on INGOs. By defining the problems INGOs must face, this will allow the
solutions discussed in chapters 3 and 4 to have greater validity. By discussing the problems, the
solutions of local community empowerment and a half way house scenario can be shown to be
viable after the constraints under which INGOs operate are elucidated in detail.
This chapter will therefore be crucial in helping to lay out the constraints placed upon
INGOs in detail. This chapter is designed to show why INGOs need certain state functions to be
active to engage in interventions, and also why INGOs are unable to adapt to the lack of state
capacity. The chapter does this in several parts. First, it discusses the current system of
international humanitarian aid interventions. It then examines the unintended consequences of
these interventions. Next, the chapter looks at why INGOs are set up to fail, and why the state is
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necessary for international interventions. Finally, it elaborates a theory on the necessity of the
state for international interventions, followed by a conclusion.
2.2

The current system of international humanitarian aid interventions

Before discussing interventions, it would be wise to discuss the system that INGOs
operate in first. When a natural or man-made disaster strikes a country, the international
humanitarian system mobilizes. Although this is not an actual formal institution, there is a
network of INGOs7, IOs8 and other external actors, such as bilateral aid agencies and other
donors, that are prepared for these situations. This international humanitarian aid ‘system’ is not
a formal institution or set of institutions: instead, it is a more informal construct of disparate
institutions, conflicting directives, and differing objectives 9. When a disaster strikes, many
external actors begin implementations as quickly as possible: states, international organizations,
INGOs. Each of these external actors has their own agenda or mandate, and they will attempt to
implement that agenda or mandate as quickly as they can based on their individual capacities.
The major reason that the international humanitarian system operates the way that it does
is that there is no single governing authority to respond with one voice toward the disaster
(Biermann and Koops 2017). Indeed, the Sphere Project, a large handbook dedicated to how
INGOs should respond to humanitarian crises, is considered the standard to which INGOs should
hold themselves, and many leading INGOs took part in the crafting of this international standard
(The Sphere Project 2011). Although many INGOs actively contributed to this large handbook,
there is a great deal of distance between the rhetoric espoused in the handbook and actual action
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Such as the Red Cross, OxFam, Save the Children, and the like
Such as the United Nations, the EU, the OAS, and the like
9
http://humanitariancoalition.ca/the-humanitarian-system
8
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on the ground due to the chaotic nature of the system itself. Stephenson lists the structure of the
international humanitarian aid system and the issues contained within (Stephenson 2006).
Stephenson states that there is no one overarching body which can coordinate or coerce
other external actors in the international system. All of these external actors overlap at times with
objectives, but they aren’t always coupled, and their objectives might and often do clash.
Everyone involved wants to engage in efficient delivery, but this might be hampered by external
factors, lack of coordination, poor infrastructure, and the like. These actors act under crushing
pressure and harrowing conditions which lead to high burnout. It’s critical for these actors to
share information, but also difficult due to the conditions on the ground. Information is critical to
all involved, but these actors are incentivized to horde this information to ensure their objectives
are not poached by others.
A crucial part of the list, however, should be quoted directly:

“Supply and transport logistics in post-disaster scenarios is always a critical concern, but
still more so in those countries with limited government capacities (2010 Haitian
earthquake) and poorly developed infrastructures (2005 Pakistan earthquake) or whose
personnel have been severely affected by a disaster (Haiti in 2010) or in situations in
which the affected population resides in a remote area (2005 tsunami in Banda-Aceh).” 10
This is a crucial concern: the lack of infrastructure here is key, as countries with limited
state capacities are unable to engage in supply and transport logistics, capacity issues which are
directly related to post-disaster scenarios. This is directly due to limited state capacity, but this is
given only a brief mention and then the author moves on, although I argue that this is one of the
major reasons why the state is so vital. In short, the “system” really isn’t a system at all: instead,
it is a loose conglomerate of very different external actors who have little incentive to coordinate
10

Stephenson, pg. 489
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or to share large amounts of information, creating classic coordination and free-rider problems
for the entire system.
As with many other issues with international relations, the major problems inherent
within the system can be traced to the lack of a central enforcer, and a massive number of actors,
each pursuing its own objectives and agendas. Even if all actors wish to maximize their
contribution to the relief effort, these factors inherent within the system itself constrain and
prevent the cooperation needed to maximize the relief effort.
This specific subsection has laid out how the international humanitarian system is set up,
who the stakeholders are, and how it is mobilized when there is a disaster of some kind. The next
section will discuss the unintended consequences of INGO interventions.
2.3

Unintended consequences of international humanitarian aid interventions

INGO intervention responses to disaster scenarios vary from purely political, to purely
humanitarian, to everything in between. A massive whirlwind of conflicting interests can
produce unintended consequences, usually negative, that can either negate the point of the
intervention, or in worst-case scenarios can leave things worse off than they were before. These
conflicting problems and interests must be taken into account, as the state can alleviate some
unintended consequences, but not all regarding an international intervention if a viable state is
present. The literature details many reasons for these issues.
The international aid system distorts external actors and outcomes, leading to suboptimal
interventions or, in many cases, the intervention can leave the situation worse off than before the
intervention (Tvedt 2002). Sometimes, the disaster that caused the emergency situation, such as a
famine, might have been caused by political factors, and the INGOs that respond to the call for
emergency relief may in fact exacerbate the emergency (Zmolek 1990). A good example of this
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issue is the humanitarian aid mission in Somalia: because there were no other resources besides
food aid in the conflict zone, Somali warlords captured convoys specifically to allow them to
redistribute the food as patronage, exacerbating the very emergency INGOs had come to
alleviate. If a state of some kind had existed and exercised its monopoly on the legitimate use of
force, there wouldn’t have been any issues with warlords capturing food aid: the very weak
capacity of the state allowed for this to be a possibility, leading to these unexpected and negative
consequences.
Le More discusses the unintended consequences of interventions in Palestinian
development: by pumping large amounts of cash and resources into the economy, this led to
fragmentation of authority and patronage politics, creating the opposite outcome than what was
desired by the donors in question (Le More 2005). Labor markets, among other institutions
within states, can be the casualties of external actors engaging in relief work (Barber and Bowie
2008; Anderson 1999). By entering a state, external actors distort not only the market, but also
the state itself by subsuming state functions in their quest for autonomy (Sanyal 1997). External
actors can easily distort local labor markets by paying salaries via a Western scale instead of a
more appropriate scale for the state in question, leading to a brain drain of skilled and learned
employees who take menial jobs for the salaries (Abdelrahman 2007). By paying locals Western
wages, doctors and lawyers become cab drivers, draining local populations of badly needed skill
sets as communities attempt to rebuild post-disaster. A viable state could instead pay civil
servants to engage in the work necessary for recovery instead of a stampeding free-for-all
chasing higher but transitory wages.
Anderson’s treatise on international aid’s impact on violent conflicts merits mention here.
Her argument states that aid can exacerbate a conflict, and that giving aid in violent conflicts
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distorts markets, the people, and the state where the aid is distributed, be it short or long-term aid
(Anderson 1999). This is a serious issue with respect to unintended consequences of INGO
interventions: by draining human institutional capacity from the state, INGOs contribute to the
degradation of state capacity, which is clearly a negative consequence of these interventions. If a
viable state were present (which in this case is clearly not possible), the state could enforce labor
laws which would lead to a decrease in locals not trying to leave the country and instead staying
to help rebuild.
Regarding specific issues such as health, the state and the external actor must coordinate,
but a state with low capacity lacks the ability to engage in this kind of coordination, and either an
IO or a consortium of INGOs is required to take the lead for health coordination, especially in an
emergency scenario if there is to be a good chance of intervention success (Cannon 1995). This
is precisely what took place in both Haiti and East Timor post-disaster: the state – in the case of
East Timor, a nascent or non-existent state, and in the case of Haiti, very weak and kleptocratic
state – was unable to fulfill its functions of being able to coordinate external actors within its
own territory. In both cases, the UN attempted to create a cluster system to augment or replace
the degraded state capacity. When Gibelman and Gelman examined the impact of INGO mishaps
and misallocations of resources on trust between the community and the INGO or the INGO and
states, they found a clear erosion of trust among donors, the communities and host governments
vis-à-vis INGOs (Gibelman and Gelman 2004). This erosion of trust can bleed over and
transform into a lack of trust in the state itself, another negative and unintended consequence of
an INGO intervention. This was repeatedly seen during the author’s research, as many
communities expressed their hostility to the state for an ineffective INGO even though the state
usually had nothing to do with the intervention in question. This leads to a downward spiral of
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legitimacy loss for the state: the erosion of trust leads to INGOs ignoring the state, local
communities ignoring the state, repeating the cycle.
Another good point to illuminate is that complex emergencies have unintended
consequences from the donor perspective for INGOs, the state and the communities themselves,
when donor needs or prerogatives interfere. White’s case study on the responses of the Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) to multiple emergencies illuminate the issues discussed in the
previous paragraphs (White 1999). White discusses and shows with his analysis that although
FAO was doing a decent job with respect to being a key player in complex emergencies due to
its institutional capacity, FAO’s donors were short sighted. Donors did not fully comprehend the
consequences of the strings they chose to attach to the resources they handed out, leading to no
end of confusion in the field and to ineffective outcomes for the very emergency situation that
they were hoping to mitigate through the FAO (White 1999). The effects of this donor/need
mismatch in this case was misallocated resources and less effectiveness with respect to
alleviation of famine. The Somalian famine during the 1990s as discussed earlier in this section
is an excellent example of misallocated resources and decreased effectiveness. Here, if an
effective state had been in place, the donors would have had another less control over where
exactly they felt interventions were needed, as the state itself would have to be taken into
account, and this could have led to a more effective intervention.
Even with the best of intentions, interventions handled inappropriately can exacerbate
low state capacity or lead to unintended, negative consequences. The idea that humanitarianism
is ‘neutral’ is also open for debate, as any intervention in a complex system will invariably lead
to unexpected consequences that might make the situation more volatile, not less (Leebaw 2007).
In some extreme cases, emergency aid to refugees indirectly leads to an increased duration of
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conflict due to the ability of rebel armies to use sanctuaries run by external actors as recuperation
stations, prolonging the conflict that generated the emergency in the first place, a clear
unintended consequence of the intervention itself (Salehyan 2008). This concept can be
extrapolated to natural disaster scenarios as well: by injecting a great deal of wealth into a
disaster scenario, unintended consequences become the norm, not the exception. Examples
include but are not limited to short-term water systems, housing, and economic destabilization.
The concern that external actors set up shop in post-conflict countries, bypass the state
(halfway house), and implement their own programming to the detriment of the local population
is a valid concern when the external actor leaves and the state is unable to continue the
programming due to state instability or inability to engage with those populations, a clearly
negative unintended consequence of INGO interventions (Kayitesi-Blewitt 2006). KayitesiBlewitt discusses this specific scenario in post-genocide Rwanda, where a flood of INGOs
entered the state to implement their own programming: due to lack of state support, these
programs collapsed after the INGOs turned elsewhere. After the 1994 Rwandan genocide, a
number of external actors entered Rwanda to engage in a number of interventions, but KayitesiBlewitt focuses on health programs, especially HIV/AIDS programming (Kayitesi-Blewitt
2006). The programming was useful, in high demand and had some short-term successes, but
when the external actors moved on, in this case rather quickly, there was no mechanism for
transference of these programs to the Rwandan state, leading to their dissolution and collapse
(Kayitesi-Blewitt 2006). This was clearly not what either the state or the external actors wanted:
a negative unintended consequence of these interventions. A negative unintended consequence is
the case when donors bypass the state and give funding directly to INGOs instead. By bypassing
the state the donors might get the short term results that they wanted, but by using a workaround
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to bypass the weak state, the long term effects of the intervention become deleterious and harm
the state, a negative, unintended consequence of these interventions (Dietrich 2013). This
therefore shows that a strong state is needed to continue this type of programming after INGOs
leave.
By engaging in an intervention, an external actor is co-opting the state’s mandate (or in
some cases, the state’s inability to execute its mandate) of delivering resources and/or services to
the population, weakening state capacity. In every situation involving external actors there is a
tradeoff with short and long-term objectives. Jarstad and Sisk’s research on the consequences of
peacekeeping operations is of use here: there are short term needs that, if satisfied, can lead to
long-term negative consequences, such as the dilemma of external security versus empowering
the local police, when elections are appropriate, and also the level of freedom of the press,
assembly and speech that are permissible in a post-conflict scenario (Jarstad and Sisk 2008). This
is especially problematic regarding communities where a short-term need is necessary, but the
long-term consequences are either not fully thought out or are actively not a priority, such as in
IDP or refugee camps. This leads to the issue of whether interventions actually weaken the state
in question (Zanotti 2010), (Edwards and Hulme 1992), which the literature shows is most
certainly the case; by divorcing service delivery from governance, serious problems arise in
democratization and accountability, leading to the accountability deficit discussed in the next
chapter of this dissertation.
How are these interventions different from when a state intervenes within its own borders
during a disaster? When a state delivers a service of some kind, there is some mechanism of
accountability regarding the service in question: the state, or the individuals empowered by the
state, can be identified and grievances can be filed or made known to those in power. This
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accountability deficit shows up in many interventions: INGOs are mostly accountable to their
donors, not to the communities in which they intervene, showing that accountability is a key
issue in this analysis (Slim 1997). The state government, on the other hand, is in theory
accountable to its constituents. If the state lacks the capacity to intervene, an INGO will have no
rational reason to hold itself accountable to the people it is intervening with. Instead, the INGO is
held accountable by its donors, who will have little to no understanding of what is actually
transpiring on the ground, leading to massive principal-agent problems.
This section has used the literature to illuminate the many ways that INGO interventions
can have negative, unintended consequences after disasters both with or without a strong, viable
state post-disaster. From the loss of state capacity to the lengthening of the conflict that the
intervention was attempting to stop, there are any number of pitfalls awaiting INGO
interventions. Some of these unintended consequences could be blunted or prevented with a
strong state, but states of course can also produce unintended consequences with their policies as
well. The next section will discuss why INGOs are set up to fail by a number of external and
internal factors, leading to sub-optimal intervention results.
2.4

Why INGOs are set up to fail

External pressures on INGOs, the internal structure of INGOs and the issue of
institutional memory for INGOs are all variables which lead to sub-optimal outcomes for these
interventions. While dealing with these external and internal issues, INGOs are at times forced to
take on many different aspects of a state that the INGO is not suited for, such as creating and
sustaining infrastructure such as roads, airports and seaports or having a deep and intimate
knowledge of local communities and culture. All of these variables mean that when the INGO
begins the intervention, they are being asked to take on a truly monumental task that almost no
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external actor could do on its own: this is how INGOs are set up to fail through no fault of their
own.
2.4.1

External pressures on INGOs

There is partial explanatory power on why INGO interventions fail contained in the
external pressures exerted on INGOs. These pressures are separate from the need for a strong
host state serving as a coordinator of aid, but these external pressures need to be examined in
detail. These external pressures can force INGOs to not interact with the state, ignore the state or
at times actively undermine state capacity to further its own goals. INGOs can and do act as
states in certain capacities: just as states have their own agendas, mandates and funding sources,
INGOs do as well. INGOs are usually not funded by the states they work in: this gives the
disaster-stricken host state little direct leverage over the INGO. There are large numbers of
external factors that constrain INGOs from acting with impunity whenever they so choose, even
in states with weak capacity. There are external pressures on INGOs which partially explain their
behavior in the field that must be considered before an analysis can begin regarding how INGOs
choose to intervene in these scenarios. The two major external pressures are the pressure donors
exert on INGOs and the international media.
The first and by far the most important external pressure on INGOs is exerted by their
donors. After the end of the Cold War, there was a large explosion of INGOs due to the
loosening of restrictions on registration, a large influx of capital into the nonprofit world, and a
shift in humanitarian norms to facilitate this growth (Reimann 2006). INGOs are at the mercy of
their donors, as they are by definition non-profits. These large donors are international
organizations, states and sometimes large private foundations. Many states have an international
development agency which attempts to use development or aid dollars to constrain or coerce
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other governments into bending to their will, using INGOs as their intermediaries. These
differing actors have differing objectives, and their best interests will clash. Although INGOs can
pull funding from grassroots fundraising, internet donations and possible merchandising, they are
unable to sustain themselves without external individual, corporate, government or foundation
support. Because of this, INGOs are forced to bend or bow to donor pressure (Cooley and Ron
2002). Because the power differential between a donor and an INGO is highly significant, the
donor has outsized influence on what the INGO can feasibly do. This leads to inefficient
allocation of resources, the bending or abandonment of mandates, and poorly executed
implementations.
If an INGO didn’t have to respond to donor pressure, an INGO could, in theory, spend its
donations as it saw fit, which would more than likely include higher overhead costs. 11 Most
INGOs are forced to keep their overhead and administrative costs low due to donor pressure: this
leads to INGOs using outdated equipment or technology in the hopes of keeping overhead and
administrative costs below an arbitrary amount even though different INGOs have different
mandates and missions, requiring different levels of overhead. 12 For instance, an INGO which
engaged in more research-based work would need researchers on staff part or full time, and this
would drive overhead costs up. However, this could translate into more effective service
delivery, depending on the INGO; if an INGO had a dedicated research department or a state
liaison department on the payroll, it would be able to more effectively gain local knowledge and
also interact with the host state more effectively. Unfortunately, many large donors consider this
type of INGO employee to be nonessential: donors wish for as much of their donation as possible

11
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https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/donors-are-turned-off-by-overhead-costs-here-s-what-charities-can-do
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_charity_trap
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to go directly to those in need, although overhead and back-end work is required for this to
happen.13 If INGOs collected only unrestricted donations14, they would be able to spend those
donations as they saw fit, given evolving conditions on the ground. Going back to the earlier
example dealing with water systems, if the donor had chosen to simply give the INGO a
donation without restrictions, the INGO could have used that funding for internal capacity
building, local community research or could have purchased what the communities actually
needed as opposed to what the donor thought they needed. States use international granting
mechanisms to push their own interests, sometimes to the detriment of the states INGOs are
working in.
This issue of attempting to serve two competing constituencies (in the case of an INGO,
the donors and the communities that they attempt to serve) has an excellent analogy in the
international relations field. Putnam discusses the idea of a two-level game where the executive
of a state must square the circle of competing, sometimes contradictory, issues arising from the
domestic and international spheres (Putnam 1988).This issue is mirrored with an INGO, with
competing pressures on the executive director of an INGO to satisfy their domestic constituency
(the communities they wish to support) and also the international constituency (the donors that
support the INGO, sometimes an IO or a state itself). This can lead to tradeoffs that have
suboptimal outcomes for all involved, but are necessary to satisfy one of the other constituencies,
as happens with states themselves (Putnam 1988). This can also be interpreted as NGOs having
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https://www.forbes.com/sites/rahimkanani/2011/12/04/how-to-strengthen-the-donor-grantee-relationship-aroadmap-to-collaboration/#7eb2b1b77c00
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There are two types of donations to non-profits: restricted and unrestricted. Restricted donations are usually
ones made by foundations and states: they have a long list of conditions and stipulations that must be adhered to
or the grant money is lost, or the non-profit can lose its charity status. Unrestricted donations are exactly that:
they can be spent however the non-profit chooses. For very clear reasons, all non-profits far prefer unrestricted
funding.
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multiple accountabilities: the donor, the state, the community, themselves. Edwards and Hulme
have shown that state funding greatly distorts mission outcomes, as the INGO bends to the will
of the donor to keep from biting the hand that feeds them (Edwards and Hulme 1996). The
literature has discussed the need for accountability reform, as serving competing and
contradictory constituencies usually leaves the communities being served on the short end of the
stick (Crack 2013; Ebrahim 2003; Najam 1996). INGOs serve two separate constituencies, and
when push comes to shove they are forced to bend toward the donors instead of the communities
they serve, as without donors there would be no service delivery at all, forcing INGOs to make
this least-bad choice. If a viable state were present, the INGO would receive pressure from the
state as well. However, that state pressure could be leveraged against donor pressure to illustrate
to donors why specific projects must take place in specific places, as opposed to a donor which
might have little to no on the ground experience.
The literature consistently points to the fact that even with the best of intentions, donors
have a lopsided effect on INGOs and their interventions. This is due to a donor’s ability to cut
off funding for multiyear programs if benchmarks are not met. This can be the case even if the
INGO has worked with the donor to set up said benchmarks: the donor is still able to reduce or
eliminate funding unless the INGO bends to the donor’s wishes (Reith 2010). A specific example
of the issue with donors having a lopsided influence over the INGOs they fund is clear in Jaime’s
work dealing with the failed linkage of INGOs between democracy and development (Jaime
2000). Here, the very autonomy that is required for INGOs to do their job in regard to democracy
and development is lost when they follow where their donors want them to go, artificially
constraining themselves and ultimately destroying the very process they were hoping to engender
(Jaime 2000). For example, structural adjustment policies implemented through both grassroot
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NGO and INGOs constrained these INGOs from questioning these donors too harshly regarding
the tensions between democracy and development, as in some cases these two objectives were
mutually exclusive (Jaime 2000).
This has a clear parallel with interventions in the field: the autonomy that might be
needed by the INGO to accomplish its mission is the exact thing the donor chooses not to grant
the INGO. This is mirrored in Makuwira’s work regarding donors and local NGOs: because the
balance of power is so unequal between donors and local NGOs, the lack of support for local
NGOs leads to stilted and/or inefficient, non-optimal outcomes. In fact, the intervention might
even make the situation worse than before the donor began distributing funding due to the
constraints placed upon the local NGOs (Makuwira 2006). Donors here are usually government
aid agencies, international organizations or foundations, and each of these donors are not very
flexible regarding their funding. This makes them susceptible to domestic policies of their home
countries which might have little, if anything, to do with the country being aided.
A donor and an INGO can have different concepts of how funding should be spent. Why
would a donor’s wishes differ from or run counter to the goal of helping recipients of aid? As
with many concepts in political science, best intentions can be mired by institutions, principalagent problems, and power disparities. An example can shed light on the situation. A disaster of
some kind strikes a state, an INGO which specializes in water mobilizes for an intervention and
makes a pitch for donations. A donor comes forward with a very large donation but there are
stipulations: the money must be spent on drilling water wells and installing pumps for the
victims. The INGO decides to take the donation with those stipulations. When the INGO staff
enters the field, they quickly find out that water isn’t the largest issue on hand: instead, there is a
dire need for shelter construction. Other INGOs have already built water infrastructure, or the
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disaster victims have other means of procuring water and require temporary shelter as quickly as
possible. This INGO has no experience with building shelters; instead, its expertise is focused on
water infrastructure. The INGO is now stuck in the unfortunate position of having to build wells
and pumps for communities which do not need them to satisfy a donor who had good intentions
but lacked local knowledge, leading to wasteful and unnecessary interventions. This is one of
many examples of how donors can distort INGO interventions, leading to sub-optimal outcomes
even though all actors in the situation are attempting to maximize returns on their investments
and interventions. The local community in this case might not know where a well would be more
useful than their own community, but the state possibly would. A viable state could then
coordinate INGO responses to ensure that resources are deployed more effectively. In this case,
the state would direct this particular INGO to a community whose water needs are dire, and a
shelter-based INGO toward this community, thereby maximizing resources and impact. This is a
basic function of a state that post-disaster states are unable to engage in.
Each INGO wants to demonstrate to its donors that it has spent the donor’s resources
effectively and efficiently. This leads to a scramble of INGOs for limited resources, usually
sacrificing long-term needs for short term gains (Cooley & Ron, 2002). Short term gains here
would mean intervening with a very short-term objective which ignores or downplays the longterm needs of the community or even the sustainability of the intervention itself after the
intervention ends. The gain would be the funding from the donor, but the sacrifice would be the
long-term needs of the community itself. In this case, a viable state could step in after the
completion of a short-term objective to continue the objective of the INGO intervention with the
resources of the state, but a state with low capacity would be unable to do so.
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Funding is the lifeblood of any institution, and when a donor’s needs trump the
community’s needs, suboptimal interventions are the result from the community’s perspective. In
this case, a functioning state could supplement and then supplant the intervention, allowing for
the state to stay accountable to the community, and ensuring that the community receives what is
needed. When an INGO is dependent on donors, as most if not all are, these donors wield
disproportionate influence over the INGO’s intervention, sometimes to the detriment of the
community the INGO is intervening in. This leads to an accountability deficit, and to suboptimal
outcomes for interventions, as donor pressure forces INGO to contort to donor wishes.
A donor’s ability to cut off funding precludes INGOs from being adaptive or creative
without severe consequences (Cameron and Haanstra 2008). This leads to one of the unexpected
outcomes regarding INGOs: civil society is the nonprofit equivalent of the “marketplace of
ideas”, analogous to free market capitalistic corporations. However, due to the donor being able
to cut off funding as they so choose, the market becomes distorted and incredibly constrained,
leading to INGOs not being able to adapt to changing circumstances without a high risk of losing
their funding. Unfortunately, the very nature of funding and donor scarcity requires INGOs to
lock themselves into very specific roles, diminishing their ability to innovate and flexibly
respond to new challenges. Ironically, the very engines of innovation, once these INGOs reach a
certain size, become locked into the very system they were attempting to disrupt or reform.
The ability to cut funding or redirect funding by donors has been shown to lead to
diminished capacity (Parks 2008). This unbalanced funding relationship leads to startup INGOs
which are not risk-averse and willing to explore new concepts and methods. When funding
patterns are established, these formerly risk-seeking INGOs become risk-averse but safe larger
INGOs. When INGOs start up, they have almost complete freedom regarding their mandate and

43

mission, as there are no donor constraints upon them (as they have no donors, unless the INGO
has been set up with a fund of some kind). Once donations begin to come in, the INGO becomes
constrained by those donations, as the donors will usually have their own set of criteria and
objectives for how their donations are used. This leads to strong path dependence in the growth
of INGOs, wherein they are frozen into the mandate that the INGO originally started with, not
allowing the organization to adapt to changing international conditions. The International
Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) is a prime example: founded in 1863 and a signatory to the
Geneva Conventions, the ICRC was originally a revolutionary concept of international aid
during disasters and conflict. However, most wars fought during the mid-19 th century were
interstate conflicts. By the end of the 20th century, most wars have been intrastate instead,
leading to more protracted conflict scenarios and longer average times for refugees in refugee
camps. Unfortunately, the ICRC, due to the specific circumstances of its creation in the mid-19 th
century, is forced to use the same model for relief that it first used in the mid-19 th century. The
ICRC is too big to adapt, and cannot change its operations without angering donors, leading to an
overall static organization. The ICRC is not the only example of a large INGO which is locked
into its relationships: CARE is another excellent example as well.
The international aid system is distorted not only by INGOs and IOs, but also by states
and other external factors such as the media. The argument can be made that where the
international aid system chooses to respond are dictated by external forces, especially the media
(Bob 2002). Because resources are finite, one of the major institutions in this informal system
indirectly handles where resources are spent is: the media. Although the international media is
not always considered a part of the international humanitarian system, its impact cannot be
overstated. The media in certain cases places a large focus on a specific conflict or need: because
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of this, resources are poured into that conflict or issue as a massive spurt, ignoring other pressing
and equally attention-deserving problems (Bob 2002). In some cases, this delicate balancing act
of attempting to tilt the media and donors toward a specific crisis or technique can be
counterproductive, and can force an INGO to engage in tradeoffs and compromises depending on
the situation at hand (Whaites 2000). The media can be considered an external factor regarding
funding streams and targets of interventions of the international aid system, especially
celebrities: Dieter and Kumar detail how celebrity endorsements on specific crises or human
rights violations shines a massive light on that specific issue. However, this causes other,
sometimes bigger, issues to be swept under the rug, leading to some issues faltering or failing
due to lack of funding (Dieter and Kumar 2008).
An excellent example of this is from my personal research after the 2010 Haiti
earthquake: there was a massive amount of media attention on the plight of the Haitian people
after the earthquake, with tons of supplies and hundreds of millions of dollars flowing to
charities. However, almost all of the media attention was centered on Port-au-Prince. The
epicenter of the earthquake was in Léogâne, about an hour outside of Port-au-Prince to the west.
Because of this large media focus on the capital, most INGOs stayed in Port-au-Prince, and very
few ventured far from the capital, even though the city of Léogâne was almost leveled by the
earthquake, and tens of thousands of people were displaced throughout the countryside. This led
to massive amounts of resources poured into Port-au-Prince, creating some of the unintended
consequences discussed earlier, and leading to economic dislocations of the city population. This
was an inefficient use of resources: Port-au-Prince had a glut of international aid, whereas the
countryside had large shortages of needed materials and aid. The media dictated where the aid
was most needed, and this lead to sub-optimal outcomes for aid distribution and interventions.
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What does this all mean for INGO effectiveness during interventions? The international
humanitarian aid system, the media, and donors are all factors in constraining and redirecting
INGOs away from their mandates and their effectiveness.
This subsection has discussed the large amount of external pressure placed upon INGOs,
causing their interventions to contort to these external pressures, such as donor expectations,
media pressure and other external actors.
2.4.2

Institutional Memory in INGOs

One of the key issues INGOs face in the field is institutional memory; the need for the
INGO to carry lessons learned forward if possible. Institutional memory is a key condition which
needs to be filled for an INGO to be able to engage in effective interventions. The longer an
INGO is able to work in a state (some INGOs have been around for more than a century), they
are able to gain institutional memory of those states: local culture, contacts, formal and informal
institutions, and the like. States have excellent institutional memory: collating and storing
demographic information is a basic function of a state, and the ability to engage with local
communities and sub-state actors is another basic function. INGOs, on the other hand, do not
have the same abilities to collate institutional memory as states do. Even worse, INGOs
sometimes lack the ability to hold onto institutional memory at all due to volunteer staff
turnover, working in a new state, and so on. Institutional memory is vital to an INGO, though,
because without it, each time an INGO goes into a disaster scenario, the INGO can only start
with the institutional memory of other external actors which have worked in the state in question.
Without institutional memory, the INGO must reinvent the wheel with every new
disaster. One of the major challenges that a number of INGOs are dependent upon volunteers,
who take their institutional memory with them (Devereux 2008). Yet another reason why
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institutional memory is difficult for INGOs to keep is that those who engage in short-term
interventions rely heavily on volunteers to keep costs and overhead down, and once these
volunteers leave, they take lessons they learned with them. Good field workers and institutional
memory, therefore, are critical for understanding field mistakes and better management practices
(Heyns 1996). INGO field workers are the keys to institutional memory, and every effort should
be used to retain these individuals for their lessons learned, if at all possible (Raymond-McKay
and Maclachlan 2000). The literature discusses institutional building of INGOs or in most cases
the lack thereof are major roadblocks to effective work in deployments and implementations
(Twigg and Steiner 2002). The importance of this institutional and organizational learning
cannot be overstated (Bloch and Borges 2002).
How would an INGO retain institutional memory in the field? It would be advisable for
INGOs to engage in research before the intervention begins. Research is required not only before
the intervention but also during and after the intervention. Research can begin building the bonds
of trust required for community buy-in and can help determine criteria for each of Egan’s
measurements for intervention success. Research can also determine what the most appropriate
interaction with the state needs to be. The field work of this research has shown that the research
and assessment of many INGOs is woefully inadequate and attempts to look for what the INGO
already knows, reinforcing their own prejudices and concepts. Research, properly executed, can
produce long-term results for the INGO that would produce best practices for the INGO both
during the intervention and for the next interventions that the INGO engages in.
Another excellent way for an INGO to retain institutional memory would be to build and
strengthen bonds with the state itself. As discussed earlier, the state contains excellent
institutional memory that INGOs can draw from during interventions.
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2.5

Conclusion

To understand why best practices during disaster scenarios fall short, this chapter first
discussed the current system of international humanitarian interventions. Then the unintended
consequences of these interventions were discussed to detail how interventions can fail even with
the best of intentions. The chapter continued with an analysis of why INGOs are set up to fail:
external pressures on INGOs and institutional memory of INGOs means that before the INGO
even begins the intervention, all of these factors are present, and then the INGO is required to
take on functions that states usually take on in the back end. This is a monumental set of
variables and objectives which must be crossed off or contained before the intervention can even
begin. The reason best practices fall short during disaster scenarios is that a capable state is
needed to maximize how humanitarian aid is delivered. INGOs which have a capable state to
work with can overcome some of the external and internal factors which were discussed in this
chapter: if there is no capable or viable state, state functions must be replicated, or another
external actor must create some state-like functions to increase optimization and efficiency. The
two solutions proposed in the next two chapters attempt to address this issue: local community
buy-in and a half way house scenario are both solutions which can replicate or supplant the
weakened state post-disaster. The next chapter will discuss the necessity of local buy-in, which
can also be facilitated by a capable state.
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3

SOLUTION 1: LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN LIEU OF A STRONG STATE
3.1

Introduction

As discussed in the introduction and the previous chapter, INGO interventions after
disasters fail because the lack of state capacity isn’t taken into account, leading to increased
chances of failure. The previous chapter discussed the issues INGOs face with respect to
adapting to local conditions, and why it is exceedingly difficult for INGOs to fulfill their
mandates in post-disaster scenarios. In this chapter and the following chapter, I argue that there
are two solutions INGOs can implement that takes into account such problems and concerns.
This chapter will cover the first of these solutions: local community buy-in. As discussed
in the first chapter, local community buy-in is one of the keys to a successful intervention, as
local communities will only consider themselves stakeholders when they feel the INGO has
empirical legitimacy (Krasner and Risse 2014). The lack of state capacity can be partially
supplanted by local community buy-in and empowerment if implemented appropriately. If the
local community feels that they are stakeholders in the intervention, they will both actively work
with the INGO and this grants the INGO legitimacy in the community’s eyes, creating a positive,
self-reinforcing cycle that benefits all actors. This gives the INGO access to local knowledge and
institutions, a key state capacity function which gives the intervention a higher chance of success
if executed appropriately.
Without a viable state or a state with internal or external legitimacy, INGOs can also
ignore or bypass local communities during their work. This is because local communities have
no feedback mechanism for accountability regarding INGOs, and INGOs have no real need to
consider the needs of the local community. A capable state or an external actor supplanting the
state could impose accountability and transparency measures on INGOs, could act as a
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coordination mechanism for humanitarian relief, and could also keep successful INGOs from
having to replicate state functions. Even if the state or external actor could not fully impose these
measures, they could increase the transaction and operation costs for INGOs which choose to
flout the state or external actor.
This chapter provides an extensive case analysis of Haiti and demonstrates the evolution
of the current kleptocratic state. This analysis demonstrates that local community empowerment
can supplant the weak or nonexistent state, replicating some state functions to allow for INGO
intervention success. By giving local communities the tools and resources needed for their local
problems and giving these communities a stake in the intervention itself, positive results can be
achieved. This is also an effective method for an INGO to gain legitimacy with the local
community, which is vital for long-term success. This research also shows that when INGOs
chose not to replicate state functions and ignored local communities they were doomed to fail.
The case analyses clearly demonstrate that without an effective state, local community
empowerment is a viable alternative to a lack of state capacity. This ties into the overall
argument of this dissertation: local community empowerment is a viable solution to weakened
state capacity in post-disaster scenarios, and those INGOs which engage in local community
empowerment see a higher success rate than those that don’t.
Both the Haiti and East Timor case analyses demonstrated that local community buy-in is
an effective means of supplanting weakened state capacity. Both the case analyses also
demonstrate the serious obstacles INGOs have in engaging in community buy-in. An excellent
example of why local community buy-in is difficult is a problem that plagues many
interventions: the wealth gap between the INGOs and the country being intervened in. Western
aid workers enter a disaster zone where their monetary currency goes far further than it would in
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their home countries. This allows aid workers to live in conditions that are far superior to those
of the people they are in the country to purportedly help and leads to the perception that they
should fear the locals. This fear of the locals places a massive hamper on the ability of INGOs to
attempt to gain community buy-in. In both East Timor and Haiti, with large amounts of Western
money pouring into the country, the large amounts of hard currency produced inflation in basic
products such as food and water. To the locals, this flaunting of Western wealth also produced
harsh complaints from locals who consistently saw white Land Cruisers in Dili and Port-auPrince, a city which didn’t have that many privately owned cars, exacerbating the resource gap
with a showy display of wealth (Steele 2002). This display of wealth mirrors some of the
unintended negative consequences discussed in Chapter 2. Although the INGO does not want
this to take place, this is a clear unintended consequence of a seemingly benign action. The
research observed similar issues in Haiti: white Toyota Land Rovers (donated by Japan)
peppered the city of Port-au-Prince and the outlying rural areas. The locals were none too
pleased with the flagrant display of wealth, just as the East Timorese experienced an analogous
situation. This point is further driven home by the fact that the vast majority of contracting work
for infrastructure, of which there was sufficient local capacity to contract out to the local
population, at least labor wise, went to INGOs and not to local NGOs, civil society or local
communities (Bhatia 2005).
This chapter will begin by laying down the theoretical framework of why local community
buy-in is imperative if there is not a viable state to work with. It will continue with a detailed
case analysis of Haitian state history, showing that the lack of viable state capacity is embedded
deep within Haitian history, and why most INGOs chose to bypass the weak Haitian state. Then
this chapter will discuss the Haiti case results from both an academic literature analysis along
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with original field research and will also examine examples from East Timor gleaned from that
case analysis, followed by a conclusion for the entire chapter.
3.2

The necessity of local community buy-in to replace the state

This section will discuss the absolutely necessity of local buy-in by beginning with the
concept of bottom-up empowerment in the academic literature, as this type of local participation
allows INGOs to replace or replicate state functions where needed. Where there is no state,
INGOs are forced to replicate the state: a feat that many INGOs don’t have the capacity or will to
do. This will be followed by a discussion of how INGOs can decentralize their work to improve
community buy-in followed through the investment of human capital and a discussion on the
need for a minimal state to demonstrate that states matter in emergency relief efforts.
3.2.1

Bottom-up empowerment

This research underlines the dire need to have community buy-in for a successful INGO
intervention. Bottom-up empowerment is key to the ability of an INGO to supplant a state during
a disaster scenario. This section will discuss the challenges that INGOs have in implementing
bottom-up empowerment, and also how INGOs can successfully engage in bottom-up
empowerment, given the constraints discussed in the previous chapter.
Including meaningful bottom-up participation is a general problem of many international
efforts at relief. Pouligny’s research regarding UN peacekeeping operations from a bottom-up
perspective demonstrates that local communities and people which the interventions were
attempting to help were bypassed; their input was either ignored or not requested, even though
they were the very people the intervention was purportedly there to help (Pouligny 2006). Those
interviewed by Pouligny stated that they had much to share, but no method of sharing their wants
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and needs with the intervenors (Pouligny 2006). If local communities had been given the ability
to give input into the interventions, all parties would have been more satisfied with the outcomes.
Dicklitch and Rice’s case study analysis of Mennonites engaging in ground up
development work confirmed that listening to and working with local communities is a viable
method for development work, and can even help with short-term interventions, as the
community feels that their wishes are respected and are more receptive to the INGO’s
methodology (Dicklitch and Rice 2004). In this case study, the state was studiously avoided, as it
was considered either corrupt or incompetent, leading to the Mennonites bypassing the state and
working with the local population instead. Although this was a successful intervention, not all
INGOs will have the time, patience or resources to fully interact with a community without state
assistance. Aid workers have also discussed with researchers best practices in the field, although
aid workers are only one lens of the complex situation on the ground itself (Apthorpe 2012).
Audefroy discusses best practices in regard to a specific subset of post-disaster relief: emergency
shelters (Audefroy 2010). By looking at case studies in both Asia and Latin America, Audefroy
conclusively showed that local skills and participatory processes are the major indicator of good
practices in the field (Audefroy 2010). Unfortunately, this kind of work was difficult to find
during the field research: because most of the work Audefroy looked at involved post-disaster
housing, the state was worked around instead of consulted with, leading to some failed
interventions, especially regarding land ownership, which the state would have been an excellent
resource for.
Blouin and Pallage show that local experimentation can yield beneficial intervention
results if the local community is invested in the project (Blouin and Pallage 2008). Blouin and
Pallage’s case study dealt with civil wars, where the state itself is being fought over by rival
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groups: this means that the entire project was conducted without state capacity being taken into
account. This reinforces the argument that state capacity is important: without state capacity,
INGOs were forced to work around that lack of capacity and instead use local communities as
proxies. Local experimentation can lead to successful interventions where there is no state
capacity but only by understanding that the lack of state capacity requires additional intervention
resources.
A case study on Heifer International shows that there are effective methods of
institutional learning which are based around empowering local communities, creating a good
example of a scalable solution (Dierolf et al. 2002). However, this specific method is most
effective with a model that produces self-sustaining outcomes, such as Heifer International
programs with calves and kids in the long run (Dierolf et al. 2002). Indeed, the case study
mentioned the states which the analysis was in, but no interaction with the state was mentioned
at all: this is because Heifer International avoided working with the state and instead replicated
state-like functions on the ground at the community level only. As this case study showed,
bottom-up participation can be successful even if the state isn’t involved.
Local participation can also come in the form of local NGOs. Ahmad discusses the issue
of the difficulties of being a field worker, and why working closer with Southern INGOs, which
are usually part of the local communities, can help alleviate some of those problems (Ahmad
2002). Menocal and Rogerson also show that Southern INGOs should be listened to for effective,
self-sustaining interventions, as without them, there will be no long-term development, again
showing the need for local community buy-in (Menocal and Rogerson 2006). Zettar also states
that Southern INGOs are the key to ensuring long-term sustainability of development projects
(Zetter 1996). Ntata shows that secondments can be used to improve and strengthen local NGO
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capacity in emergency situations and recommends this to bolster the ability of local INGOs when
needed by giving local capacity a boost with an international worker who has experience in
similar situations (Ntata 2007).
Burstein shows that local experimentation, if community-driven, can yield beneficial
development results as well (Burstein 2009). However, Hilhorst discusses how bottom-up
development, although it has some promise, rests on some inaccurate assumptions that revolve
around the attitudes and culture of the INGOs in question, and these attitudes usually involve
marginalizing or ignoring the very population that the INGO is attempting to intervene with
(Hilhorst, Christoplos, and Van Der Harr 2010). Successful interventions will revolve around
community-driven, bottom-up interventions which gain active buy-ins by the communities and
the state as discussed earlier in this research.
People participation has been a standard idea in international development circles for
decades now, but it does not always translate into real local input. Ziai speaks truth to power in
her research, showing that the community-driven development rhetoric is just that, rhetoric (Ziai
2009). Ziai states that although the rhetoric deals with community-driven development, the
actions of INGOs in the field do not match their words. Although INGOs discuss in press
releases, websites and their social media campaigns their dedication to community-driven
interventions, her research demonstrates that on the ground, the community is given little to no
input into the intervention itself (Ziai 2009). However, there are a small number of cases where
community empowerment does match actions to words, as demonstrated in this research.
The interventions which produced the best results in the field engaged in bottom-up
empowerment in every single case. If bottom-up empowerment is done in an appropriate
manner, it can pay large dividends down the road. By giving the local community training
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appropriate to the intervention and entrusting the community with the physical resources needed
for maintenance and upkeep, the intervention has a much higher probability of leaving a more
permanent and sustainable intervention.
Given the current system, INGOs are set up for ‘quick wins”; i.e. quantity over quality. In
these cases, a quick win is to produce quantifiable output regardless of utility – e.g. building a
large number of wells even if the state or the local communities neither want nor needed wells
dug or pumps installed. States and communities, however, don’t want quick meaningless wins:
they want sustainable wins. This ties into the idea that ‘emergencies’ are very short-term and
require only short-term solutions, but in fact most emergencies are no longer short term and
therefore require more thoughtful solutions. The emphasis on the number of wells drilled or the
number of schools built does not truly capture the effectiveness of the intervention nor the local
community’s need for said intervention. This sort of intervention leads instead to misallocated
resources, no community input, and extreme bitterness and anger from communities.
Interventions which are based around bottom-up, community-led interventions would alleviate
these serious issues seen in the field.
Most scholars agree that one of the key elements of INGO intervention success is local
community support. Regarding disaster scenarios, the literature gives a great deal of guidance in
regard to how to deal with ground aid responses, focusing on community based approaches when
necessary (Fernando and Hilhorst 2006). Collier states that INGOs must work with local
communities for any project to be sustainable, and this was written 20 years ago, clearly showing
that the issue has been covered for some time in the literature (Collier 1996). Krishnadas states
that people-centered governance is extremely important in regard to post-disaster reconstruction,
and INGOs should step away from governance structures to allow local communities to reassert
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themselves (Krishnadas 2008). Lane discusses how INGOs can work with local NGOs on
development projects, and how to ensure that they are able to take a community based approach
(Lane 1992). The discussion of how to scale up development INGOs deals with another issue
INGOs have, the problem of scaling pilot or innovative programs to take advantage of
economies of scale if at all possible (Edwards and Hulme 1992). The main thrust of each of these
arguments is the absolute necessity of community involvement; without it, the intervention fails.
This argument is especially strong if there is a state with low capacity: under those
circumstances, working with the local community to replace state capacity is the only viable
option for any kind of successful intervention.
3.2.2

Decentralization and replacement of the state

During disaster scenarios, INGOs sometimes make the mistake of engaging in top-down
interventions, where the main office gives specific directives to their staff in the field without
regard to local conditions. Although this could be considered more efficient and cost-effective,
this leads to missing vital information on the ground. Instead of a centralized response, some
INGOs instead use a decentralized response, focused on more local level governance and placing
authority in the hands of local partners and staff members to give them more flexibility in
fulfilling the INGO’s mandate. By decentralizing their operations, INGOs can adapt more
rapidly to changing conditions on the ground, and work with local communities more effectively.
Fonkoze, Partners in Health, and the INGOs which worked with the state for a successful
intervention all used the concept of decentralization of its operations to effectively engage in
interventions. By engaging in this process of decentralization, community buy-in becomes
paramount and a necessary portion of the intervention itself, greatly enhancing the intervention.
Although the literature refers to the process as decentralization, in essence this process is simply
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the replacement of state functions at the local level: by decentralizing the intervention, the INGO
is able to more effectively adapt to local conditions as needed. Decentralization, when done
appropriately, can lead to grassroots NGOs having a greater ability to fulfill their mandates if
their resources are not taken away from them (Keese and Argudo 2006). This contrasts with the
competing but mainstream INGO approach of centralization, and its cookie-cutter, one size fits
all approaches to massively different emergency scenarios (Stroup and Wong 2013). Wit
discusses some of the benefits community level implementations, and directly discusses the
problem of bottom-up grassroots work versus top-down centralized INGO implementations,
showing that a combination of both would yield the most beneficial results, but more emphasis
needed to be placed on the bottom-up approach than the top-down implementation itself (W. de
Wit 2002).
One-size-fits-all approaches fail more often than not in the field. Decentralization of the
intervention itself allows INGOs to avoid the cookie-cutter solutions that plague humanitarian
interventions, as one size rarely, if ever, fits all. Although Haiti and East Timor have a
substantial number of similarities, the interventions were incredibly different, requiring different
mandates, resources, personnel and everything else. What worked in East Timor would not work
in Haiti. Each intervention is unique, and cookie-cutter solutions will produce suboptimal results.
Decentralization allows for adaptation in the field to local conditions as needed, which could be
determined by prior research and also by local community participation and buy-in. By engaging
in local community participations, INGOs attempt to work around weak or non-existent state
capacity, but the large institutional barriers to creating a mini-state from scratch are usually too
high for many INGOs.
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3.2.3

Investment in human capital

Many interventions choose to spend the vast majority of resources in physical
infrastructure during emergencies: shelters, tarps, water systems, and so on. However, this is
only the first step required for successful interventions. Without investing in human capital of the
communities in question, the long-term benefits of any intervention are bound to fail. A
successful intervention would instead invest in the human capital of the community and the
surrounding communities as well. A state should have the capacity to loan the INGO the
temporary human capital needed during an intervention, but due to weak state capacity, this is
usually not the case, leaving an INGO to completely invest in human capital on its own. As
Partners in Health did in Haiti, by replicating relevant state-like functions, an intervention can
succeed without the need for specific portions of state capacity. Human capital investment is a
requirement for this: by training local communities in upkeep and maintenance or specialized
training, the INGO can create the sustainable structures it needs to leave and create a successful
intervention. Human capital is largely overlooked in humanitarian interventions, but its
crucialness cannot be understated: without an investment in human capital, interventions can not
only fail, but create and compound existing problems.
One of the major methods to ensure an excellent return on investment is to invest in human
capital alongside physical infrastructure, due to the fact that human capital has far better returns
on investment and has a multiplicative effect, assuming that this is a possibility and allowing for
this shift in the paradigm (Kaplan 2000). There is literature showing that civilians should no
longer be simply passive recipients and instead should take a more active role in regard to
protection, implementation and programming, a sentiment which bears repeating from earlier
(Bonwick 2006). If the recipients of an intervention feel that their participation matters in some
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way, they will attempt to ensure that the implementation is more to their liking, and more
effective. This is echoed by Anderson, who states that people in emergency and protracted
scenarios are a large source of human capital which can be used to more effectively distribute
and in some cases produce aid and fulfill needs, especially in regard to gray economies that arise
in these scenarios due to the myriad number of skill sets that these people will statistically have
and could turn to a positive use (Anderson 2000). Human capital investment can repay a
donation many times over and can lead to more successful INGO interventions.
3.3

The accountability deficit

In a state with high capacity, local elites and the residents of the community itself would
have a mechanism to ensure accountability with respect to INGO interventions. In regard to
services rendered, be it voting their displeasure, refusal of cooperation, or other methods of
voicing their needs and wants to the state, as detailed in Hirschman’s treatise Exit, Voice and
Loyalty (Hirschman 1970). In a state with high capacity, then, there is a much smaller
accountability deficit than there is with a state with low capacity or with an INGO which chooses
to bypass the state. When an INGO bypasses the state, they are not only able to bypass the
accountability mechanisms to the state itself, but they are also able to circumvent the
accountability mechanisms of the community, short circuiting the ability of the community to
register its displeasure with the state, due to weak state capacity. The state is no longer
responsible for the delivery of services, in essence contracting out this service delivery, to the
detriment of the community, as they have no choice over who will intervene, how long the
intervention is, or even if the external actor will listen to the community itself, leading to
ineffective interventions from the community’s perspective.
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Scott’s seminal work Seeing Like A State argues that top-down attempts at governance
usually fail due to the fact that they fail to take local culture and local society into account. This
leads to an accountability deficit similar to what was discussed earlier, as in this case the state
itself has an accountability deficit in regard to the local communities, as local culture and ties are
not taken into account. Strong states can also fail to be accountable, but this is due to a specific
state capacity weakness: the lack of accountability mechanisms inherent in weak states. As a
result, state and society are interlinked but do not completely overlap (Scott 1998). Scott
discusses a number of case studies detailing this specific issue, such as the construction of
Brasilia and the collectivization of farms in Soviet Russia. Brasilia was created specifically to
address the urban problems in other locations; the idea was to use the concept of high modernism
to create an urban paradise for the bureaucratic workers who would inhabit the city.
Unfortunately, this exclusively top-down planning did not take into account the expertise of the
local population. Instead of a vibrant urban center and a functioning city, the boulevards and
broadways were sterile and empty of people and an informal Brasilia grew up around the formal
structure of the city itself, leaving the planned portions almost entirely devoid of life (Scott
1998). The same issue of ignoring local conditions severely affected the Soviet collectivization
project as well: the Soviet government simply planted a panned, artificial set of buildings on top
of local communities and informal structures and did not take the people in the community into
account. The result: massive failure due to noncompliance of workers and ignorance of local
agricultural conditions (Scott, 1998). Scott’s book is a massive and groundbreaking critique of
the idea of high modernism: the concept that excellent planning from the top down can take into
account all that is necessary to engage in successful agricultural or city planning practices.
Instead, Scott shows that the reduction of complicated issues such as collectivization and city
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planning to simple, cookie cutter solutions15 leads to a number of considerations being thrown
out that are actually needed to make the system itself work. This top-down approach to
governance means that local communities and structures are missing from the equation to the
detriment of the program in question. This also shows that without incorporating the local
community into a project, the long-term effects of the project will either be minimal, nonexistent or in the worst-case scenario, deleterious. This problem of not taking into account local
expertise is paralleled by INGOs during interventions when those who choose to bring their own
ideas of what is needed instead of actively working with the communities or the state in question.
The argument can and has been made that the entire international system itself contorts
INGOs (Cooley and Ron 2002). Although there is a method involving second-best forms of
accountability to keep donors in check, the ability of a donor to cut funding when their objectives
or needs are not fulfilled makes donor accountability very difficult in practice (Rubenstein 2007).
For instance, Rubenstein discusses the concept of surrogate accountability, and to directly quote
an example: “Donors act as surrogates for aid recipients by sanctioning NGOs that fail to meet
accepted standards of aid provision, but aid recipients cannot sanction donors”. 16 Unfortunately,
second-best forms of accountability are still deficient, although they create at least some kind of
accountability mechanism. This mirrors what happens with respect to a state weakness and
accountability: a weak state with low capacity has no direct method of enforcing accountability
on INGOs.
This has clear parallels to the relationship between an INGO and the community it is
serving: a purely top down approach without due regard for local governance structures,
capacities and knowledge is bound to fail due to this accountability deficit. Scott explicitly notes
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that without local support for any project, the project will either have no effect or will simply
fail. This can also be tied to how state capacity can contribute to this: a viable state could act as a
bridge between a local community and an INGO. In this way, the INGO can learn the local
community’s structure and intervene in an effective and efficient manner with a combination of
bottom-up and top-down knowledge, along with supplementing state capacity until the state is
able to resume its normal function.
Migdal discusses that states and societies, although interlinked, are two separate forms of
social authority that compete with other forms of social authority17 (Migdal 2001). The
individual must choose which authority to allow to influence it, and the state is simply one of
many authorities that ask individuals for their submission. Because of this, the state will
sometimes not be held accountable, as other institutions or individuals are held accountable
instead of the state, as the state is not present while other institutions and individuals affect
peoples’ lives on a daily basis. This leads to the state sometimes becoming marginalized,
especially where the state has weak local capacity. This idea that there are different forms of
social authority means that an INGO must earn the trust of the local community to be able to
effectively engage with it. Otherwise, a poorly thought out intervention can lead to the same
results that Migdal describes.
When local communities are able to hold an INGO accountable, the community can
communicate their needs and desires more effectively to the INGO. When communities buy in to
an intervention, they become stakeholders of that intervention. This leads to the community
becoming active participants in the intervention, and this can increase the success of these
interventions. Communities which are involved in these INGO interventions can act as a
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replacement for some state-like functions, allowing for a more positive and successful
intervention.
The rest of this chapter examines these arguments in the case of Haiti and, to a lesser
extent, East Timor. I show that when there is a weak state, local community buy-in can be an
effective alternative to supplant weak state capacity.
3.4

Haitian case background

The 2010 Haiti earthquake led to a massive international intervention, and a number of
analyses based around the local community buy-in for INGO interventions. This makes it an
excellent case analysis for details of community buy-in when state capacity is inadequate or nonexistent. This section will begin with an overview of the history of the Haitian state as it pertains
to the incredible weakness of the Haitian state, along with its deficiency of both internal and
external legitimacy since inception. The section will continue with an analysis of the damage
which the 2010 earthquake created and will then follow with a brief discussion of the state’s
weak capacity. The section will continue with a discussion of INGO perceptions of the Haitian
state after the earthquake, and then will move forward with a detailed analysis of INGO
interventions from the literature. The absolute requirement of local community participation for a
successful INGO intervention will be discussed in detail in this analysis, as well as the
accountability deficit regarding local communities, along with the external factors which play a
role in INGO interventions after disasters.
3.4.1

History of Haiti, Pre-colonization-2010
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Figure 2: Map of Haiti

Haiti is located in the Caribbean Sea on the western third of Hispaniola, which it shares
with the Dominican Republic. Haiti is approximately 27,740 square kilometers with a tropical
climate.19 Almost two-thirds of the land is used for agriculture. 20 The population of Haiti is
slightly more than 10.5 million, with more than half of the country adherents to the Roman
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Catholic faith.21 Haiti is split into 10 administrative divisions called departments, and the capital
is Port-au-Prince.22
The history of the Haitian state since independence demonstrates that the state was built
on an unstable foundation in that its leaders had to fight for both internal and external legitimacy,
with a small group of elites attempting to control the state from the beginning of independence.
Although there were small numbers of “people of color” (gens de couleur) who were free, the
French began to enact discriminatory laws against the gens de couleur to reinforce racial and
socioeconomic differences, laying down divisions based on both class and skin color in Haitian
society that still exist to this day (Girard 2005).
In 1789 the French Revolution and its ideals came to Saint-Domingue, paving the way
for the beginnings of revolution in the colony. Directly citing the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen, the gens de couleur demanded equal rights from the elites (Coupeau
2008). When this failed, a slave revolt began in 1791, which led to the Haitian Revolution.
Although the revolution was fought in fits and starts over more than a decade, the French forces
under Napoleon Bonaparte’s brother-in-law, Charles Leclerc, were defeated and driven off the
island by the end of 1803 (Girard 2005). Although the specific history of the revolution is too
detailed to fully cover in this dissertation, the end result of independence is the key takeaway:
Haiti declared its independence on January 1st, 1804, only the second country in the Western
Hemisphere to do so at that time (Coupeau 2008).
At this point, two large events led to Haiti being considered a pariah state by the
international community and directly contributed to the weakness of the nascent Haitian state:
the forced indemnity paid to France, and the massacre of all whites left in the newly independent
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nation. These two events largely shaped the next two hundred years of the Haitian state regarding
internal and external legitimacy and the overall weakness of the state with respect to its ability to
exercise its sovereignty. Although the French had been repeatedly and soundly defeated on the
battlefield, France refused to recognize the new republic, and imposed an embargo on the
country, along with the United States and Great Britain. The Haitian state negotiated with the
French government, and in 1825, it was agreed to end the embargo on the condition that Haiti
would pay France 150 million gold francs in retribution of France’s lost property, which the
French saw as land, equipment and most importantly, the lost capital invested in the former
slaves themselves (Girard 2005). This was a disastrous sum for the fledging country, forcing the
Haitian government to take out several high interest loans to cover this debt which would have
grave repercussions later in its history. Although this was reduced later to 90 million francs, the
Haitian government was still forced to borrow money and was unable to fully pay off this debt
until 1947.23 This event therefore made the new republic an international outcast, starved for
external legitimacy. On the flip side, the Haitian peasantry felt the state had betrayed the ideals
of the revolution, leading to a consistent crisis of internal legitimacy as well.
The second major event directly after the revolution which caused large disruptions was
the massacre of all white people in the country24. Dessalines ordered that all whites were to be
killed, women included unless they married Haitian men, and any white children were also put to
death (Girard 2005). Even though the order was sent to all urban regions of Haiti, Dessalines
himself rode to the cities to ensure his order was enforced. By the end of the massacre, almost
every white man in Haiti had been cut down, along with all women and children. Dessalines
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chose not to hide this massacre: on the contrary, he sent out an official proclamation informing
the entire world of what had transpired in Haiti. Unfortunately for Haiti, this had a chilling effect
on Haiti’s relations with other countries: specifically, the United States did not recognize Haiti
until the middle of the American Civil War due to the fact that this massacre convinced slave
owners in the American South that any kind of emancipation would end with violent genocide
for the white slave masters (Abbott 2011). To quote from Senator Thomas Hart Benton of
Missouri in 1826, ‘We receive no mulatto consuls or black ambassadors from Haiti. And why?
The peace of eleven states will not permit the fruits of a successful Negro insurrection to be
exhibited among them.”25 This resistance to Haitian independence by the Unites States was only
overcome during the American Civil War, and Haiti was recognized by the United States in 1862
(Dubois 2012). Due to these two intertwined events, the Haitian state started its existence under a
great deal of debt to other countries and as an international pariah due to the massacre of 1804.
This left the newly independent state at the mercy of both its creditors and great powers who
wished to use the new state to their advantage, which they did repeatedly throughout its history.
Because of this, the Haitian state started out very weak from its inception and encouraged
consistent kleptocratic tendencies in the elites of the country along with downright fear from
other states, a massive crisis of external legitimacy. From the declaration of independence on
January 1st, 1804, Haiti has struggled to retain a stable state (Fatton Jr 2002).
The United States was concerned about German influence in Haiti in the early 20 th
century. German communities controlled a great deal of the commerce in Haiti, and in 1915, the
United States government invaded and occupied Haiti under the pretext of collecting debt owed
by the Haitian state to American banks. The United States Marines landed in Port-au-Prince in
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1915 and the United States, in essence, annexed Haiti until 1934 (Schmidt 1995). The American
authorities forced a sham plebiscite for a constitution in 1918, and the occupying authorities
attempted to modernize Haitian infrastructure by using poor workers and peasants to build roads
in lieu of paying tax. Although uncoordinated groups of rebels attempted to attack the American
Marines to liberate the country, they were repulsed and destroyed as an effective fighting force
by 1920 (Schmidt 1995), leaving the Americans in full control of Haiti, demolishing Haitian
state capacity in the process. This certainly left Haiti with both internal and external legitimacy
issues. When the Americans departed in 1934, they left better infrastructure, education and
public health systems along with some agricultural development in Haiti. However, they also left
a problem that would crop up time and again in the 20th and 21st centuries for Haiti: the
centralization of what little state power there was in Port-au-Prince at the expense of the other
departments (Schmidt 1995). By leaving Port-au-Prince as the major focus of any state power,
the departments were left to fend for themselves.
The occupation also left a truly national police force trained by the Marines, the Garde
d’Haiti, as opposed to regional forces that had plagued Haiti before. By 1934, with the
Americans leaving, Haiti had settled into some stability, with an impartial, internal police force
to maintain internal order. This brief window of the emergence of a potentially stable state with
high capacity was not to last. Presidents rose and fell until 1957 when Francois Duvalier, a
medical doctor and public health activist, managed to secure himself the presidency and his
followers also gained two-thirds of the National Assembly and all the Senate seats. Previously a
Minister of Health, there was great hope, both locally and internationally, that he would be able
to fix Haiti’s myriad problems. As was so often the case in Haitian history, Francois “Papa Doc”
Duvalier instead consolidated power in the presidency and became one of the worst dictators of
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the 20th century with respect to corruption, repression and egregious human rights violations
(Abbott 2011; Coupeau 2008; Fatton Jr 2002). Soon after assuming office, he banned opposition
political parties, repressed independent newspapers and harassed or arrested opposition to his
rule.
Duvalier had paid close attention to his predecessors and took steps to ensure he did not
make their mistakes. After a failed 1958 coup, in 1959 Duvalier created the Tonton Macoute, a
Haitian paramilitary force he used to keep an iron grip on the Haitian population and by
extension the state (Abbott 2011; Girard 2005). Although the police and military still existed
under his rule, the Macoutes ensured that obedience was paid directly to Duvalier, and all other
loci of power bowed to him through intimidation, fear and the terror tactics used by the
Macoutes. This allowed Duvalier and his elite allies to loot the state, as so many of his
predecessors had done. This was a further refinement of the kleptocracy that had started since the
birth of the state itself; however, it must be made clear that Duvalier’s rule was a cult of
personality, and not beholden to the state in the slightest. His harsh rule led to a massive
emigration of educated Haitians, exacerbating Haiti’s problems and mirroring other developing
countries’ issues. For the average Haitian citizen, life under Papa Doc was a brutal struggle for
survival while a small elite concentrated a great amount of wealth in their hands, reinforcing the
kleptocracy and the looting of any state capacity for the elites as opposed to the general
population. Distrust of the state would be a grievous understatement: the state was a police state
used to enforce and enrich Duvalier’s will, no others.
Duvalier built a cult of personality around himself and his family, painting himself on the
same level as a loa, a god of Haitian Vodou, and at the right hand of Jesus Christ, which given
Haiti’s Catholic history and population, served to reinforce his personal rule (Fatton Jr 2002).
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His government became a nest of corruption and most importantly he used patronage politics to
replace the old elites who had controlled Haiti since the beginning of the country itself, allowing
him to further consolidate his power (Girard 2005). Migration to Port-au-Prince under the
Duvalier regime, coupled with a kleptocratic government which did not enforce building
regulations, led to weaknesses in state capacity and unsafe construction in the capital (Tobin
2013). These unenforced building codes would haunt the capital during the 2010 earthquake:
many houses and structures were simply not up to code, and this is one of the major reasons for
the widespread destruction of the earthquake.
When Duvalier died in 1971, power passed to his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, dubbed
Baby Doc. Due to his father’s changes to the Haitian constitution, Baby Doc Duvalier was
handed almost absolute control over the country at the age of 19. Although foreign governments
gave Baby Doc Duvalier the benefit of the doubt compared to his father, he continued the
kleptocratic government his father had put into place (Abbott 2011). In 1985, revolts began in
the departments, and by 1986 Baby Doc Duvalier was forced into exile and left Haiti in that
same year, although his history with Haiti does not end at this point.
After 1986, there were four years of massive instabilities while the 1986 constitution was
written and promulgated: a military junta attempted to keep a lid on the political instability and
violence, with elections canceled in 1987, and the 1988 presidential elections boycotted by
almost all of the candidates (Abbott 2011; Fatton Jr 2002). In 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a
Roman Catholic priest, won the presidential election by a large percentage, with international
observers stating that the elections were mostly fair and free (Dubois 2012). Although there was
international hope that Aristide would help guide Haiti to a more democratic state, the military
disagreed. Aristide was considered a radical populist, and he was overthrown in a coup d’état by
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the military in 1991. This military rule lasted until 1994, when Aristide returned, backed by an
international force led by American troops, and the 1995 election led to Rene Preval being
elected (Dubois 2012). In February 1996, Aristide stepped down and Preval took his place,
making it the first time in Haitian history that a peaceful transition between two democratically
elected presidents had ever taken place.
By 1999, Preval ruled by decree, as the legislative branch’s terms had all expired.
Electoral troubles continued into 2000, where Aristide was elected to a second term but the
opposition had chosen to boycott the elections (Fatton Jr 2002). By this point, Aristide was
accused of allowing drug trafficking to flourish in Haiti, and Aristide was again thrown out by a
coup in 2004 organized by rebels and possibly the American government. By this point, the
government was taken over by the Supreme Court Chief Justice, who asked the United Nations
to deploy an international peacekeeping force, given that the UN had previously been in Haiti in
1993 after Aristide’s resignation. For most of the history of Haiti, international interventions
were the norm, not the exception to the state: the international system and specific states within
that system imposed their will upon the state, which usually lacked the resources to resist. This
led to an erosion of external legitimacy, which spiraled into an internal erosion of legitimacy, a
cycle which continues to this day.
This temporary UN peacekeeping force became MINUSTAH 26 in 2004, which was
replaced by MINUJUSTH in 2017 with a force strength of 1,626 personnel at the time of this
writing.27 MINUSTAH was specifically mandated to assist the transitional government in
ensuring a secure and stable environment, reformation of the Haitian National Police (HNP), and

26

MINUSTAH is an acronym for the French name of the mission: Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilization en
Haiti.
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https://minujusth.unmissions.org/en/mandate
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other state capacity building mandates.28 Although these international troops managed to
stabilize the Haitian state, the situation continued to deteriorate. Peacekeepers were accused of
shooting down protesters, and clashes between the police and civilians were common. The
interim government pushed for elections, and these took place in February 2006, wherein Rene
Preval managed to receive a second term, which expired in 2011. Riots and protests continued
throughout his entire presidency, and the Haitian government was in tatters by the time the
earthquake hit on January 12th, 2010.
This brief discussion of Haitian history has illustrated the factors that have shaped the
modern Haitian state which faced the massive disaster of the 2010 Haitian earthquake. The
Republic of Haiti since independence has had 23 different constitutions, with the most recent set
of amendments passed in 2012, which in all actuality led to a further fragmenting and dissolution
of state power. The most current constitution, although a de jure work of art, functions poorly in
Haiti due to several factors, not least being the inability of the state to function effectively and an
ingrained kleptocracy. Although Haiti has had democratic elections and peaceful transfers of
power, these have been few and far between. Instead, financially indebted to creditors and
invaded by other powers, Haiti has been forced to chart a course between leviathans for most of
its existence. Instead of serving the general population, the state has been constructed to serve
the small set of elites who trade power back and forth to the detriment of the state itself.
Corruption, cronyism and patronage have eroded the confidence in the Haitian state. Although
Haiti is trying to move away from kleptocracy, the journey was not complete by the time of the
earthquake. Internal and external legitimacy issues continue to plague Haiti, and due to this,
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donors were very hesitant to give money directly to the Haitian government, instead choosing to
distribute aid through INGOs.
3.4.2

The 2010 earthquake and its aftermath

External actors wishing to intervene in Haiti, from donors to the UN to INGOs, felt that
the intertwined issues of severe state weakness and a kleptocratic government meant that the best
way to work in the country was to bypass the state apparatus itself. Because the state was so
weak, the state was unable to coordinate the large numbers of external actors entering the
country, nor was it able to provide effective feedback mechanisms or act as a bridge between
local communities and INGOs, forcing INGOs to replicate state functions if there was to be any
chance of success.
Against this backdrop of a weak state and a kleptocracy, the earthquake struck. The 2010
earthquake took the fragile Haitian state and almost destroyed it. Given the issues Haiti faced
before this natural disaster, the earthquake only exacerbated them. Although the earthquake’s
epicenter was near the city of Léogâne, Port-au-Prince was most directly affected by the
powerful earthquake, leaving hundreds of thousands of Haitians homeless and in desperate need
of emergency aid. The Haitian Ministry of Health was almost destroyed, and a vast number of
public records were buried or destroyed in the earthquake or the aftershocks as well. The iconic
Cathedral of Our Lady of the Assumption, whose gutted walls still stand in the middle of Portau-Prince, was also destroyed by the earthquake, along with the Haitian Presidential Palace 29.
MINUSTAH itself lost 96 peacekeepers, including the Force Commander of that mission. 30 In
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The researcher drove by the ruins of the Cathedral every day on the way from Port-au-Prince to Léogâne and can
attest to the veracity of the observation.
30
https://minustah.unmissions.org/en/about
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the UN’s LOGCAP31 base, within walking distance of the international airport, there is a wall
painted with the names of all the peacekeepers who died during the earthquake as a reminder to
those stationed there after the earthquake.32

33

Figure 3: Wall Memorial of fallen peacekeepers

The earthquake also damaged the seaport and airport, crippling any rapid response to the
situation from an international perspective. Telecommunications were disrupted by the
destruction of cell phone towers, water pipes were destroyed by the shifting earth, hospitals were

31

LOGCAP: Logistical Capacity
Researcher observation
33
Researcher’s photograph
32
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reduced to rubble and large numbers of roads were either blocked or made impassable by cars
and debris, making it difficult to move materials from the southern port of Jacmel or the northern
port of Govianes. These issues paralyzed the immediate response of the state. Instead, the UN,
the United States, France, and large numbers of INGOs descended upon Port-au-Prince,
attempting to achieve their policy objectives or their mandates, sometimes at cross purposes. The
United States took control of the airport at the request of the Haitian government to allow for
efficient air traffic control operations. This meant the United States could dictate who could land
at what times and turned away several INGO flights: the US wanted to restore order as quickly
as possible, and their first priority was establishing a strong security presence.
Due to the historically kleptocratic government as discussed earlier, building codes were
not enforced leading to the collapse of a substantial portion of Port-au-Prince’s buildings during
the earthquake, leaving many people without shelter and their livelihoods. Unlike in the United
States, where homes and land are bought and sold as one unit, Haitians purchase homes and land
separately. This means many Haitians either squatted on land they did not own and built
makeshift houses on this land, or they legally rented the land from a landlord and built their
house. In either case, with the destruction of the house on the land, landlords attempted to
enforce their property rights, and chased squatters off their land. Due to the destruction of several
public records, this led to questions of land ownership, as no one could be certain who owned
what parcel of land, a process still sorting itself out years after the earthquake. The earthquake
destroyed not only a great deal of wealth but also several informal arrangements and institutions
which papered over the lack of the ability to enforce legal statutes within Haiti itself. With the
logistical issues discussed above, this led to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, with hundreds

76

of thousands of people without shelter or the necessities of life, compounded by weak state
capacity.
The good intentions of the relief interventions led to unexpected and unintended
consequences. Due to the control of the airport, the United States’ international development
agency, USAID, engaged in what could be considered a questionable and ultimately harmful
intervention with respect to Haitian farmers 34. USAID sent 90,000 metric tons of American rice
and corn to Haiti to be freely handed out to quake sufferers. However, because Haiti is a largely
agricultural country, several farmers north of Port-au-Prince were impacted by this hand out of
free rice and corn: they were attempting to sell these crops in the city themselves, and because
many farmers do not own the land they work on, they were evicted by their landlords. Because
the United States chose to import rice which was handed out for free, Haitian rice farmers in the
countryside were unable to sell their own rice: when a product is distributed for nothing, the
price for that product clearly drops or bottoms out. This was the case with rice: these farmers
were unable to pay the rent on their farmland, and this led to them being evicted. Without jobs or
money, they chose to head to Port-au-Prince to find employment and sometimes ended up in tent
cities, although the earthquake didn’t directly impact them at all. The outsized influence of
external actors regarding the situation on the ground, and the powerlessness of the northern
agrarian communities led to the United States using Haiti as a location to dump excess American
crops to ensure American farmers did not take losses, but this had the unintended consequence of
ruining Haitian livelihoods who had not been affected by the quake.
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Focusing more specifically on water purification and distribution, DINEPA 35, the Haitian
state’s National Directorate for Water Supply and Sanitation in the Ministry of Public Works,
was hit hard by the earthquake as well, with shattered pipes littering Port-au-Prince and capacity
greatly diminished, even though the capacity for water distribution was already inadequate
before the earthquake. Although DINEPA has attempted to expand water purification and
distribution throughout Haiti since the 1950s, most of the population gets their water from either
water sellers on the street or from private companies who sell purified water in bulk in small
plastic bags called sachets. Sachets hold about nine fluid ounces of water, and three sachets
usually sell for five gourdes (approximately 10 cents US at the time of this writing). Because of
DINEPA’s lack of penetration regarding water distribution, water sachets were and still are the
go to for quick clean water needs both before and after the earthquake, but this is clearly not a
long-term solution to the water situation on the ground. DINEPA lacked the institutional capacity
to deliver water even before the earthquake: after the earthquake, it was entirely unable to do so,
and other non-state institutions, both internal and external, took over water purification and
distribution. These internal providers were mostly individuals selling water on the street, or
private water companies shipping water to where it was ordered, bypassing state infrastructure.
In many cases, water was simply collected directly from a river or stream. Most of the water
system was privatized due to the gutting of the state by neoliberal policies.
Before entering the field, the researcher reached out to DINEPA staff in Port-au-Prince.
As discussed in the history of Haiti, state power was usually concentrated in the capital and
rapidly declines from that center. This was exemplified by DINEPA itself: although it had an
office in Port-au-Prince, its reach and authority were weak even in the capital itself. There were
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Acronym used in Haiti due to the French name of this state agency: Direction Nationale d’Eau Potable et
d’Assainissement and will be used for the rest of the dissertation.
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pipes still broken from years past, gushing out uncleaned water onto the muddy streets of the
city. Making an appointment to meet with DINEPA was relatively simple: most Haitians in Portau-Prince know of DINEPA as the agency engaged in infrastructure work around the city. The
office was in a non-descript office park, and it was easy to walk directly in and talk with the
DINEPA representatives. The layout was what one would expect in a typical office building:
cubicles for civil servants, name plates for identification, filing cabinets, and so on. After some
initial confusion as to the purpose of the visit, the professional staff quickly pulled up where the
DINEPA agent was in Léogâne. After the researcher discussed his reasoning for the visit, the
staff eagerly dove into their Port-au-Prince work, how much water DINEPA pumped and
purified each day, and so on. However, when asked for contact information for the agent in
DINEPA, the staff demurred: confirming the researcher’s fears, the staff stated that the
information for those ‘out in the field’36 was out of date. After some back and forth, the staff told
the researcher that the information should be on DINEPA’s website. As the researcher didn’t
have internet access at that point, goodbyes were exchanged, and the researcher set out for
Léogâne.
On the road to Léogâne, the researcher managed to gain internet access 37 and managed to
pull up a very rough idea of where the Léogâne DINEPA office was. The researcher spent
several hours attempting to find this office: in typical Haitian fashion, when not able to find
something, the researcher’s translator asked the citizens of Léogâne where the office was. The
citizens met the question with open skepticism or outright laughter: it turned out that although
the Port-au-Prince office listed a DINEPA office in Léogâne, the actual office or civil servants
didn’t exist in the city. This is an excellent demonstration of capacity fading rapidly as one
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DINEPA’s wording
Thank you, T-Mobile
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leaves the capital, where capacity is highest. Whether the office was intentionally left empty, or
was staffed but the office was elsewhere, or whether the civil servants in question were on the
government payroll but didn’t have an actual job is unknown, but the fact that they weren’t in the
city at all speaks volumes. It is difficult for DINEPA to produce and broadcast advice if there is
no one in the field to do so. Without infrastructure or any kind of human state capacity, INGOs
working outside the capital were forced to work entirely on their own or with at most minimal
state cooperation.
3.4.3

Conclusion

This section has provided the historical context of the history of Haiti to demonstrate the
number of interventions that have taken place in the country and also the significant cultural and
social factors which led to the modern kleptocratic state. This context is necessary to understand
the degree of state weakness that INGOs needed to work with after the disaster. Out of the two
cases, Haiti would be considered the worse case scenario, given its long history of international
isolation, despotism, weak state capacity and kleptocratic governance. INGOs which chose to
intervene after the 2010 earthquake had no state counterpart to work with, leading to these
INGOs bypassing the state and attempting to replace it with either their own ideas of what was
needed, or by replicating state-like functions to allow for the continued bypassing of the state.
Haiti is a strong example of a state with very low state capacity for an extended period of time.
3.5

Field research and literature examples of positive and negative local community buyin as a replacement for state functions
3.5.1

Haiti examples

As discussed above, the response to the Haitian earthquake has been largely seen as a
failure, both in the short and longer term. Why was this intervention such a failure? Given the
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weak state of the Haitian state, a successful intervention requires active inclusion and
participation of Haitians at the local level. This section looks at examples from the Haiti case
analysis of INGOs which engaged in positive and negative local community buy-in as a
replacement for state functions.
The literature discusses the failure of coordination during the emergency phase. The
perceptions of the international community colored the coordination of supplies and INGO
interventions during the immediate aftermath of the emergency (Schuller and Morales 2012).
The local population was excluded from OCHA meetings dealing with the coordination and
distribution of aid, as the meeting took place in the LOGCAP base of MINUSTAH in English
and French, a clear attempt to exclude local communities, which as discussed earlier, is a prelude
to INGO intervention failure (Schuller and Morales 2012). The local populations were not
informed or consulted at all about the interventions themselves. The local NGOs and
communities attempted to create an organization to coordinate local partners called the Haitian
Response Coalition (HRC), but their efforts were quickly sidelined as many of the members
were banned entry into the LOGCAP base, where the meetings were taking place (Schuller and
Morales 2012).
This can be personally attested to by my research: I was never questioned when I tried to
enter the LOGCAP base. In fact, I was on more than one occasion mistaken for a UN officer sent
from New York! I had used my UN ECOSOC badge as my ID, and due to that badge alone they
waved me through security without sending me through the metal detector or even giving me a
pat down. The badge alone (which was only for access to UN headquarters in New York and
granted me no authority whatsoever) was more than enough for them to ignore security
procedures. On the other hand, my translator was barred entry: an irony that was not lost on him.

81

The HRC was in a unique position to deliver aid to the communities hardest hit, but were
unable to do so:

“In the first days after the earthquake, the coalition’s member organizations had difficulty
sending aid, blocked from landing planes in Port-au-Prince by the US government, which
controlled the airport and initially gave priority to troop deployments and the delivery of military
equipment. But even when the transportation lines were loosened, the aid has come slowly, and
Ruth [a Haitian community organizer with the HRC] has helped organize more camps than she
has aid to deliver. Meanwhile, the well-heeled relief aid agencies have often ignored camp
committees, and conditioned handouts on the presence of US or UN troops.” 38
INGOs made clear their fear of the people they were there to help, clearly showing their
perceptions of the state and the culture. INGOs kept most of their staff to Petionville 39, travelled
in large SUVs and enforced a curfew of 6 PM for their international staff. This perception of a
lawless community full of looters and thieves reinforced in the minds of these INGOs their
perception of a weak, kleptocratic and lawless state which they needed to avoid and bypass
(Schuller and Morales 2012). Even though the UN mission was ostensibly there to provide
security, the INGOs’ perception of Haiti led them to take their own draconian precautions. This
perception of a weak or non-existent present and future state led these INGOs to bypass the state
itself. Many INGOs chose not to replicate any state-like functions or cooperate with their aid
recipients. Without replication of state-like functions, and without any community buy-in, these
INGOs chose instead to simply act as aid delivery services, ignoring the local communities and
instead bowing toward their donors’ will instead. This failure to work with the community and
failure to replicate state functions always led to INGO intervention failure.
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Schuller and Morales, pg. 48.
The wealthiest portion of Port-au-Prince; e.g. Manhattan in New York City or Buckhead in Atlanta.
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Due to the shift in funding described in the literature review at the end of the Cold War,
increased portions of funding bypassed the host state and went to INGOs instead. Due to the
massive number of INGOs which came into Haiti, the state was dubbed “The Republic of
NGOs” by international and domestic groups (Schuller and Morales 2012). As INGO entered
Haiti and began spending large amounts of American dollars, Haitian government workers fled
their jobs to the higher-paying jobs of the INGOs, strongly distorting the labor market and
leading to the unintended negative consequences discussed earlier (Schuller and Morales 2012).
The academic literature is almost unanimous in its agreement of the poor INGO response
to the aftermath of the earthquake by almost all external actors. Primary sources and diaries
reveal that the physical conditions of the tent cities in Haiti were inadequate at best, and the
people living in those tent cities were very unhappy with the response, stating that they were not
consulted on anything regarding the intervention itself (Schuller and Morales 2012). As many
camp occupants stated, they felt they’d been forgotten by the international community,
abandoned by the state, and cut out of the very aid distribution that they were supposed to be the
recipients of (Schuller and Morales 2012). In this case, the research conducted demonstrates that
the local communities felt that they were not consulted at all by either INGOs or the state itself,
leaving no mechanism for reporting or accountability in the field.
The literature generally regards the international intervention in Haiti after the earthquake
as a failure, with some few and far in between exceptions. A closer look at this literature is
warranted. Zanotti discusses the decrease in institutional state capacity after the Haitian 2010
earthquake, specifically the need for service delivery and infrastructure maintenance, and that
these fragile state institutions were even further subsumed by international strategies which
promoted INGOs as substitutes for the state, actively undermining the already weak state
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(Zanotti 2010). Because these INGOs perceived the state’s capacity as very low, the INGO
didn’t coordinate or work with the state, leading to a further decrease in state capacity, leaving
communities affected worse off than when the intervention took place (Zanotti 2010).
The literature states that after the 2010 earthquake, most aid was filtered through INGOs
with little to no accountability to local communities to their detriment (O’Connor, BrissonBoivin, and Ilcan 2014). Carlin et al specifically discuss the implications of the perceptions of
state capacity, but from a community perspective: because Haitians saw that INGOs were doing
most of the reconstruction and relief work, trust in the state itself decreased as displayed by a
decrease in interpersonal trust. This drop in trust in turn reinforced many INGOs’ negative
perceptions of the state as an institution which should not be worked with (Carlin, Love, and
Zechmeister 2014).
Jonathan Katz, the AP reporter, was in Haiti during the earthquake, and produced a firsthand account of the immediate aftermath of the earthquake and the many INGO interventions
soon afterward. His observations closely match the academic literature: the weak state meant that
INGOs, who had already been in Haiti for years before the earthquake, had free rein to engage in
whatever interventions they wanted to. INGOs rarely, if ever, chose to work with the state or
local communities, instead assuming that their work would be appreciated and also could be
maintained without the state itself, although most if not all of the INGOs assumed that the state
was kleptocratic, weak, nonexistent, or some combination thereof (Katz 2013). His book covers
similar issues to academic literature: INGOs coming to help without having adequate knowledge
of local customs, culture or language, avoiding or ignoring the state, not replicating state-like
functions when needed and not asking the local community for direction. Most importantly, Katz
discusses the fact that most of the INGOs assumed weak state capacity and actively chose to
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bypass the state, instead trying to fulfill their own mandates and objectives without looking at the
strategic picture, creating chaos, overlap of INGOs fighting over turf, and many communities
simply forgotten (Katz 2013). Katz interviewed dozens of camp residents, who all discussed
similar results of these INGOs: a quick, brief intervention, money drying up, and no state coming
in to help. In fact, in many cases, the only time the state was seen by these tent cities was when
the residents of the tent cities were evicted by the Haitian National Police, as the landlords of the
squatted land called in political favors to remove the victims (Katz 2013). Katz states repeatedly
that INGOs came to Haiti with some of the best intentions, but due to these factors, the
interventions usually left the communities they were purporting to serve worse off (Katz 2013).
Other academic literature makes a similar point: tent cities were thought to be temporary
but without state support for new housing, these tent cities became permanent, leading to
massive water and sanitation issues due to funding drying up for emergency aid INGOs
operating the camps around 6 months after the earthquake (Polyne 2013). Residents of the tent
cities complained that although the INGO left physical infrastructure behind, they did not give
the community any skills to keep any programming going at the exit of the INGO, leaving empty
shells with the INGO’s logo on it, but nothing else (Polyne 2013). Here, those INGOs which
bypassed the state but didn’t replicate any state-like functions or work with the local community
sowed the seeds for their own intervention failure. During this crisis, INGOs and UN agencies
filled in gaps left by the state such as the health care system, shelters, water, sanitation, hygiene,
and the like. However, INGOs did not provide security for the citizens of Haiti, as a state would,
nor did they engage in large public works projects, as a state would.
Amy Wilentz, through her personal travels in Port-au-Prince before and after the
earthquake, unearthed similar issues: her work focused on the myriad mistakes Sean Penn made
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when the actor chose to directly intervene in Haiti, strongly demonstrating the ability of an
INGO with money to completely circumvent the state as needed without the replication of statelike functions necessary for a successful intervention (Wilentz 2013). Again, due to the
perceptions of the INGOs, other actors chose to work around the state, leading to negative and
unintended consequences for the recipients of aid: in the case of Penn’s community, the
community was moved to a different location per another INGO’s recommendation, with the
land they were moved to in a much worse situation than they were in before, to their chagrin
(Wilentz 2013).
To complement the academic literature, the researcher engaged in months of field
research in Haiti to gain a more nuanced perspective on these interventions: there was very little
bottom-up research done by other academics after the earthquake. Bottom-up research involves
the communities directly affected by the earthquake as opposed to state officials, UN officials or
INGO staffers. Most of the literature as listed earlier in this chapter focused on the large
response and the interventions of major external actors, such as the UN, states, and large INGOs.
Given this gap, the researcher engaged in field work to ascertain if there were any nuanced
differences between the literature’s conclusions of the intervention, and the recipients of the aid
themselves.
As discussed in the introduction chapter, I engaged in months of field work in Haiti to
look at INGO interventions after the 2010 Haiti earthquake dealing with the crucial issue of
water provision. Most INGO interventions in Haiti regarding water revolved around two types of
water systems: hand pumps and foot pumps. There are some differences between these two
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pumps that must be discussed. A typical hand water pump looks as such:

40

Figure 4: Typical water hand pump

There are a few advantages to using a hand pump: the parts are relatively inexpensive,
and it is possible with some work to find local parts to replace when parts on the hand pump
break. However, because hand pumps are cheaper to produce than foot pumps, they break more
rapidly. Children sometimes play with the pump, accelerating the breakage.
A typical foot water pump looks as such:

40

Researcher’s photograph

87

41

Figure 5: Typical water foot pump

A foot water pump is more expensive to install, and the parts for repair are not locally
available. Foot pumps can last longer, and it is more difficult for children to play with the foot
pump, leading to a longer life span. However, once a foot pump breaks, a specific part inside
must be replaced, or the entire pump cannot function, as opposed to a hand pump, which can be
jury-rigged depending on which part breaks.
A few typical examples are in order here to show the usual type of INGO intervention,
which all failed to engage in local community support. In order to measure the degree of
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involvement of local communities, I conducted a detailed survey of water projects in 48
communities with respect to use of local labor, consultation with local communities on details of
the projects and how the project fared in the long run. The tables below summarize the results of
the survey and show clearly that the majority of INGOs operating in this heavily affected part of
Haiti both failed to gain buy-in from local communities and produced malfunctioning water
systems. Table 2 lists the length of the INGO deployment, whether the INGO utilized local labor
or not, and if the INGO trained the community in maintenance and repair of the water system.
Table 3 lists whether the INGO left spare parts for the water system, if the INGO asked for
permission to conduct the intervention, and if the INGO asked the community for a suitable
location for the intervention. Table 4 lists the number of times the water system has broken since
the intervention, if the water system was broken at the time of the research, and if the INGO
estimated the water table for the system inappropriately. Table 5 lists whether the INGO used
plastic or metal piping, whether the INGO chose to follow up after the completion of the
intervention, and finally any notes on the specific community and water system for each
intervention.
Table 2: INGO Intervention List 1 – Length of Deployment, Use of Local Labor and Training
Community
ID
A1
A2
A3
B1

Year of
Deployment
2012
2010
2012
2012

B2

2012

INGO
FASI
Terre des Hommes
Sache/ Water for Life
Save the Children/ Comme
il Faut
JEM

Length of
Deployment
2-3 years
6 months
8 days
6 days

Local
Labor?
No
No
No
No

Training?

3 months

No

Yes

Yes
Yes
No
No
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B3

2010

IAJ, Haut Rich

6 months

No

No

B4

2013

Unknown

3 weeks

No

No

B5

2011

Water for Life/Food for the
Poor

1 week

No

No

B6

2011-2012

Spanish Red Cross

6 months

Yes

No

B7
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6

2011
2015
2012
2013
2011
2010
2010

Food for the Poor
Food for the Poor
Hearts with Haiti
CARE
Unknown
ACTED
ACTED

2 weeks
2 weeks
3 months
1 month
1.5 months
3 days
6 months

No
No
No
No
No
No
No

No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No

C7

2015

Food for the Poor

6 days

No

No

D1
D2
D3
D4
D5
D6
D7
D8
D9
D10
E1

2012
2012
2011
2014
2012
2015
2013
2012
2010
2013
2012

N/A
N/A
1.5 months
2.5 weeks
1 year
Months
2 weeks
1 month
1 month
6 months
4 days

Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No

No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No

E2
E3

2012
2012

Living Water International
Unknown
JEN
Spanish Red Cross
JEN
Unknown
Unknown
UNICEF
German Red Cross
CARE
Food for the Poor/ Water
for Life
Food for the Poor
Samaritan's Purse

4 days
5 days

No
No

No
No
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E4
E5
E6

2012
2012
2011

CARE
Pumpiore Sans Frontiere
Pumpiore Sans Frontiere

1 month
15 days
20 days

Yes
No
No

No
Yes
No

E7
E8
E9
E10

2011
2013
2013
2012

Pumpiore Sans Frontiere
Pumpiore Sans Frontiere
Spanish Red Cross
International Red Cross

1 week
4 months
4 weeks
4 days

Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes
No
No
Yes

F1
F2
F3
F4

2010
2011
2012
2011

Unknown
CRW
JEN
Food for the Poor

1 week
1.5 weeks
4 days
1 month

No
No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
No

F5
F6

2015
2014-2015

Vision Church
Quebec

1 week
Months

No
Yes

No
No

F7
F8
F9
F10
F11

2015
2012
2014
2010
2012

Food for the Poor
CARE
Food for the Poor
Oxfam
Say Cee

2 weeks
1 month
2 weeks
Weeks
1.5 months

No
No
No
No
Yes

No
No
No
Yes
No

Table 3: INGO Intervention List 2 – Involvement of Community: Permission and Location
Community
ID
A1
A2
A3
B1

Year of
Deployment
2012
2010
2012
2012

B2
B3

2012
2010

INGO
FASI
Terre des Hommes
Sache/ Water for Life
Save the Children/
Comme il Faut
JEM
IAJ, Haut Rich

Spare
Parts?
Yes
No
No
No

Asked for
Permission?
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Asked for
Location?
Yes
Yes
No
No

No
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
No
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B4

2013

Unknown

No

No

No

B5

2011

Water for Life/Food
for the Poor

No

Yes

No

B6

2011-2012

Spanish Red Cross

No

Yes

Yes

B7
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6

2011
2015
2012
2013
2011
2010
2010

Food for the Poor
Food for the Poor
Hearts with Haiti
CARE
Unknown
ACTED
ACTED

No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No

C7

2015

Food for the Poor

No

Yes

No

D1

2012

No

Yes

Yes

D2
D3
D4
D5
D6
D7
D8
D9

2012
2011
2014
2012
2015
2013
2012
2010

Living Water
International
Unknown
JEN
Spanish Red Cross
JEN
Unknown
Unknown
UNICEF
German Red Cross

No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No

D10
E1

2013
2012

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

E2
E3
E4
E5

2012
2012
2012
2012

No
No
No
No

Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No
Yes

CARE
Food for the Poor/
Water for Life
Food for the Poor
Samaritan's Purse
CARE
Pumpiore Sans
Frontiere
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E6

2011

Pumpiore Sans
Frontiere

No

Yes

Yes

E7

2011

No

Yes

Yes

E8

2013

No

Yes

Yes

E9
E10

2013
2012

Pumpiore Sans
Frontiere
Pumpiore Sans
Frontiere
Spanish Red Cross
International Red
Cross

No
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

F1
F2
F3
F4

2010
2011
2012
2011

Unknown
CRW
JEN
Food for the Poor

No
Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No
Yes

F5
F6

2015
2014-2015

Vision Church
Quebec

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

F7
F8
F9
F10
F11

2015
2012
2014
2010
2012

Food for the Poor
CARE
Food for the Poor
Oxfam
Say Cee

No
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Table 4: INGO Intervention List 3 – Follow-up and Long Term Efficacy
Community
ID

Year of
Deployment

INGO

How many times
has it broken?

Broken
now?

Water
Table Issue

A1
A2
A3
B1

2012
2010
2012
2012

3
N/A
N/A
3

No
No
Yes
No

No
No
No
No

B2
B3

2012
2010

FASI
Terre des Hommes
Sache/ Water for Life
Save the Children/
Comme il Faut
JEM
IAJ, Haut Rich

3
4

No
Yes

No
No
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B4

2013

Unknown

4

Yes

No

B5

2011

Water for Life/Food
for the Poor

4

Yes

No

B6

2011-2012

Spanish Red Cross

5

Yes

Yes

B7
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6

2011
2015
2012
2013
2011
2010
2010

Food for the Poor
Food for the Poor
Hearts with Haiti
CARE
Unknown
ACTED
ACTED

3
0
1
0
2
2
1

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No

C7

2015

Food for the Poor

0

No

No

D1

2012

4

Yes

No

D2

2012

Living Water
International
Unknown

5

Yes

No

D3
D4

2011
2014

JEN
Spanish Red Cross

4
2

Yes
Yes

No
No

D5
D6
D7
D8
D9
D10
E1

2012
2015
2013
2012
2010
2013
2012

3
0
1
6
3
5
7

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
No
No

E2
E3
E4
E5

2012
2012
2012
2012

JEN
Unknown
Unknown
UNICEF
German Red Cross
CARE
Food for the Poor/
Water for Life
Food for the Poor
Samaritan's Purse
CARE
Pumpiore Sans
Frontiere

7
2
2
5

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
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E6

2011

Pumpiore Sans
Frontiere

5

Yes

No

E7

2011

3

Yes

Yes

E8

2013

2

Yes

Yes

E9
E10

2013
2012

Pumpiore Sans
Frontiere
Pumpiore Sans
Frontiere
Spanish Red Cross
International Red
Cross

2
2

Yes
No

No
No

F1
F2
F3
F4

2010
2011
2012
2011

Unknown
CRW
JEN
Food for the Poor

2
1
2
1

Yes
No
Yes
No

No
No
No
No

F5
F6

2015
2014-2015

Vision Church
Quebec

N/A
N/A

No
No

No
No

F7
F8
F9
F10
F11

2015
2012
2014
2010
2012

Food for the Poor
CARE
Food for the Poor
Oxfam
Say Cee

1
3
N/A
4
1

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

Table 5: INGO Intervention List 4 – Type of Pipe and Follow-up
Community
ID

Year of
Deployment

INGO

A1
A2
A3
B1

2012
2010
2012
2012

B2
B3

2012
2010

FASI
Terre des Hommes
Sache/ Water for Life
Save the Children/
Comme il Faut
JEM
IAJ, Haut Rich

Metal vs.
Plastic
Pipes
Plastic
Plastic
Plastic
Plastic

Follow-up
after
completion
No
No
No
No

Plastic
Plastic

No
No

Notes

Mosquito
Issues; INGO
used wrong
materials
during
construction

95
, lengthening
job

B4

2013

Unknown

Plastic

No

B5

2011

Water for Life/Food for
the Poor

Metal

No

B6

2011-2012

Spanish Red Cross

Plastic

No

B7
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6

2011
2015
2012
2013
2011
2010
2010

Food for the Poor
Food for the Poor
Hearts with Haiti
CARE
Unknown
ACTED
ACTED

Plastic
Plastic
Plastic
Plastic
Plastic
Plastic
Plastic

No
No
No
No
No
No
No

C7

2015

Food for the Poor

No

D1

2012

D2

2012

Living Water
International
Unknown

Metal,
already
showing
yellowing
Plastic

No

D3
D4

2011
2014

JEN
Spanish Red Cross

D5

2012

JEN

Metal,
water
has rust
Plastic
Metal:
pipe is
rusting
Plastic

No

No
No
No

Wrong
location, in a
road where
people get
hit
Signed
contract in
English the
community
couldn't
read; wasn't
allowed to
keep a copy
Promised 3
pumps: built
1

INGO dug
well twice;
screwed up
first dig and
had to start
over
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D6
D7
D8
D9

2015
2013
2012
2010

Unknown
Unknown
UNICEF
German Red Cross

Plastic
Plastic
Plastic
Plastic

No
No
No
No

D10
E1

2013
2012

Plastic
Plastic

No
No

E2
E3
E4
E5
E6

2012
2012
2012
2012
2011

CARE
Food for the Poor/
Water for Life
Food for the Poor
Samaritan's Purse
CARE
Pumpiore Sans Frontiere
Pumpiore Sans Frontiere

Plastic
Plastic
Plastic
Plastic
Plastic

No
No
No
No
Yes

E7
E8
E9
E10

2011
2013
2013
2012

Pumpiore Sans Frontiere
Pumpiore Sans Frontiere
Spanish Red Cross
International Red Cross

No
No
No
No

F1
F2
F3
F4

2010
2011
2012
2011

Unknown
CRW
JEN
Food for the Poor

Plastic
Plastic
Plastic
Metal;
pipe is
pumping
yellow
water
Plastic
Plastic
Plastic
Plastic

F5
F6

2015
2014-2015

Vision Church
Quebec

Plastic
Plastic

No
Yes

F7
F8
F9
F10
F11

2015
2012
2014
2010
2012

Food for the Poor
CARE
Food for the Poor
Oxfam
Say Cee

Plastic
Plastic
Plastic
Plastic
Plastic

No
No
No
No
No

No
No
No
No

Issue with
location

INGO came
back and
fixed it
several
times after it
broke

Mosquito
Issues
because of
poor
drainage
Large
project,
water
spigots
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Unfortunately, due to temporal constraints, the researcher was unable to talk to INGO
representatives themselves, but instead relied on oral testimony from intervened communities.
By far the most common intervention was where an INGO entered a community, dug a
well, installed a pump, and left. In almost every instance of this kind of intervention, the dialogue
between the community being served and the INGO consisted of asking for permission to build a
well and pump, with no follow up work or questions at all. In a few cases, one specific INGO
asked the community to sign a contract with the INGO dealing with digging the well and
installing a pump. These contracts were not in Kreyol, the dominant language for the people in
these communities. Instead, the contracts were in English, and no translators were provided. The
community was not allowed to even keep the contract in question. Several INGOs also ordered
the community to provide them with sand, cement and blocks to be used for the construction of
the pump, providing an excellent example of the lack of accountability which INGOs have
regarding the communities they intervene in. This could also be classified as bullying: without
any type of mechanism to hold the INGO accountable, the INGO was free to do as it wished
regarding the local community. In this case, the INGO left the community with no choices or any
way to discuss the situation on equal terms: instead, the INGO bullied the community into
signing something they couldn’t read. Although this is certainly an interaction with the local
community, this is not buy-in: without community involvement, these interventions failed.
Without proper design or targeting, without an appropriate execution of the intervention, without
an understanding of the project environment, and especially after the veiled extortion of the
communities these INGOs were purporting to help, these interventions could not succeed.
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If a viable state existed, some of these problems could have been alleviated. A state with
some level of capacity could have blocked an INGO’s entry if that INGO attempted to extort
local communities. The state could have also guided the INGO to other locations or could have
provided some infrastructure or supplies to ensure that the local community wasn’t being taken
advantage of. Without the state, the INGO could have also attempted to cooperate with the local
community, but as discussed earlier, there is very little incentive for the INGO to do so. The
state’s inability to coordinate, its inability to enforce its own laws, and the inability to interpose
itself between INGOs and communities led these specific INGOs to engage in their intervention
as they saw fit, to the detriment of the communities in question.
Most of the INGOs did not bring a translator to the community: instead, whoever of the
community that could speak English were assumed to be the leader of the community, and many
INGOs chose to treat that person as such, even if that person might not have been the actual
person in charge. This is usually not the case: more often than not there are other people in the
community who actually hold de facto leadership positions, whereas the English speaker can
wield disproportionate power due to his or her (usually his in Haiti) ability to talk directly with
INGO staff and circumvent other power structures within the community itself. The most
common question asked, if any, was for permission to drill. This was not a universal question: 3
INGOs (specifically, A3, B4 and E3) simply chose to begin the intervention without notifying
the community at all, leading to zero community buy-in and participation for obvious reasons.
Many communities reported that while the INGO staff engaged in their work, the community
simply watched: powerless to say or do anything at all due to the lack of translators. Because of
weak state capacity, there was no coordinating agency to point these communities out; the INGO
simply walked up to them and began their intervention without notifying OCHA or DINEPA. As
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discussed earlier, DINEPA didn’t even have a staff member in Léogâne, meaning that there was
no state to truly cooperate with. Because there was no local community buy-in to replace state
capacity, these interventions failed. A strong state could have provided lists of translators,
coordinated INGO interventions, or even attempted to bridge the cultural and linguistic gap
between these communities and the INGO itself. Because there was no strong state, these INGOs
felt the need to bypass the state and work with the local communities instead, but their local
community outreach was not sufficient to overcome the lack of state capacity.
Several INGOs made mistakes that could have been avoided with appropriate state
interaction or local community knowledge and interaction. A few examples are in order here. A
major issue leading to intervention failure which would have been easily solved with local
knowledge was elementary knowledge of water table depth in Haiti. During the field research, it
was determined that three INGOs either dug wells to an insufficient depth, or they did not lay
enough pipe to reach the water. In one specific case, the well was dug to a depth of 180 feet, but
the pipe was only laid down to a depth of 90 feet, although the water table begins at around 120
feet in this specific area of Haiti. Although both the WASH cluster and DINEPA had this
information readily available, this lack of basic local knowledge doomed the entire intervention.
If the state had sufficient capacity to make cooperation viable, the cluster and DINEPA could
have passed this information along to the INGO, as these local conditions were key to the
success of the intervention. Unfortunately, these INGOs ignored both the state and the local
community itself, leading to failure of these interventions.
Basic construction errors were rampant with respect to the interventions observed with
the research study. One intervention built a ramp up to the pump but did not build a drainage
system for the pump’s wastewater. This led to a mosquito infestation, and malaria cases were
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reported by the local community. Installed foot pumps broke, and no spare parts were left,
leading to a failed intervention. Local communities asked for hand pumps, but again, this
information was not sought out by INGOs, leading to a quick failure of the intervention. This
information was also available from the WASH cluster and the Haitian Ministry of Health: due
to the state’s lack of capacity, there was no way to enforce these health codes, leading to this
failed intervention. The local community could have been used as a weaker proxy of state
capacity, but again the INGO chose to ignore the local community as well. Without any kind of
capacity supplementing the INGO, the intervention failed.
Only 10 out of the 48 interventions chose to use foreign labor instead of local labor even
though in most of the communities there was a pool of laborers who stated that they would have
been eager and willing to work but were never asked to do so. By bringing in foreign labor, these
INGOs distorted the local labor market. As discussed earlier in the literature review, this is a
negative, unintended consequence of the INGO interventions. The lack of community buy-in is
telling here: the Haitian labor market after the earthquake meant that there was a large pool of
labor that would have worked for wages far cheaper than Western INGO staff, but due to the
lack of community engagement, these INGOs didn’t know this was an option. A state with
stronger capacity could have attempted to enforce local labor laws, and also could have expelled
INGOs which chose not to obey these laws. Even though the INGO chose to bypass the state, the
INGO could have still engaged with the community as a weaker proxy of state capacity. By
ignoring this as well, these INGOs produced interventions with unintended, destructive
consequences.
At three of the communities interviewed during the field research, another major issue
arose regarding local knowledge and expertise: the use of metal for piping as opposed to plastic.
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This is a major issue in Haiti: the high humidity and large amount of seasonal rainfall quickly
leads to non-galvanized metal rusting rapidly, usually on the order of months. Even if a pump
still worked, the water became undrinkable due to coloring and taste issues. Otherwise, for some
of the interventions, the metal pipe broke in less than a month. As with earlier information
issues, this information was readily available from the WASH UN cluster, DINEPA, and the
community itself, but these INGOs chose to continue without local community engagement or
attempting to work with the state. This led to metal piping rusting and breaking, creating a
worthless intervention after only a few months. Almost all the INGO interventions gave the local
community no training, and no spare parts to fix anything if the pump failed to function. Out of a
total of 48 projects, 33 failed to function. This is a 69% failure rate. The INGOs chose to bypass
the state, which had vital knowledge that would have helped their interventions succeed. They
also ignored the local communities, a proxy for state capacity, who also had the knowledge
required for a successful intervention. This led to intervention failure.
Almost none of the interventions asked the local community where to build their well and
pump at, with one INGO intervention producing unexpected and tragic consequences: the INGO
chose not to ask what location would be best and picked one on their own without any
consultation from the community. Because of this, they built the pump in a location that turned
out to be in the middle of a road. Because the road was not paved in any way, the INGO couldn’t
tell that they had built the pump in the middle of a road as they had not asked the local
community for an optimal location. Two women were struck and killed by cars on that road
while attempting to get water from the pump: a tragic outcome which could have been avoided if
the INGO had questioned the local community. The state in this case had been completely
bypassed: the state could have given the INGO the cultural expertise required to understand
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where and how roads were laid out. In this case the more important issue was the placement of
the pump, which the INGO was unable to do effectively due to not engaging in community buyin, which could have been a proxy for state capacity, but the INGO chose to ignore this avenue
as well.
One intervention did attempt to circumvent weak state capacity effectively by actively
working with the community, but left out a crucial element, leading to a failed intervention.
Unlike most of the other interventions, this INGO intervention used local labor, left spare parts
for the community, and the community was regularly consulted on every step of the process. The
INGO communicated through a translator and stated clearly what the objectives were for the
intervention, to which the community happily agreed to. The intervention was a large and
dedicated project, with a solar pump, electrical equipment, and a water distribution system. The
INGO discussed security arrangements with the community to ensure that the intervention did
not fail in the long term. Here, we see the INGO actively taking steps with the local community
to replicate relevant state-like functions, like public goods maintenance, a step not seen in most
INGO interventions in the study.
However, one large mistake derailed the entire intervention: the INGO never came back
to check on the community, nor did they leave any contact information with the community
itself. The security arrangements in for this project were not complete when the INGO left, and
two weeks after the INGO left, someone stole the small electric pump from the community.
There was no equivalent pump in Haiti, and the community lacked the funding and the expertise
to fix it. Because of this, the entire intervention can be labelled as a failure because of this one
small mistake. The intervention did work very closely with the local community, but by not
effectively replicating required state-like functions, in this case the security of the equipment
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itself, this INGO intervention foundered. Although most INGOs aren’t normally responsible for
the security of the infrastructure, given the local conditions, some precautions should have been
taken which were not. Here is an excellent example of an INGO intervention that cleared the
hurdle of community buy-in to replace weak state capacity: the community was eager and
excited to work with the INGO, and gave them anything they needed, knowledge-wise.
However, this intervention also demonstrates that community participation and buy-in are not
sufficient on their own to guarantee a successful intervention, as the intervention was unable to
fully compensate for the lack of state capacity.
Before discussing successful interventions, the data collected must be examined on what
was reported versus what was actually happening on the ground. The Haitian state, the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and MINUSTAH both produced data showing
the reducing numbers of victims needing to be resettled, with that number dropped to less than
100,000 by 2015. The researcher can say with authority, however, that these numbers and
locations were in error: I personally went to places which had been marked as evacuated or
emptied to find tens, hundreds or thousands of people still at the location, wondering when the
next aid delivery was coming. A similar scenario arose from the number of shelters built: the
maps and data said one thing, actual on the ground observation said something else. In other
words, just because an external actor stated that something had happened, did not mean that
something had truly happened.
The water sector is indicative of these issues of faulty data on relief efforts in general.
According to the UN data collected by MINUSTAH and other UN agencies for the 2010 report,
DINEPA along with the WASH cluster’s partners reached 1.72 million Haitians affected by the
earthquake with water provisioning services, hygiene kit distribution, solid waste elimination and
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drainage management42. As the academic literature review for the Haitian case analysis
demonstrated, however, this was clearly not the case regarding water management: ignoring the
cluster coordination system was the modus operandi of most INGOs, and this lack of
cooperation with the coordination agency led to frustration on all ends of the spectrum. By
bypassing the state and not replicating relevant state-like functions or even sharing the data of
who was doing what, the coordination cluster and the state didn’t know what was going on
where, and were unable to coordinate effectively, or at all. INGOs could attempt to circumvent
this weakness in state capacity regarding coordination and local knowledge by working with the
local community, and many did attempt to do so.
One intervention, however, illustrated good lessons on how to work with the local
community to supplant weak state capacity for a successful intervention, but it also demonstrates
how much is asked of INGOs regarding duplication of the state itself. By working with the local
community effectively and duplicating state-like functions in lieu of the state itself the
intervention managed to avoid the failures of others. Community resident A stated that a
consortium of INGOs engaged in a large-scale intervention between 2014 and 2015 for several
small communities in Léogâne, these communities collectively referred to here as F6. The
intervention was very large, estimated to be in the six or seven figures USD, as the intervention
took months to complete and involved a great amount of infrastructure. This intervention was
well planned, with great detail given to every step of the process, and due regard paid to the
communities being served for reasons made clear shortly. Unlike other communities, there were
no water pumps, hand held or otherwise, in F6. Instead, each house had a small, PVC pipe with a
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http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/documents/un_report_haiti_2010_en.pdf
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faucet on the top of it, as seen below:

Figure 6: PVC pipe water system
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Resident A told the researcher that the water was purified, and the researcher, clearly
suffering from heat exhaustion and/or insanity, drank some of the water. The researcher can
report that the water had a faint chlorine taste, but otherwise no ill effects were observed. Given
that this was the first time that a faucet of this kind had been encountered during the entire
research trip, a great deal of attention was paid to F6 and several questions were asked about the
specifics of the intervention. One of the first things resident A relayed to the researcher was the
fact that the INGO’s personnel spoke French: according to resident A, they were told they were
from Canada, the logical assumption being that the INGO must have been Quebecois in origin.
From the very beginning, the INGO consortium began by bringing in people who spoke one of
the native languages instead of hiring translators or not bothering to communicate with the
community at all. This means that community participation and buy-in where integral to this
intervention as they attempted to replicate the state due to low state capacity.
The project involved pumping water from the local mountains to many communities on
the outskirts of Léogâne. This project involved water pumping systems in the mountains, a
gravity distribution system from the mountains to the communities, and construction of
infrastructure to facilitate operations. The INGO hired local labor for the entire project: these
pipes were laid all the way from the mountain reservoir down to the communities themselves.
The labor was compensated fairly, according to Haitian standards, and a considerable number of
laborers were pulled in from Léogâne to construct the infrastructure for this project. The water is
filtered and chlorinated at the reservoir site before being pumped. F6’s residents who have access
to the pipes receive clean water from this intervention at the time of research. To conserve
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resources and to not overtax the system, F6’s residents do not have the ability to turn on the
water: the water flow is controlled from the mountain reservoirs instead, and resident A reported
that the water is only turned on three times a week for this reason. The water only flows during
those days from sunrise to sunset, at which point the water is shut off again. The INGO also
made sure to teach F6’s residents how to repair the pipes if they broke, but because almost all of
the piping was buried underground (and the piping was PVC, not metal, as with other, failed
INGO interventions discussed earlier), the only breakage issues have been the pipes and faucets
sticking up out of the ground. Compared to the larger pipes underground, the smaller plastic
pipes are easier to repair, which the INGO anticipated. In the immediate vicinity of resident A,
20 houses had water pipes and faucets installed. The INGO hired local people after the pipes
were laid to also install the faucets for access to the water, giving another source of revenue to
F6’s residents. However, the faucets did not take the same effort to install as the rest of the
intervention did. Here is an excellent example of an intervention which queried the local
community and gained their buy-in early, producing data that helped with this intervention’s
success to supplant weak state capacity.
When resident A was asked why everyone in F6 didn’t have a faucet in front of their
house, the response given was that it cost money to hook a faucet up to the larger pipe system,
and not everyone in F6 had the money required to do that. This included hiring labor, the
physical infrastructure such as the pipes and faucets and the cost of the water itself, which
according to resident A was about three USD per month per household. In Haiti, this is not an
insubstantial sum of money, explaining the non-universal coverage of this water project.
Resident A also stated that people from the INGO and the reservoir maintainers would collect
money every month from the people in F6 who had access to keep the water flowing: if they did
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not, the INGO would cut water off to that specific household until they were able to pay. This
was rare, but resident A confirmed that this had happened on more than one occasion. In this
instance, the INGO has taken the unusual step of replicating relevant state-like functions: the
construction and maintenance of public infrastructure, and the collection of taxation for public
services.
Due to its understanding of the kleptocratic and sclerotic Haitian state, this specific INGO
chose to bypass the state and replicate relevant state-like functions by engaging in collecting
taxation for public goods. The INGO, therefore, acted as a state regarding the maintenance of the
water systems, with the power to cut off water if necessary for nonpayment into the system. The
ability to collect taxation is essential for a functioning state and the INGO replicated this
function: the Haitian government, in this case represented by DINEPA, lacked the capacity to
collect this funding. The INGO circumvented the state and replicated the relevant state-like
functions necessary for the intervention, leading to a resounding INGO intervention success.
Unfortunately, the sheer amount of resources, time and money invested into this project meant
that it is far beyond the capacity of most INGOs. In this case, bypassing the state led to a
successful intervention, but this was only because the INGO was able to replicate every state-like
function required for its intervention to succeed and used the local community as an effective
proxy for this lack of state capacity. This is not realistic for most INGOs: they instead require
some kind of viable state.
As with my field work, some INGO success stories regarding local community buy-in do
stand out in the literature: Partners in Health and Fonkoze bypassed the state and worked with
local communities to create relevant state-like functions and ensure that as their interventions
wound down, local capacity could compensate for the loss of the intervention, leaving a more
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successful and long-term intervention in its wake (Zanotti 2010). This also involved the
replication of relevant state-like functions to allow these INGOs to continue to operate without
the assistance of the state itself. According to Zanotti, Partners in Health’s entire mandate
revolves around a community-based, needs driven approach to health as opposed to
programmatic decisions by donors (Zanotti 2010). To quote Zanotti:

“Different from NGOs that are limited by statute to perform specific tasks (i.e.
emergency relief) or whose mandate is defined by donors and constituencies that conceive it in
line with their (political, economic, ideal) priorities, Partners in Health is driven by the needs of
the local poor and is committed to work in partnership with local institutions in order to build the
local capacity to provide services.”44
In other words, Partners in Health’s success can be directly traced to its intensive bottomup, community buy-in model.
Wilentz also discussed Partners in Health:

“Paul Farmer’s Partners in Health had been in Haiti for more than two decades and had
five thousand people delivering health care in-country before the quake, most of them Haitians.
PIH quickly raised a comparatively small $40 million but was much better able to translate those
funds into action on the ground because of its pre-quake commitment to resources and staff.
They went on to raise money in the following years.
“Before the earthquake, PIH was already functioning in Haiti as a mini-government, with
its own people designated to deal with customs, its own transport plans, its own hospital, its own
network of associated clinics, its own suppliers (although of the aid groups, it is among the few
that make a point of including government ministries and authorities in the mechanics of their
programs as much as possible). All nongovernmental organizations that have stayed in Haiti over
long periods have been forced to create their own mini-fiefdoms to one degree or another.” 45
As Wilentz stated, even though Partners in Health notifies the state of its actions, the
INGO replicated relevant state-like functions to engage in successful interventions, including
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customs, transportation, hospitals, suppliers and the like. Partners in Health engages in bottomup, community-driven health work in Haiti, and is still on the ground to this day. Partners in
Health managed to create a successful intervention due to their work with local communities and
their successful replication of relevant state-like functions, as they worked both around the state
and with the state while these INGOs supplanted state capacity. As Wilentz stated, Partners in
Health managed to create a successful intervention by engaging in local community
empowerment and working with the government ministries and authorities to the best of their
abilities. Where the state failed, the INGO was able to supplant the state as needed. This required
a large investment into building a parallel infrastructure that many INGOs are unable to produce.
However, those INGOs that are able to replicate relevant state-like functions as needed and work
with various levels of state government are able to produce far more effective interventions. This
is strong evidence that INGOs can make a difference if they’re more embedded in the
communities they serve.
Zanotti also discussed the success of Fonkoze, an INGO dedicated to providing
microfinance and financial opportunities to the most disenfranchised of Haitians (Zanotti 2010).
Similar to the method Partners in Health used to engage in successful interventions, Fonkoze
engaged in very active community outreach to learn the local needs and also to gain local
community buy-in (Zanotti 2010). Also like Partners in Health, Fonkoze bypassed the state but
built state-like functions to ensure that their intervention could succeed without a state present
and by actively encouraging local community buy-in (Zanotti 2010).
As can be seen, the successful interventions had to engage in not only community buy-in,
but also need to replicate relevant state functions to have a successful intervention to supplant the
weak state. This means that the INGO is expected to not only intervene and provide material aid,
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but also coordinate with the local community and copy state functions to ensure sustainable
success. Instead, the clear alternative is simply to have a functioning state instead.
3.5.2

East Timor examples

The Haiti earthquake provided a plethora of examples of successful and unsuccessful
INGO interventions. However, the East Timor case analysis also has useable examples regarding
local community empowerment that is useful in discussing supplanting state capacity here as
well. With respect to local communities, East Timor and Haiti gave nearly identical lessons:
local community empowerment is an effective technique to supplant or replace a weak or
nonexistent state post-disaster.
East Timor had a wealth of examples of why local community buy-in is essential for a
successful intervention. Strating discusses the fact that domestic NGO growth exploded in East
Timor after the 1999 referendum, and that these NGOs were able to lobby successfully for
effective institutional state building from a bottom-up perspective at times (Strating 2016). The
key phrase here is at times: local NGOs lacked expertise and resources to truly fulfill their
mandates, and INGOs at times chose to work around local NGOs as well. Unfortunately, because
of this rapid growth, many of these domestic NGOs lacked experience, expertise and resources to
fully fulfill their own, self-determined mandates, and that in turn hampered their ability to
influence institutional state building (Strating 2016). Many domestic NGOs argued that INGOs
did not want to work with local NGOs on their specific projects, thereby cutting them out of their
own state’s capacity building process (Strating 2016). INGOs thus not only did not work with the
nascent state in question, they also did not work with local NGOs and other civil society
organizations, so much that local NGOs felt they were “… reduced to ‘observers and critics who
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have to ask for what they want’.”46 A state with decent capacity could simply deport the INGOs
who refused to interact as the state wished.
The literature states that INGOs saw East Timor through the lens of a tabula rasa, a state
entirely devoid of any institutions and therefore a blank state from which to create whatever
institutions the INGO saw fit (Harris and Goldsmith 2011). The authors discuss the fact that
although the physical infrastructure of East Timor was in literal shambles when INGOs entered
the country and the people were displaced, it is also true that the human customs, traditions and
governance were carried with the East Timorese and such indigenous practices could not be
ignored if progressive successes were to be obtained (Harris and Goldsmith 2011).
Brunnstrom’s research dives deeply into the dire need for community buy-in. Her
research involved a detailed, bottom-up analysis of East Timorese NGOs and local communities
where she was able to directly ask East Timorese for answers to specific research questions, as I
did in Haiti. Her research was focused on East Timorese NGOs and their cooperation with
INGOs, something she stated was a deliberate choice (Brunnstrom 2003). Brunnstrom’s
excellent study gives a rare window into bottom-up interpretations of interventions. Brunnstrom
states that because East Timor was so closed off to the outside world prior to the referendum, the
international community had little to no experience in the country, and this meant it took months
for INGOs to gain local knowledge and expertise (Brunnstrom 2003). To quote Brunnstrom
regarding the emergency nature of the interventions:

“Most international organizations began working in East Timor in response to
emergency conditions of extreme deprivation and crisis. Hence they brought with them a
relief mindset that does not lend itself easily to working on a collaborative basis with
46
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local institutions, or to developing sustainable and long-term solutions to problems
encountered.”47
This relief mindset translates into the INGO assuming it knew what was best, to the
detriment of the communities they interacted with. Brunnstrom argues that one of the major
issues with INGOs in these scenarios is “… that of assuming that the systems and institutions
that function best are those created in the image of those dominate in Western countries
(Brunnstrom 2003).” She continues:

“In almost every discussion held with local NGO representatives in East Timor,
they expressed disappointment with the international NGOs for their poor knowledge of
and interest in local circumstances, history, culture, traditional social structures, and
languages. Few efforts are made and little time is invested to improve understanding,
while standardized solutions and approaches reflecting a top-down Western attitude to
development are applied.”48
In plainer language, cookie-cutter approaches to development and relief leave the local
populations frustrated, alienated and angry with the interveners due to the lack of communication
and not being treated as equals. She illustrates the major issue with lack of coordination and
ignoring the local communities with an example:

“In a village I visited as part of the research, two small local organizations linked
to the Catholic Church worked with young people and women. A large international
NGO (distributing relief items) was also active in the same community. However, despite
the expressed wishes of the two local agencies, the latter had made no attempt to establish
early contacts, identify common strategies or plans, or contribute to their efforts in any
way.”49
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This anecdote neatly illustrates the issue local communities have with INGOs during an
intervention: the INGO refuses to coordinate or even talk to the communities, leaving them
justifiably irritated and cut out from the process. For the INGO, this almost always leads to
intervention failure: without local community buy-in, without any type of discussion regarding
the other criteria for success, these INGO interventions fail. According to Brunnstrom, the
Timorese feel this lack of time for discussion is a sign of arrogance and lack of interest from
INGOs. As with other interventions, due to the lack of language capacity by INGOs, Englishspeaking locals are hired, usually in junior positions, instead of direct collaboration with
communities and local organizations. This leads to a drain of local human resources which are
absorbed by INGOs, to the detriment of state capacity in the long run.
Yet another issue Brunnstrom unearthed with first-person accounts was the issue of
donors bending locals to their will by forcing them to comply to what they thought was best for
the country as opposed to what the East Timorese themselves felt was best. To quote: “The
consequence is that they often abandon their own vision of what is right for the country, which,
unlike that of international NGOs, is based on local knowledge and understanding.” 50 As with
local NGOs worldwide, Brunnstrom also found that it was difficult for them to stay afloat
between projects, as relief funding would dry out rapidly, leaving these NGOs in the lurch
(Brunnstrom 2003).
A major issue which Brunnstrom also uncovered is NGO capacity building. Due to the
brain drain discussed earlier, both larger and smaller local NGOs discussed the desperate need
for capacity building, but also understood the tension inherent with the issue itself:
“…indigenous NGOs feel that foreigners do not respect their knowledge and expertise, and yet
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they recognize that their knowledge and skills need to be reinforced to increase their ability to
establish themselves in the communities in an independent fashion.” 51 Brunnstrom argues that
capacity building can’t just be imposed from the outside or reduced to a standardized training
program; instead it must be built along the lines of local context to truly succeed (Brunnstrom
2003). Brunnstrom also discussed the concern that many local NGOs were unable to interact
with local communities due to problems with starting or continuing engagement in those
communities, as the local NGOs felt they lacked the capacity to start work (Brunnstrom 2003).
All in all, Brunnstrom’s research from the bottom-up demonstrates the gap between rhetoric and
practice: discussing collaboration with local NGOs and local communities is a necessary but not
sufficient means to engage in collaboration and bottom-up work with these actors.
The idea that it is desirable to have small-scale, location specific community-controlled
and owned development initiatives has begun to percolate through the development literature,
although as before the lack of consultation with local actors and a lack of understanding of East
Timorese power structures meant that these initiatives could not be fully realized (McGregor
2007). McGregor’s research is one of the few, like Brunnstrom’s, which directly asked the East
Timorese themselves for information to compile data. McGregor states the issue succinctly:
“Despite talk of ‘empowerment’, ‘community ownership’ and ‘bottom-up decision making’, it
seems that community representatives are only trusted to pursue their vision of the future once
they have been tutored to think and act like development actors.” 52 The researcher found that
although INGOs engaging in sectoral project-based initiatives claimed that they would engage in
community empowerment by incorporating community members in the design of the systems
and also training community-based organizations in how to build and maintain their own
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systems, action in the field fell far short of this rhetoric (McGregor 2007). According to
McGregor, these projects were designed by international consultants who had little to no
opportunity to engage with anyone on a local, community scale, nor did they interact with state
representatives, leading him to call consultations with these projects ‘tokenistic’ (McGregor
2007). Although communities were consulted on water and sanitation options, the project staff
pursued the project outputs that the INGO felt was best, even if that wasn’t what was prioritized
by the communities themselves. Instead of cooperating with the local community or the state,
these INGOs simply decided what was best and built that. The key example here was of latrines:
although latrines are certainly necessary, there were much higher priorities for these
communities when they were asked, but these priorities were ignored in favor of what the INGO
felt was best (McGregor 2007). There was an attempt to partner with the communities to ensure
that they would be able to contribute to civil society after the intervention. Unfortunately, this
was not to be the case as they were unable to sustain themselves after the intervention due to a
lack of institutional training and support from the INGOs (McGregor 2007). McGregor
summarizes:

“While the ultimate benefits of such programs in terms of improved health or
sanitation are unquestionable, their common structure – sector-specific, externally
designed, output focused, top-down, short time frames – restrict their usefulness to those
wishing to build community-led post-development futures.” 53
Harmer and Frith’s research reinforces Brunnstrom’s research about relations between
civil society, local communities and INGOs. Their research pulled together data from local
NGOs to help construct a vivid picture of relations between civil society, local communities, the
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state and INGOs. Their research raises the issues of what portion or portions of civil society are
legitimately representing East Timorese society (Harmer and Frith 2009). Harmer and Frith
found however that at least with respect to the health sector, local interests were marginalized
and subordinated to INGOs (Harmer and Frith 2009). Although many portions of civil society
were given the ability to input their ideas into how East Timor was to be rebuilt, many local
NGOs felt that this was done simply to placate the local NGOs, who felt they were given an
opportunity to speak, but later felt that none of their input was incorporated or being
implemented (Harmer and Frith 2009). To quote the researchers: “The implicit assumption in the
civil society literature was that to be more effective, UNTAET institutions would have to have
been staffed by more East Timorese, thereby bringing the issues of accountability and
effectiveness together.”54 Clearly, without local community buy-in, these interventions were
unable to successfully fulfill their needs. However, the researchers did find that for genderrelated issues, the local communities and civil society were not only listened to, but they actively
lobbied for and received what they felt was best for East Timorese society, with positive results
(Harmer and Frith 2009). Local NGOs sprung up after the independence referendum as many
underground civil society organizations were able to gain legitimacy after the referendum and
attempted to work with external actors as the nascent state was being constructed.
The concept that local knowledge, input and expertise is essential for success is repeated
in the civic education sector (Goldstone 2004). The idea that “Timorization”, or turning as much
as possible over to local communities, the nascent East Timorese state, and local NGOs who
would then be able to use resources more efficiently and effectively given that they knew the
culture and norms better than INGOs did, was used with civic education with great success; so
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much that the author of this specific research suggested that this lesson could have been applied
to many other areas that were falling short of their mandates (Goldstone 2004). Again, here,
successful INGO interventions revolved around community buy-in but also close cooperation
with the state to ensure success.
Although most of McGregor’s analysis discussed earlier in this research covered some of
the negative consequences of interventions with respect to project-based initiatives and
institutional capacity-building partnerships, he was able to uncover some positive, effective
interventions with respect to community partnerships (McGregor 2007). He gives two examples
of how two-way communication can be effective with winning a community’s trust and respect,
thereby increasing the chances of the community being willing and wanting to work with the
INGO. To quote:

“When approached correctly, as the following example demonstrates, such
partnerships can facilitate sensitive understandings between local and international
imaginaries:
‘…there’s one community that’s in Oecussi and they have lots of food
taboos and one of them is no fish or seafood products because that’s their ancestry
and we just felt that was like completely taboo and was untouchable really, so we
tried to work with them on other protein sources.’ (KI 7).
When approached incorrectly, however:
‘… in Viqueque they posted two international staff for six months or one
year… and they say ‘you have to do it like this! In my country we do it like this!
You have to do it like this!’ Then one day they come to these internationals with
machetes and they have to run away from this village.’ (KI 8).” 55
By listening to the local community and not operating under the assumption that the
INGO knows best, there is a good chance that they won’t be run out of the community with
55

McGregor, pg. 165.

119

machetes as happened to the less fortunate INGO staffers in the second example. This is
important for INGOs to keep in mind, not the least concern being insurance premiums.
3.6

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the necessity of local community buy-in for successful INGO
interventions, especially where the state is weak or kleptocratic. INGO interventions in postdisaster states can be successful if they engage in local community buy-in. In both cases, there
were large numbers of examples of INGO intervention failure due to not taking the weak state or
local community buy-in into account. On the other hand, in both cases there were INGO
intervention success stories post-disaster where the INGO succeeded by engaging in local
community buy-in. This local buy-in allowed INGOs to supplant weak or nonexistent state
capacity, something other INGOs were unable or unwilling to do, leading to the variance
described in this analysis.
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4

SOLUTION 2: THE HALFWAY HOUSE: HOW THE STATE CAN BE REPLACED
BY OTHER EXTERNAL ACTORS WHEN NEEDED
4.1

Introduction

As discussed in the introduction and Chapter 2, INGO interventions after disasters fail
because the lack of state capacity isn’t taken into account, which leads to intervention failures.
Chapter 2 discussed the issues INGOs face with respect to adapting to local conditions, and why
it is exceedingly difficult for INGOs to fulfill their mandates in post-disaster scenarios. I have
argued that there are two solutions INGOs can implement which take into account the problems
and concerns presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 defined and elaborated on one of those solutions:
local community buy-in and bottom-up empowerment. This chapter will discuss the second
solution: a half-way house scenario.
During disaster scenarios, the state is severely weakened or in some cases almost
destroyed. There is precedent during these emergency situations for the United Nations to act as
a “halfway house” with respect to taking over state-like functions which can act as a template for
future emergency scenarios. This chapter will first lay out the definition of a half-way house, and
what the conditions are required for the half-way house to work effectively. This concept of a
half-way house scenario ties back into the discussion about the factors which determine
intervention success: in this case, the half-way house scenario is an expression of institutional
design of a UN peacekeeping operation. If the UN peacekeeping operation designs the half-way
house scenario appropriately, then INGO intervention success rates will be higher. This has large
implications for the international humanitarian aid system: if these scenarios can be replicated
successfully, less INGO interventions will fail, leading to more successful overall interventions.
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This chapter will then discuss the role the UN played as a half-way house to facilitate
refugee resettlement in East Timor after that country’s 1999 independence referendum by
highlighting how the UN acted as a coordinating mechanism for INGOs to replicate state-like
functions which were non-existent after the referendum.
4.2

The half-way house scenario

A half-way house is an institution set up specifically to help people who have diminished
personal capacity or some type of disability to give them the ability relearn the skills needed to
reintegrate into society. A half-way house provides certain services to facilitate this transition:
psychological, medical, social, educational and the like. In plainer language, a person with low
capacity is given the tools and assistance needed for them to regain their capacity. This analogy
can be extended to states: when a state has been weakened, an external actor such as the UN can
step in and provide tools and assistance to give the state what it needs to regain its capacity as
well. Because INGOs might attempt to avoid or sidestep the weakened state, the half-way house
can create an institutional framework for coordination which can discourage INGOs and other
external actors from bypassing the state or the half-way house itself.
A half-way house scenario could be implemented when a state has diminished or nonexistent state capacity, necessitating an external actor co-opting some state functions. Why
would the state not be available? After a disaster, the state can be weakened, or even nearly
destroyed as it was in Haiti. In other situations, such as in East Timor, the state might not exist
after a massive internal or external crisis, leading to the need for a UN peacekeeping mission to
step in and supplant or augment certain state functions. This concept of supplanting a weak,
nonfunctioning or non-existent state with an external actor has been enacted repeatedly in the
20th and 21st centuries, namely the mandate system of the League of Nations and the Trusteeship
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system of the United Nations. However, an entire peacebuilding mission built around a
diminished or non-existent state did not come to fruition until the late 20 th century. Near the end
of the Cold War and afterward, the United Nations engaged in peacebuilding missions where the
UN was given extraordinary state-like powers to fulfill its mandates. UNTAC, the UN
Transitional Authority in Cambodia, is an early example of this halfway house concept. 56
UNTAC was charged with many state functions, including holding elections, security and human
rights enforcement.57 Other examples of this halfway house concept put into practice include
UNOSOM II and the UN mission currently in Kosovo, UNMIK. Each of these engaged in
supplanting weak or nonexistent state capacity over multiple levels.
Therefore, some external actors take it upon themselves to co-opt some of the weak
state’s capacity to facilitate a successful intervention. The irony here is that by building a strong,
effective intervention that directly addresses the community’s needs, the external actor could coopt the state’s functions, making the state weaker in the long-term, leading to more external
actors needing to co-opt state functions, leading to a destructive cycle of co-opting state power
which further weakens the state, necessitating more co-opting. The irony, therefore, is that the
interventions that are the most effective are also the ones most destructive to the very state they
are purporting to serve. In some cases, state capacity becomes so low that a governance structure
akin to a neotrusteeship arrangement is set up by external actors, to the detriment of the state and
to the benefit of certain international actors (Fearon and Laitin 2004). Accountability and
governance is stripped from local institutions and placed in international institutions which lack
accountability to the very people they are mandated to govern, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo
(Fearon and Laitin 2004). Albala-Bertrand demonstrates with an analytic comparison that
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complex protracted humanitarian scenarios wreak havoc upon state institutions, demonstrating
the unintended yet deleterious effects of external interventions (Albala-Bertrand 2000). There is
evidence to show that international emergency humanitarian aid leads to shorter durations of
peace in post-conflict scenarios. This is clearly a negative, unintended consequence of the good
intentions of the intervention itself (Narang 2014). These prolonged scenarios therefore overlap
with the state’s capacity that the system is supposed to be ‘saving’; instead, these conditions lead
to the continued weakening or in extreme cases dissolution of the state itself. A case has been
made in the literature that some actors in the international system attempt to keep state capacity
low to allow them unfettered access to their target audiences (Cohen, Kupcu, and Khanna 2008)
or to keep themselves in business, especially development INGOs such as CARE or government
actors like USAID (Eade 2007). In cases such as this, the intention of the INGO is self-centered:
the INGO actively works with other actors to keep the state from breaking out of a cycle of
dependency upon INGOs and other external actors.
To attempt to curb these issues, a half-way house scenario can be arranged. In this
scenario, an external actor such as the United Nations supplants some specific portions of state
capacity, such as coordination and security, to ensure that INGO interventions are executed
successfully. This also allows the half-way house to act as a discouraging factor for INGOs
which attempt to work around the state or the half-way house itself. If executed correctly, this
halfway house will not weaken future state capacity by engaging in institutional capacity
building with the state itself. This scenario was attempted in both Haiti and East Timor by a UN
peacekeeping operation: in Haiti it was completely unsuccessful, but in East Timor there were
some successes. In Haiti, a kleptocratic state along with a lack of internal and external legitimacy
prevented the UN from being able to create a successful half-way house scenario. In East Timor,
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on the other hand, the conditions needed for a half-way house scenario existed, allowing for
some small successes.
Not all halfway house arrangements lead to successful interventions. For a half-way
house scenario to succeed, specific criteria must exist: a post-disaster scenario, a state with
internal and external legitimacy which has had its capacity compromised by a disaster, an
external actor – most commonly the United Nations – able to supplant the state which
understands and accepts that the scenario is temporary, and INGOs willing to cooperate with the
external actor. If these criteria are not satisfied or mostly satisfied, then the halfway house will
more than likely fail, as it did in Haiti. Even though the UN attempted to engage in coordination,
the lack of a state with internal and external legitimacy along with the UN unsure of when or if it
would ever leave led to this scenario failing. An example of this would be UNOSOM II: without
a clear state-building mandate, nor with any clear idea of when the UN would exit, INGOs chose
to work no other external actors. INGOs would find it extremely difficult if not impossible to
create this type of scenario on their own without the UN or a similar external actor: INGOs are
simply not designed or created for the purposes of supplanting weak state capacity. UN missions,
on the other hand, can supplant weak capacity.
In Haiti, due to the history of that state as detailed in the previous chapter, the state had
very low internal and internal legitimacy: because of this, a half-way house scenario could not
take root. In East Timor, on the other hand, all of these criteria were met, leading to a successful
half-way house scenario where close INGO cooperation with both UN coordination agencies, the
nascent state and local communities led to intervention successes. The half-way house is not
designed to last forever; it is specifically designed to be temporary in nature and cede state
functions to the state at the end of the execution of the scenario. The half-way house allowed for
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INGOs to engage in a coordinated response to the disaster. This coordinated response is the key
to the success of these INGO interventions: close cooperation with the UN coordination agencies
and the forming, legitimate state was the linchpin for the success of these interventions.
Although Haiti and East Timor had UN peacekeeping operations attempting to create a
half-way house scenario, only East Timor had the conditions needed to successfully implement
this scenario. External actors, from the UN to INGOs, view some states as more legitimate than
others: states which have historically demonstrated consistently low state capacity, high
corruption or endemic civil violence are considered less legitimate than other states. In the case
of Haiti, all of these factors have been historically present, whereas East Timor had no historical
record at all. This lack of historical record and a large international consensus on East Timorese
independence led the UN peacekeeping operation and the external actors which intervened in
East Timor to treat the state and the half-way house set up by the UN as a legitimate actor in the
country. Although this scenario was not fully successful in East Timor, there were cases of
success with this setup. The next section will discuss East Timor’s history and how it led to a
successful implementation of a half-way house scenario.
4.3

East Timor case background

This section will give a detailed background of INGO interventions after the September
1999 Indonesian army’s large-scale destruction of the nascent East Timorese state during its
withdrawal after the independence referendum for East Timor in that same year. This section
will begin with a brief overview of the evolution of the state of East Timor, from its Portuguese
colonization to its annexation by Indonesia in 1975. The section will continue with the
discussion of the brief, aborted independence of East Timor in 1975, the annexation of East
Timor by Indonesia, and the years of occupation by Indonesia from 1975 to 1999. The section
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will then continue by covering in detail the 1999 independence referendum, the Indonesian
army’s withdrawal, and the consequences of that withdrawal.
4.3.1

History of Timor, 1510-1975

East Timor (also known as Timor-Leste) is located on the island of Timor in southeastern
Asia, northwest of Australia at the eastern end of the Indonesian archipelago. 58 The country is
situated on the eastern half of Timor, and the country also includes a few islands off the coast of
Timor and the Oecussi region on the northwest part of the island of Timor. 59 The country is
approximately 15,000 square kilometers with approximately 25% of the land used for agriculture
in a tropical climate.60 The country has a population of approximately 1.3 million people, of
which more than 97% are Roman Catholic.61 The population is mostly concentrated in the
western third of the country, especially around the capital, Dili. 62
Although the human history of the island of Timor stretches back more than 40,000
years, only a brief overview of that history is necessary for the purposes of this research. East
Timor, unlike Haiti, only recently became independent, and did not have the long history of
weak state capacity and kleptocracy that Haiti has. Before Portuguese colonization, the island of
Timor was not unified as a state (Retboll 1998). Instead, the island was ruled by small kingdoms
(Kammen 2015). These small kingdoms or local chiefdoms were known as liurai, and these
liurai would be crucial for the Portuguese, as they were able to use them to project indirect
control over the territory (Hainsworth and McCloskey 2000; Taylor 1999).
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The first Europeans to reach the island of Timor were the Portuguese around 1510, but it
wasn’t until the middle of the 16th century that Dominican friars went to work converting the
Timorese to Catholicism (Retboll 1984; Taylor 1999). By the 17 th century, the Portuguese had
administrative control over the eastern portion of Timor, while the Dutch were able to gain
control of the western portion of the island by the mid-17 th century (Robinson 2010). This
colonial political divide has lasted to the present day, with West Timor currently a province of
Indonesia, whereas East Timor is now an independent country (Kammen 2015). This political
divide also exacerbated linguistic differences: West Timor uses Indonesian, whereas East Timor
uses Portuguese and Tetum (Pinto and Jardine 1997). Although the Portuguese claimed East
Timor as their own, the colonizers never gained complete control of the territory throughout the
entire colonization period (Hainsworth and McCloskey 2000). By 1702, the territory was
officially organized by Portugal as Portuguese Timor: a governor was installed with Lifau as the
capital of the colony (Kammen 2015; Retboll 1998; Robinson 2010; Taylor 1999). The colony
was a backwater for Portugal; it was used by Lisbon as a place to send political prisoners and
criminals (Robinson 2010). The Dutch colonized the Dutch East Indies by the 18 th century, but
East Timor stayed under Portuguese control (Robinson 2010). The capital of the colony was
moved from Lifau to Dili in 1769, where the present-day capital of East Timor remains
(Hainsworth and McCloskey 2000; Pinto and Jardine 1997; Taylor 1999).
The Portuguese and the Dutch drew the borders between their respective colonies in 1859
with the Treaty of Lisbon, and these demarcations are still used to this day by the states of
Indonesia and East Timor (Kammen 2015). With the declining fortunes of the Portuguese
Empire at the turn of the 20th century, the Portuguese chose to enhance their exploitation of East
Timor, and they began to squeeze the colony harder (Cristalis 2009). Portuguese rule was both
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brutal and exploitative, and this led to a number of revolts, the largest being in the early 20 th
century, which the Portuguese were only able to suppress with naval support and troops from
Mozambique (Hainsworth and McCloskey 2000; Retboll 1998). As with many other colonizers,
the Portuguese kept most of their military and state power in the capital, Dili (Pinto and Jardine
1997; Robinson 2010). This concentration of state power in the capital at the expense of the
outlying areas is repeated in other former colonial states, including Haiti.
The Second World War was a calamitous event for the colony: Portugal was neutral in
the war, but the island of Timor held strategic importance in the Pacific theater to both the Axis
and the Allies (Robinson 2010). As a preemptive measure, Dutch and Australian forces occupied
Timor, expecting a Japanese invasion (Taylor 1999). The Japanese did not disappoint, invading
and occupying Timor in 1942 (Kammen 2015). The Dutch, the Australians and many Timorese
spent a year fighting back with a guerilla campaign against the Japanese (Hainsworth and
McCloskey 2000). However, the Allied forces evacuated in 1943, leaving the Timorese to fight
on their own against the Japanese, who withdrew at the end of the war in 1945 (Kammen 2015).
The Timorese paid a high price: anywhere between 35,000 and 75,000 Timorese died during the
guerilla campaign and the occupation, with large amounts of infrastructure and food destroyed
(Kammen 2015; Robinson 2010). Although Portugal was handed back Portuguese Timor after
the end of the war, the Portuguese continued to treat it as a backwater outpost, investing very
little in infrastructure, both physical and human (Taylor 1999). Few Timorese were educated at
the elementary level, and even fewer gained university degrees.
After the 1974 Portuguese revolution, Portugal pulled out of its colonies as fast as
possible, and this included Portuguese Timor (Hainsworth and McCloskey 2000; Ramos-Horta
1987). Because Portuguese Timor was a backwater outpost for Portugal during its entire
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existence, the colonizer engaged in a speedy withdrawal (Ramos-Horta 1987). A new governor
was appointed to lead the way for decolonization, and three political parties were formed: the
Timorese Democratic Union (the UDT), the Timorese Social Democratic Association (the
ASDT) and the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti) (Cristalis 2009; Pinto and
Jardine 1997; Retboll 1984). The ASDT soon changed its name to the Revolutionary Front of
Independent East Timor (Fretilin) (Robinson 2010). Fretilin spawned Falintil, the guerilla wing
of the party, after the Indonesian occupation of 1975 and would also be the party which won the
first East Timorese elections in 2001 (Kammen 2015; Taylor 1999). The plan was for Portugal to
grant independence in 1978 after general elections were held (Retboll 1984).
However, that was not to be the case, as events on the ground drove the narrative far
faster than Lisbon could have anticipated. Fretilin was solidifying its position, and to counter this
threat, the UDT launched a coup against them (Robinson 2010). The colonial Portuguese
governor chose to stay out of the conflict: he sat out the conflict on an island off of the shore of
Portuguese Timor, depriving Fretilin of legitimacy (Cristalis 2009). Indonesia was worried that
the left-leaning Fretilin party would become communist, leading Indonesia and Australia to pay
close attention to the outcome of the coup (Retboll 1984). Indonesia determined that the
integration of East Timor into Indonesia itself would be the best political move for the country,
and pressured UDT into attempting to gain support for integration into Indonesia (Retboll 1984).
Fretilin attempted to secure the return of the Portuguese governor, but that was not to be.
Instead, on November 28th, 1975, Fretilin made a unilateral declaration of independence of the
Democratic Republic of East Timor in Dili (Hainsworth and McCloskey 2000; Taylor 1999).
Indonesia responded by having UDT, Apodeti and other minor East Timorese parties sign a
declaration calling for East Timorese integration into Indonesia (Robinson 2010; Taylor 1999).
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This declaration was not drafted by the parties; instead it has been revealed that it was drafted by
Indonesian intelligence (Retboll 1984). An independent East Timor was not to be tolerated by
Indonesia, and that state chose to engage in drastic action to rectify the situation (Cristalis 2009;
Kammen 2015). This first attempt at independence was aborted, and the resistance was driven
underground by Indonesia, ensuring that no state would gain traction in East Timor.
4.3.2

Invasion and occupation, 1975-1999

Indonesia invaded and occupied East Timor on December 7 th, 1975 (Hainsworth and
McCloskey 2000; Pinto and Jardine 1997; Retboll 1998). East Timor was annexed by Indonesia
and was treated as the 27th province of Indonesia by the Indonesian government; however, the
majority of the East Timorese people and the international community including the United
Nations did not recognize this annexation (Robinson 2010; Taylor 1999). This occupation of
East Timor lasted from 1975-1999. Whereas the Portuguese chose to engage in indirect rule, the
Indonesian government treated East Timor as a conquered province, and engaged in direct rule,
enforced by the military and local East Timorese militias (Fernandes 2011). The United States
and Australia, both active in the region and concerned about the spread of communism, gave
Indonesia the go ahead for the invasion and promised to stay out of the way (Retboll 1984).
Recently declassified and non-redacted CIA documentation (in 2001) shows that both American
President Henry Ford and American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger gave President Suharto
of Indonesia “repeated assurances that the United States would understand should Indonesia
choose to take ‘drastic action’ in East Timor” (Fernandes 2011; Robinson 2010). Unlike the
Portuguese, the Indonesians chose to invest in infrastructure which led to some economic growth
for East Timor (Kingsbury 2009). However, the human cost of the brutal occupation was high:
estimates for the death toll of the occupation from 1975-1999 range from 60,000 to 200,000
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(International 1985, 1994). Indonesia engaged in low-level terror attacks against the East
Timorese population for the entire occupation period, including but not limited to extrajudicial
executions, disappearances, torture and political imprisonment (International 1985, 1994).
Falintil fought a low-level guerrilla war against the Indonesians for that entire period (RamosHorta 1987). Falintil was almost completely destroyed in 1978, when it changed from an army
attempting to defend fixed bases into a guerilla force operating to force the Indonesian occupiers
out of East Timor (Robinson 2010). The Indonesian military blockaded and sealed off the
territory until 1989, creating and maintaining a police state in the territory to keep it under a firm
military grip.
By 1989, Indonesia had nearly full control over the territory and opened East Timor to
tourism until 1991, when Indonesian troops fired on protesters at the Santa Cruz cemetery in
Dili. The Santa Cruz massacre galvanized the Catholic Church and NGOs worldwide to call for a
settlement of the East Timorese question (Kingsbury 2009; Taylor 1999). This atrocity was
recorded by foreign journalists and was subsequently aired around the planet, refocusing the
world’s attention on East Timor (Robinson 2010; Taylor 1999). Although the Indonesian
government installed a civilian administration, the military remained in full control, using secret
police to torture, arrest and murder dissenters when needed (International 1985, 1994; RamosHorta 1987). The Catholic Church in East Timor played a vital role in protecting dissidents and
advocating for self-determination for East Timor internationally throughout the entire occupation
period (Robinson 2010). International pressure continued to increase upon the Indonesian
government: by 1996, the Nobel Peace Prize was given to Bishop Belo And Jose Ramos-Horta in
recognition of their work toward East Timorese independence (Fernandes 2011).
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In 1998, Indonesian President Suharto resigned from a combination of the 1997 Asian
economic crisis and a resurgence of Indonesian democracy, leading to his vice-president, B.J.
Habibie, to assume the presidency (Cristalis 2009; Robinson 2010). This also led to the growth
of Indonesian democracy, and this meant a re-examination of the East Timorese issue along with
international pressure (Fernandes 2011; Taylor 1999). Both the Australians and the Americans
pushed Indonesia to reconsider the issue, and this confluence of domestic and international
factors, led Habibie to allow the East Timorese to have a referendum on independence from
Indonesia (Robinson 2010). However, the Indonesian military, still a large locus of power even
after Suharto’s resignation, had a vested interest in East Timor due to the high price in blood and
treasure the military had paid for the territory and would not let go easily (Fischer 2000;
Kammen 2015). The Indonesian military secretly sent weapons across the border from West
Timor to arm pro-independence militias in East Timor in an attempt to scare the population into
submission, and to keep East Timor a part of Indonesia (Cristalis 2009; Robinson 2010).
Although the East Timorese people were able to push for independence, there was no formal
state apparatus when the Indonesian army withdrew from East Timor, leaving only communities
and recently formed grassroots NGOs to begin the laborious process of state-building. There was
no state to work with for INGOs; instead, there would need to be another external actor to take
over state functions until a state could be built from almost scratch. This meant that another
country or external actor would need to create state functions for a time.
4.3.3

Independence referendum, the Indonesian army’s withdrawal and its aftermath

With international and domestic pressure bearing down on Habibie, a referendum on the
future status of East Timor seemed a viable option for the Indonesian government (Fischer
2000). The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, sent a letter to the Indonesian government,
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stating that Australia would look favorably upon a referendum (Robinson 2010). It was heavily
implied in the letter, according to Habibie, that Indonesia was acting like a colonial power, to
which Indonesia (a former colonized state) took great offense (Fernandes 2011; Robinson 2010;
Smith and Dee 2003). Habibie was very upset, and announced a snap election in early 1999 for
later that year for an independence referendum for the status of East Timor (Cristalis 2009;
Robinson 2010). The referendum took place in East Timor under United Nations supervision
with Indonesia guaranteeing the security of the process on August 30 th, 1999 (Fernandes 2011;
Smith and Dee 2003). The United Nations had been asked to intervene by the UN Security
Council with UN Security Council resolution 1246, which created the United Nations Mission to
East Timor, or UNAMET.63 Although the UN political mission stated that there was some voter
intimidation, voter registration was very high, with an astounding 98.6% of those registered
voting on that day (Fischer 2000). This referendum led to a massive majority voting in favor of
independence, the alternative on the ballot being an autonomous province within Indonesia itself
(Fischer 2000; Goldstone 2004; Robinson 2010).
The vote was 78.5% in favor of independence, giving a decisive defeat to Indonesia,
which the army was not pleased with (Cristalis 2009; Fischer 2000; Robinson 2010). Directly
after the independence referendum, the Indonesian military, along with pro-Indonesian East
Timorese militia, retaliated against the referendum results: the Indonesian military along with
East Timorese pro-Indonesian militia engaged in a massive campaign of violence and terror
against the East Timorese population, something which both had had a great deal of practice with
since the 1975 occupation (Fernandes 2011; Nevins 2005; Robinson 2010). Around 1400 East
Timorese were killed, and about 300,000 people were displaced by the violence, pushed into
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West Timor (still a part of Indonesia) as refugees (Fernandes 2011; Nevins 2005). The nascent
state’s infrastructure was also a target of this retaliation: homes, water systems, schools and
almost the entire electrical grid of the country was destroyed in this retaliation (Cristalis 2009;
Fernandes 2011; Kingsbury 2009; Nevins 2005; Smith and Dee 2003). There was a massive
international push, both in the region and at the United Nations, to send an international
peacekeeping force to East Timor to quell the violence, although the full details of the
Indonesian military’s covert assistance was not fully known at this time (Kingsbury 2009;
Nevins 2005; Robinson 2010). Indonesia, still in a dire economic situation, decided that a
peacekeeping force in East Timor would give Indonesia the clout it needed to ask for economic
assistance, and agreed with the UN to allow a peacekeeping force to restore peace in East Timor,
as this was considered a prerequisite for a UN peacekeeping deployment (Smith and Dee 2003).
The UN didn’t have the resources to create a peacekeeping force on its own, and instead
authorized the creation of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) with UN Security
Council Resolution 1264.64 Most of the troops committed to the force were from Southeast Asia,
with almost half coming from Australia itself, as it was the local power in the region (Fischer
2000; Robinson 2010). This force deployed on September 20 th, 1999, and rapidly managed to
bring the violence to an end. The administration of East Timor was taken over by the UN by the
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on October 25 th, 1999.65
The deployment of INTERFET ended on February 14th, 2000, with UNTAET taking over for
INTERFET at that time. Free and fair democratic elections were held in late 2001 for an
assembly to draft a constitution, which was finished in February 2002. East Timor was
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considered to have gained its independence on May 20th, 2002 and gained UN membership on
September 27th, 2002 (Kingsbury 2009; Smith and Dee 2003).
4.3.4

Conclusion

This section covered the history of East Timor to demonstrate the significant cultural and
social factors which led to the international intervention in 1999 by covering the history of
Timor, followed by the invasion of East Timor by the Indonesian army in 1975, the occupation
from 1975-1999 and the independence referendum of 1999. This historical analysis shows that
East Timor was only forming a state in 1999, and there was very little to no formal state after the
1999 independence referendum, necessitating an external actor to step in and fill some state
functions. The fact that there was no extant state necessitated the unique halfway house situation,
as there was no state at all to engage in basic state functions, which are vital for INGO
interventions to succeed.
4.4

Halfway houses: the replacement of needed state functions in East Timor

As discussed in the previous section, sometimes when a state is incredibly weak or nonexistent, an external actor is needed to replace needed state functions. In essence, a “halfway
house” is needed: an external actor which will temporarily replace needed state functions and
then pass power back to the state as the state regains the ability to administer its territory after a
disaster. The United Nations has done this on multiple occasions, but one of the most effective
examples of the UN taking over a state would be the intervention in East Timor.
After the 1999 independence referendum, the United Nations was called upon to help
create the East Timorese state. This led to peacekeeping missions wherein the mandate of the
mission was expanded greatly to allow the UN the ability to replace many state functions. The
United Nations commanded four separate operations in East Timor, starting with UNAMET,
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continuing on to INTERFET which was taken over by UNTAET which was then merged into
UNMISET. Each of these missions expanded the mandate from the previous one, but one of the
main points of each resolution was the assembly of institutional state capacity for the nascent
East Timorese state. This is one of the major differences between Haiti and East Timor: the
international community specifically stated that East Timor’s reconstruction mandate would
revolve around creating and building sustainable state capacity. Haiti’s did not have a mandate
this specific, demonstrating that institutional design, as discussed earlier, is an important
component of the successful criteria for a half-way house scenario.
UNTAET was the end result of the evolution of the very limited intervention that was
UNAMET. UN Security Council Resolution 1272 constructed a mandate that would create a
very far-reaching intervention, not unlike MINUSTAH’s mandate discussed in the Haitian case
analysis, specifically operative clauses two and three:

“2. Decides also that the mandate of UNTAET shall consist of the following
elements:
(a) To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East
Timor;
(b) To establish an effective administration;
(c) To assist in the development of civil and social services;
(d) To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and
development assistance;
(e) To support capacity-building for self-government;
(f) To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development;
3. Decides further that UNTAET will have objectives and a structure along the lines set
out in part IV of the report of the Secretary-General, and in particular that its main
components will be:
(a) A governance and public administration component, including an international police
element with a strength of up to 1,640 officers;
(b) A humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation component;
(c) A military component, with a strength of up to 8,950 troops and up to 200 military
observers.”66
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Operative clause 10 dives into further detail about operative clause 3, subsection
b:

“10. Reiterates the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance and calls upon all parties to cooperate with humanitarian and human rights
organizations so as to ensure their safety, the protection of civilians, in particular
children, the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and the effective delivery of
humanitarian aid.”67
These clauses are the heart of the discussion: The United Nations (as it did in Haiti)
specifically called for coordination of external actors, the delivery of services to the population,
including rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure.

With these mandates fully and clearly laid out, showing the high similarity in language
between the MINUSTAH and UNTAET mandate for coordination and delivery, this research
will engage in further analysis specific to on the ground observations of both external actor-state
cooperation and external actor-community cooperation.
In East Timor, most of the infrastructure was destroyed by the Indonesian army. This
included water systems, roads, housing, public buildings and the entire power distribution
infrastructure system. Large numbers of external actors entered East Timor after the disaster to
assist. To deal with the influx of these external actors, UNTAET, as MINUSTAH would do in
the future, chose to set up a cluster system for coordination of humanitarian relief efforts of UN
agencies and other external actors. According to Kingsbury, the destruction was incredibly
severe:
67
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“Following the destruction of September 1999, an estimated 80 percent of schools
and clinics were destroyed, along with three-quarters of administrative buildings. Less
than a third of the population remained in or near their homes, with the rest scattered into
the hills or compelled across the border into West Timor. Markets had been destroyed
and transportation either stolen and taken across the border or burned, while telephone
communications were nonexistent. Almost all the trained personnel in East Timor were
either Indonesian or sympathetic to Indonesia and had fled across the border, meaning
there were almost no trained personnel left in East Timor and no institutions for them to
work in. Government records were all but completely stolen or destroyed, while virtually
all medical facilities and staff were removed, along with almost all secondary teachers
and a large proportion of primary teachers.” 68
This led to the UN intervention discussed earlier with an emphasis on emergency
humanitarian aid and return of refugees who had fled the destruction. With the Indonesian army
withdrawal, other external actors who had never had the opportunity to work in East Timor now
had that chance. The mission was also more promising in terms of enjoying both strong domestic
and international support. Peter Galbraith, one of the senior members of the mission with
extensive international experience in post-conflict settings, contrasted the mission to UN efforts
in Bosnia, stating that East Timor was a much more viable mission with both domestic and
international will driving it (Steele 2002).
Unfortunately, that did not mean that the external actor interventions were completely
successful. UNTAET was considered legitimate by the international community, but it could not
fully replace the state and gain the trust of the local community due to it, by definition, being an
outside authority, leading to legitimacy issues for all external actors involved (Goldstone 2004).
Goldstone also discusses the issue of sovereignty, where he states that the UN cannot have
territorial sovereignty (Goldstone 2004). This is, however, inaccurate: The United Nations has a
Trusteeship Council which is indeed set up if necessary to govern non-self-governing territories
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if it so chooses, which it did not in this case.69 However, the issue of sovereignty, as discussed in
the literature review, is still a telling concern for external actor interventions. Philpott relates
meeting several NGO activists in Dili who bitterly complained that there wasn’t a single person
at UNTEAT with oil or energy law experience to determine East Timor’s most important
resource: the mineral rights of the Timor Sea, which needed to be renegotiated with Australia
and would be East Timor’s major export (Philpott 2006). This led to the UN negotiating a new
boundary on East Timor’s behalf, a clear usurpation of state sovereignty, and this example was
by far not the only one.
Not every INGO intervention chose to treat the state as a blank slate; instead, some
INGOs saw an equal partner in the CNRT (Smith and Dee 2003). Coordination between INGOs,
local communities, the CNRT and UNTEAT, where the INGOs treated the CNRT as an equal
partner and engaged in close cooperation with the nascent state, led to a successful
implementation of the swift return and resettlement of East Timorese (Nixon 2010).
Lacking local governance structure in support of an intervention, the intervention
becomes much more difficult or impossible to complete effectively (Harris and Goldsmith 2011).
According to the authors, “… East Timorese expressed frustration and a sense of alienation at
what they saw as the sidelining of their own culture and values and an undermining of local
governance mechanisms.”70
It has been noted in the literature that the UN staff deployed to the mission were unsuited
to the task, due to them being career bureaucrats who, concerned mainly about career selfpreservation and advancement, had very little interest in learning about the local communities
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and culture, nor had the skill sets needed for the tasks at hand (Kingsbury 2009). Kingsbury
continues regarding international aid agencies and INGOs:

“The main mistake made by such agencies was primarily in terms of a lack of
sustainability of the projects they had established once the aid providers had left. This, in
turn, was compounded by a lack of grassroots engagement by a number of agencies,
which came into East Timor with more or less set plans and without adequately engaging
with the local population in what they saw as their own needs or how efforts toward
meeting those needs could be sustained in the longer term.” 71
Kingsbury continues by stating that after the immediate emergency phase was over there
was plenty of time to consult with the local communities, but the INGOs, just like the UN
mission, didn’t have the communication/translation skills required to do so, thereby ignoring the
people which they were purportedly there to assist (Kingsbury 2009). Kingsbury labels this
attitude, with justification, ‘patronizing’ (Kingsbury 2009). He also states that this issue shines
through with ‘holier-than-thou’ attitudes which many INGO staff have toward those they serve,
which would make interaction with both the state and the communities in question far more
difficult for obvious reasons (Kingsbury 2009). As discussed earlier in this research, lack of
community involvement led to INGO intervention failure in every case.
Although the literature points out the serious issues and how the interventions failed,
there was an unqualified success where INGOs succeeded in an efficient and very effective
manner: the resettlement of East Timorese who had been displaced after the Indonesian army’s
withdrawal in 1999. Best estimates state that almost half of all East Timorese were forced to flee
their homes during the withdrawal, and about a quarter of a million either chose or were coerced
into fleeing to West Timor (Nixon 2010). However, there was a swift, coordinated response
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among INGOs, the forming state, UNTAET and most importantly, local community structures
and local NGOs which made the return and resettlement of East Timorese a resounding success
(Nixon 2010).
This coordinated response is the key to the success of these INGO interventions: close
cooperation with the UN coordination agencies and the forming state was the linchpin for the
success of these interventions, along with local community support and buy-in. Due to the near
destruction of any state authority during the vacuum after the exit of the Indonesian army and
before UNTAET, local communities (sucos, or villages and aldeias, or communities) and their
leadership were instrumental in facilitating the return and reintegration of those who had fled
(Nixon 2010). INGOs did not cooperate amongst themselves; however, they did allow UN
coordination agencies the leeway and the authority to engage in coordination along with local
authorities.
With UN-OCHA coordinating INGOs and working closely with both the de facto state
(which at this point was the CNRT, which was a conglomeration of local NGOs and civil
society, the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction) and local suco and aldeia leaders,
the cooperation and effectiveness of this intervention in this specific subset cannot be
understated: by working with the UN coordinating agency (the halfway house in this example)
and local actors, INGOs were able to leverage their resources more effectively and efficiently.
With local and state support INGOs were able to rapidly finish this portion of the intervention to
the satisfaction of all involved.
This analysis of the resettlement is echoed in other literature (Smith and Dee 2003). UNOCHA coordinated very well and as discussed earlier dealt with the nascent state and local
communities and leaders effectively, but there was still room for improvement: the peacekeeping
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operation could have helped more, and UN-OCHA should have begun to coordinate sooner than
they did (Smith and Dee 2003). Again, the research shows that the bottom-up work of reaching
out to suco and aldeia elders, i.e. local community leadership, was crucial for resettlement to be
as successful as it was. Working with the UN coordinating agency and working with
communities was considered the key attribute for the success of this portion of the intervention
(Smith and Dee 2003). Local community buy-in was essential for success, but as discussed
earlier, the appropriate interaction with the state was the key for these INGO intervention
successes: by closely cooperating with the UN coordinating mechanism in this case, the INGO
interventions were able to quickly and effectively fulfill their mandates.
4.5

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed a solution that has proven effective in the field to supplant the
lack of a viable state after a disaster: a halfway house scenario where an external actor such as
the United Nations temporarily replaces some state functions to allow for the coordination of
INGOs, the allocation of resources, and acting as a bridge between local communities and
INGOs. This chapter began with an analysis of the history of East Timor, followed by a
discussion of the need for a state along with what institutions could step in to replace a state if
the state was unable to fulfill its functions, and the example of the UN’s intervention in East
Timor from 1999-2002 was used to show that a halfway house scenario is a viable option if the
state lacks the capacity to engage in administrative functions. Regarding refugee resettlement,
the halfway house scenario successfully coordinated INGOs and acted as an effective bridge
between local communities and these external actors in the East Timor case. The need for
legitimacy and the need for effective institutional design of the halfway house are crucial for
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future policy makers: without both external and internal legitimacy for the external actor and an
effective institutional design for the halfway house, the scenario is bound to fail.
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5

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

Why do INGO interventions after disasters in weak states have suboptimal results? This
research has shown that INGOs face a number of external and internal issues which make it
difficult for INGOs to adapt to changing local conditions in the field after disasters. These issues
also incentivize INGOs to ignore or bypass the state and other external actors, as INGOs must
bend to the will of their donors to continue operations. Because of the issues listed in Chapter 2
of this research, INGOs have massive difficulties implementing adaptive practices in the field.
However, I have argued that there are at least two solutions which can be used by INGOs which
can partially circumvent the issues in Chapter 2: local community buy in and empowerment by
INGOs, and a half-way house scenario which can supplant certain state functions. Both solutions
replace or supplant post-disaster weakened or non-existent state capacity and help to alleviate the
accountability issues discussed earlier. Because INGOs are much more susceptible to donor
accountability as opposed to the communities they choose to work with, donors could use this
leverage to force INGOs to engage in both of these scenarios. Donors could insist that INGOs
engage in local community empowerment with research-based metrics, and they could also
empower the UN peacekeeping operations during these scenarios to create and sustain a halfway house scenario by donating to the operation engaging in coordination. The operation could
then, in turn, donate those resources to the INGOs which choose to work with the half-way
house. In this way, the accountability issues could be drastically reduced if the half-way house
organization is transparent and the half-way house would be given more authority through its
financial means.
As discussed in this research, INGOs have a number of barriers to adapting to conditions
on the ground after a disaster, the most important being the international humanitarian aid system
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itself, donor pressure and the media. The media is not something that can be easily remedied, nor
can the entire system. However, this research and my personal notes and observations have lent
some insight into how donor pressure can be alleviated or redirected toward more positive results
which I will detail later in this conclusion. This research has shown that one of the two major
solutions that INGOs can use in post-disaster scenarios with weak or non-existent state capacity
is the concept discussed in Chapter 3: local community buy-in. This will be discussed in more
detail in the following paragraphs. This research has also shown that the other major solution that
external actors can use in post-disaster scenarios with weak or non-existent state capacity is the
concept discussed in Chapter 4: a half-way house scenario, which will also be discussed in more
detail in the following paragraphs.
What are the implications of this research for INGOs and the international humanitarian
aid system? First, donor pressure is one of the major stumbling blocks with respect to INGO
adaptation in post-disaster scenarios. As discussed in Chapter 2, INGOs are forced to bow to
donor wishes, which leads to INGOs changing or modifying their mandates to consider donor
wishes and concerns. The problem does not lie with the INGO or the donor, however: the issue
lies within the relationship thereof instead. INGOs, both large and small, who choose to accept
donors who do not align with their mission and mandate nor trust the INGO will not be able to
adapt as needed in the field, as the mistrustful donor will threaten the INGO with withholding
funds until the INGO bows to the donor’s wishes. How can this issue be alleviated? INGOs must
learn to say no. INGOs must tell donors who do not match up with the INGO’s mission and
mandate that they do not wish to take their donation. Although every INGO can turn down any
donation it so pleases, although there are obvious reasons not to do so, including selfpreservation, leading to the trap discussed in Chapter 2. However, if an INGO is able to build an
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effective donor network of donors which fully understand the mission of the INGO and trusts the
INGO to fulfill its mandate, it gives the INGO much more effective leeway in the field to adapt
to changing circumstances and allows it to more fully realize its mandate and mission. Donors
can turn to other INGOs if they so choose, but over time the norms which govern these
humanitarian interventions could possibly evolve to a new paradigm where these donors are
discouraged from these types of actions.
Turning to the solutions to the problem of INGO intervention failure, local community
buy-in is one solution toward dealing with this issue. Even with the issues listed in Chapter 2,
there are viable methods for INGOs to engage in local community buy-in as discussed in the case
analyses and research in Chapter 3. This research has demonstrated that those INGOs which
work with local communities to encourage buy-in and with state authorities where possible have
a much high degree of success than other INGOs have during post-disaster interventions. This is
because of the ability of the local community to supplant absent state capacity, as demonstrated
in both the Haiti and East Timor case analyses. INGOs can supplant absent state capacity if they
desire to do so; however, this supplanting does take a deep commitment of time and resources
into local communities, something that some donors may not be amenable to do. This concept of
local community buy-in and its efficacy regarding post-disaster scenarios is clearly transportable
to any post-disaster scenario, not just Haiti and East Timor. Local community buy-in and
empowerment require something that many donors and INGOs shy away from: on the ground,
time and resource-intensive field research. By treating local communities as active participants
instead of passive recipients of aid, better and more accurate data can be collected, and most
importantly the local community can supplant weakened state capacity, producing more effective
and successful INGO interventions. Spending $10,000 on a well-funded research trip can save
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several hundred thousand dollars of misappropriated aid. Unfortunately, many INGOs are not set
up to engage in this kind of research, as their donors want boots on the ground as fast as possible,
and research is usually considered superfluous. The major shortcoming of this method is that the
current humanitarian aid system is designed to react quickly but in very short-term ways:
research is designed to ensure the intervention is sustainable after the INGO leaves. These are
not always compatible scenarios. Local community empowerment might also require a time and
resource commitment that the INGO is simply unwilling or unable to provide. Local community
buy-in can only take place when the donors of INGOs choose to allow it to take place.
The other solution discussed in this research in Chapter 4 is the concept of a half-way
house scenario set up by a UN peacekeeping operation. This research has shown that a half-way
house scenario (such as the one designed and implemented by UNTEAT in East Timor) can be
successful if the appropriate conditions exist. Although East Timor’s conditions were unusual,
they were by no means unique: as weak states continue to have disasters, be it natural or manmade, there will be more and more need for the UN to enter the devastation and supplant state
functions. The major shortcoming for this scenario is of course if the UN chooses not to design
and implement said scenario: an INGO alone will lack the resources to coordinate, and it would
have no legitimacy to do so in the eyes of other INGOs. Therefore, the UN’s willingness to both
enter the situation and to play a role in the coordination and allocation of resources is vital to
understanding when halfway house scenarios can and will be created. Only when the UN is able
to create this scenario will the scenario exist, and this depends on external factors such as
visibility, funding, and political considerations.
The major, overarching issue with failed post-disaster INGO interventions, however, is
the international humanitarian aid system itself. This system has been built around the concept of
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an ‘emergency scenario’, which means that interventions have been designed to last three to six
months to save lives, prevent famine, and so on. This model is no longer as valid in the early 21 st
century, as a number of disaster scenarios are no longer short-term. Instead, they become longterm, protracted scenarios which can last years or even decades, depending on the situation. The
system is only beginning to turn toward the concept of dealing with protracted emergency
scenarios with different methods from what the current system uses, including some listed in this
research. However, the international system like any complex system required time to change
and adapt with respect to policy. INGOs can and should take the lead in nudging the
international system toward new policies and finding mechanisms designed for protracted
emergency scenarios such as those described in this research, as opposed to the quick wins the
current system is designed to evaluate and reward. This research was designed to reinforce what
is needed for that paradigm shift: a greater focus on local community needs, but even more
importantly, a focus on the necessity of supplanting or replacing a weakened state post-disaster.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Data Collection Methods
Interview questions have been placed in Appendix B, C and D, B being the English
questions, C being the questions translated into Haitian Kreyol with the understanding that some
deviation was sometimes necessary in the field for the interview questions, and D being the
Kreyol back-translated to English. Once these data had been collected, the research began on the
western side of the city and worked systemically toward the east and the border with Gressier.
These interviews took place during daytime hours at the community’s convenience, with no
interview taking longer than 45 minutes. Each community was open and receptive, and each
community was integral to directing the research toward the next water system, given the
haphazard deployment method of INGO interventions. This method was highly effective in
optimizing the time and resources required for the research.
Target Populations and Sample Sizes
The criteria for eligible interviewees involved communities where an INGO built a water
system (well, pump, etc.) after the 2010 Haitian earthquake in the city or outlying areas of
Léogâne. This involved my translator/driver and I engaging in many impromptu conversations
with residents of Léogâne to gain local knowledge of where water systems had been placed after
the earthquake due to a lack of documentation of INGO interventions. The communities in
question, after hearing and understanding what the research was about, were very open regarding
what was being asked, and wanted to make sure their stories were heard, lest lessons would not
be learned and what happened to their communities would happen elsewhere. These
communities comprised sizes from several dozens to several hundreds of people per water point.
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Every community had been affected by the earthquake and were eager to share their issues and
expressions with the researcher.
Labeling of communities and participants
To protect the anonymity of the communities and the participants in this research, the
participants are numbered instead of using their names, while the communities themselves are
given a letter and a number to differentiate them from each other. Each community was given a
letter and a number: the letter designating what day the community was visited, and the number
the order on that day which the researcher visited these communities. Each person in the
community that the researcher spoke to was assigned a letter: A being the first person spoken to
by the researcher, B the second person, and so on. Each community’s location was recorded, but
this data has been destroyed in accordance with IRB regulations.
Ethical issues
The research was done with the full cooperation of all communities surveyed, with the
absolute minimal impact upon their lives possible. People in several communities discussed the
need for the story of what happened during INGO interventions to get out into the world and
were adamant about ensuring the research was done quickly and effectively. The research was
also conducted in such a manner as to ensure anonymity of the respondents for their safety,
minimizing any ethical issues. This project was reviewed and approved by Georgia State
University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). The specific portions of the IRB that are relevant
to this research are attached as appendices at the end of this dissertation.
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol for Haitian Research
Interview Protocol for Haitian Research
Disclaimer: Due to the fact that I will be interviewing possible political elites, community
leaders and regular citizens, there will likely be follow up questions that could not be foreseen at
the time of this writing.
Protocol for United Nations and International Civil Society Officials and Staff Members:
1. What was your mission mandate here?
2. What was your specific role in the organization you worked for?
3. How did you fulfill that mission mandate?
4. What was the role of the Haitian state in providing these needs?
5. Who worked with you to help fulfill your mandate?
6. What do you think your role should have been?

Protocol for local Léogâne community leaders and citizens:
1. What was the role of (IO/state/UN) who worked with you?
2. Did they do what they said they would do?
3. Do you feel they worked with you?
4. Did you learn anything from them? If so, what?
5. What do you think their role should have been?
6. Why do you think that role didn’t happen?
7. How did you engage in local governance before (IO/state/UN) came along? Did that
change?
8. Why did it change? If now, why not?
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Appendix C: Informed Consent Form English
Georgia State University
Department of Political Science

Informed Consent

Title: Nothing Can Stand in the Way of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: An Analysis of the
Impact of Local Governance Norms by International Humanitarian Interventions

Principal Investigator: Carrie Manning
Student Principal Investigator: Greg Hodgin

I. Purpose:
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of the study is to investigate how
international interventions help or hurt local governance and why. You are invited to participate
because you are someone who lived through the earthquake and also dealt with an international
organization that was here to help. A total of 70 participants will be recruited for this study.
Participation will require 1 hour of your time today.

II. Procedures:
If you decide to participate, you will be interviewed by Greg Hodgin in a location of your
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choosing in Léogâne, Haiti. This interview will take no more than one hour of your time. This
interview will take place immediately after consent is granted.

III. Risks:
In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life.

IV. Benefits:
Participation in this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain information
about how international organizations can better serve those they are trying to help.

V. Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal:
Participation in research is voluntary. You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to be in
the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time.

VI. Confidentiality:
We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. Greg Hodgin and Carrie
Manning will have access to the information you provide. Information may also be shared with
those who make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board, the Office for
Human Research Protection (OHRP)). We will use your initials rather than your name on study
records. The information you provide will be stored on a password protected and firewall
protected computer. Your name and other facts that might point to you will not appear when we
present this study or publish its results. The findings will be summarized and reported in group
form. You will not be identified personally.
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VII. Contact Persons:
Contact Carrie Manning at 404-413-6172 or cmanning2@gsu.edu if you have questions,
concerns, or complaints about this study. You can also call if you think you have been harmed by
the study. Call Susan Vogtner in the Georgia State University Office of Research Integrity at
404-413-3513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu if you want to talk to someone who is not part of the study
team. You can talk about questions, concerns, offer input, obtain information, or suggestions
about the study. You can also call Susan Vogtner if you have questions or concerns about your
rights in this study.
VIII. Copy of Consent Form to Subject:
We will give you a copy of this consent form to keep if you ask..
If you are willing to volunteer for this research, please sign below.
____________________________________________
Participant
_____________________________________________
Principal Investigator or Researcher Obtaining Consent

_________________
Date
_________________
Date
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Appendix D: Oral Informed Consent Form English
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of the study is to investigate
how international interventions help or hurt local governance and why. You are invited to
participate because you are someone who lived through the earthquake and also dealt with an
international organization that was here to help. A total of 70 participants will be recruited for this
study. Participation will require 1 hour of your time today.

If you decide to participate, you will be interviewed by Greg Hodgin in a location of
your choosing in Léogâne, Haiti. This interview will take no more than one hour of your time.
This interview will take place immediately after consent is granted.

In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of
life.

Participation in research is voluntary. You do not have to be in this study. If you decide
to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time.

We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. Greg Hodgin and Carrie
Manning will have access to the information you provide. Information may also be shared with
those who make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board, the Office for
Human Research Protection (OHRP)). We will use your initials rather than your name on study
records. The information you provide will be stored on a password protected and firewall
protected computer. Your name and other facts that might point to you will not appear when we
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present this study or publish its results. The findings will be summarized and reported in group
form. You will not be identified personally.

Would you be willing to volunteer for this research?
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Appendix E: Oral Informed Consent Form Haitian Kreyol
Nouenvitew’ patisipe nan yonetid. Bi etid sa se pou mennenankèt sou
kòmanentèvansyonentènasyonalyoedeoubyenlakòzdomaj pougouvènans localyoepipoukisa.
Nouenvitew’ patisipepaske ou se yonmounki te viv tout mati tranbleman detè a epiki te enplike
nanyonòganizasyonentènasyonalki te la pou ede. N’apkenbe 70 patisipan an total pou etid sa.
Patisipasyon anap mandeinè de tan nan tanw’jodia.

Siw’desidepatisipe, Greg Hodgin appasew’ yonentèvyou nan yonlokalke w’ apchwazi
nan Leyogān, Ayiti. Entèvyou sa pappran plis keinè de tan nan tanw’.
Entèvyousaapdewouleimedyatmanaprèkonsantman w’.

Nan etid sa, ou papkonfwonte plis pwoblèmke w’ ta ka rankontrechakjou nan
laviw’.

Patisipasyon nan rechèchse yonbagayvolontè. Se payonobligasyon pou w’ nan etid sa.
Siw’ fin desidepatisipe nan etidla epiw’ vin chanjelide, ou gendwa pou w’ abandonenenpòtlè.

Dosye w’ yoap rete prive (sekrè) jis nan limit lalwa bay pèmisyon. Greg Hodgin ak
Carrie Manning ap gen aksèakenfòmasyonoubayyo. Epitou, li pwobabpou gen
patajenfòmasyonakenstanski la pouasireyokeetid la byenfèt (GSU KomiteEkzamenEnstitisyonèl,
BiwoProteksyonMounkiPatisipe nan Rechèch - Office for Human Research Protection(OHRP)).
N’apitilizepremyelèt nan non w’ pou n’ mete sou dosyeyoolye de non w’ konplè.
Enfòmasyonw’apbayyoapretesere sou òdinatèkipwotejeakmodpasepiakfayèwòl
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(firewall). Nonw’ak lot bagaykipetètkapabidantifyew’ papparètnan prezantasyonetid la e
nanpiblikasyonrezilta l’ yo. Reziltaankèt (etid) laapprezante sou fòmrezimeepi se an gwoup
y’aprapòteyo. Pa genmounk’ap ka idantifyew’pèsonèlman.

Eskew’ ta renmenyonvolontè pou rechèchsa?
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Appendix F: Oral Informed Consent Form Back translated Kreyol-English
We invite you to participate in a study. The goal of this study is to investigate on how
international interventions help or cause damage to local governance and why. We invite you to
participate because you are a person that survived the earthquake and that were involved in an
international organization that was here to help. We will accept 70 participants in all for that
study. Participation will require one hour of your time today.

If you decide to participate, you will be interviewed by Greg Hodgin at a location you
will choose in Léogâne, Haiti. The interview should not take any more than one hour of
your time. It will start immediately after your consent.
In this study, you will not face to any more problem than you would in your
everyday life.

Participating in research is voluntary. It is not mandatory for you to be in this study. If
you accept to participate in the study and later you change your mind, you have the right to
give up at any time.

Your records will remain private (confidential) to the extent allowed by law. Greg
Hodgin and Carrie Manning will have access to the information you provide. Moreover, your
information might also be shared with institutions whose role is to make sure that the survey is
carried out correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board, the Office for Human Research
Protection
(OHRP)). Instead of labeling your records with your complete name, we will only use the first
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letter of it. The information you provide will be stored on a password and firewall protected
computer. Your name and other clues that might reveal your identity will not appear in the
presentation of the study and neither will they be published in its results. The results of the
investigation will be presented in a summary form and will be reported in group. No one will be
able to identify you personally.

Would you like to volunteer for this research?
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Appendix G: In-Person Haiti Research Report
This appendix is a listing of the interventions seen by the researcher and delves into the
specific responses given by the communities the researcher spoke to. Instead of placing this in
the main body of the dissertation, this research was moved here to not destroy the flow of the
dissertation itself.
The list of failed or failing interventions became quite long as the research began and
continued. Community A2 shared their story which was repeated many times while the research
was taking place. A French INGO came in 2010 after the earthquake and left in 2011. The INGO
contracted out someone to clean the water and left after 6 months. The INGO stated they would
install a water pump and then leave, which is precisely what they did. The INGO asked
permission from A2 but not from the owner of the land itself. Community resident A stated that
other INGOs pass by but the other INGOs did not interact with A2, illustrating the lack of
coordination of both INGOs and the state regarding the needs of communities in the field.
Community resident B specifically asked the INGO how to purify their water, and the INGO
chose not to share that information, which it might not even have had. Community residents A, B
and C, along with the crowd who had gathered around the pump to have their voices heard, made
it clear that they were happy with the INGO intervening, but were unhappy with how they were
treated: A stated that they felt like passive recipients of aid, and the INGO did not listen to or act
on their concerns at all. The state was not involved in any way regarding this intervention. Both
A and B stated they felt that the state didn’t matter, and they had resigned themselves to the fact
that no one from the INGO who originally intervened would return. This intervention shows the
ability of an INGO to present itself to a community without being questioned or coordinated by
the state due to low state capacity, which allowed the INGO to engage in the work as it saw fit.
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Without any accountability because of low state capacity, the INGO was able to leave A2
without consequence or repercussion for its actions, and the community was left with an end
product that failed to perform much past when the INGO departed, leaving them worse off than
they had been before the intervention itself.
Community A3’s experience reinforced the issue of the lack of state capacity and the
inability to direct INGOs to engage in appropriate, sustainable interventions. Community
resident A stated that an INGO had come in to the community, dug holes for a well, dumped a
large amount of chlorine to purify the water below, installed a hand pump and left A3. According
to A, the entire intervention lasted no more than 8 days. A stated that they only dug the wells:
there was no training for the community or any skill sets taught. A3 asked for training in regard
to the pump, and also requested spare parts, but A3’s residents weren’t allowed to ask any
questions of the INGO. Community resident B stated that the INGO didn’t even say goodbye to
them when they left, further evidence of the INGO treating the community as passive recipients
of aid and angering all the residents of A3. At the time of research, the pump had already broken
once, and A3 had hired someone outside of itself to fix the pump. B admitted that they were not
happy being treated in such a dismissive manner but conceded that A3 could have been treated a
lot worse by an INGO. A wished that A3 had been taught how to purify and distribute their
water. B also wished to have training on how to fix the pump and also spare parts, which the
INGO did not choose to give to A3. A3 felt that the INGO had a major communication issue: the
translator the INGO brought to A3 was ineffective and not very good, according to B. The INGO
made A3 pay for the translator, food and supplies for the INGO and did not ask A3 for any input
regarding the positioning or the need for a well and pump, according to B. The INGO came in,
implemented their project with no input from A3, and left after about a week. They chose to not
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hire labor from A3, although on further investigation A3 had several workers who were both
eager and willing to work but were not asked to do so. Lack of communication, lack of state
capacity, and treating the local community as passive recipients again reinforces the theoretical
discussion of the lack of state capacity allowing INGOs to operate with impunity and the ability
to leave with no repercussions from the state.
The evidence of the effects of state capacity continued. Community B1 had an INGO ask
for permission to build (again, an INGO assumes state-like functions instead of consulting with
the Haitian government) a pump for the community. The INGO asked only one question: for
permission. The INGO told B1 to donate sand and cement to the project. The INGO told B1 they
would build a pump, which they proceeded to do. However, the INGO did not leave contact
information for B1 if anything went wrong, gave the community no training and also chose to
leave no spare parts for the pump. The deployment was only 6 days long, with no local labor
hired. Community resident A specifically stated that they learned nothing from the INGO, as the
INGO asked no other questions. B1, if they had been asked, would have requested a much
different system, specifically a pump with a cistern and a treatment system if possible. According
to community resident B, the pump had problems on multiple occasions, and the community was
forced to raise money to fix the pump themselves. A and B stated that they believed the INGO
didn’t want to listen to B1 because they didn’t want to. B1 had heard reports that the INGO had
built full systems in other places, and A and B were very unhappy about the aborted intervention
the INGO chose to set up. Community resident C stated that there were communication issues as
well regarding the translator hired by the INGO: the translator didn’t give the whole story and
they were overcharged for repairs because B1 did not have any tools to engage in repairs, leaving
them at the mercy of outside contractors.
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Community B3 reported similar issues. Although the INGO stayed in B3 off and on for
months, no local labor was hired and utilized. Community resident A stated that B3 asked for but
did not receive training, materials or contact information from the INGO. The pump at the time
of the research was 5 years old, and community resident B stated that it had a number of
problems. The INGO did leave some tools 72 but unfortunately it was not what was needed to
actually repair the pump in question. Instead, B3 is forced to pay others to fix the pump for them.
The INGO asked no questions of B3 and simply began to build instead. When asked, A and B
said they would have requested a wall built for the pump and also a method to drain water away;
because the pump was built in a slapdash and haphazard fashion, the brackish waste water turned
into a breeding ground for mosquitoes, creating a clear negative and unintended consequence.
Community resident C also stated that the INGO used the wrong materials to build the pump,
which explains why they took so long to finish the job in the first place.
Community B5 detailed the intervention which targeted it. The INGO (this INGO will be
designated INGO A) intervened for only 1 week. Community resident A stated that local labor
was not used, there was no training for B5’s residents and no spare parts were given. B5 was
instructed to pitch in to give INGO A sand and cement to use for constructing the well, which A
felt INGO A should have been more upfront about. INGO A had chosen to use a metal pipe for
the pump. The Haitian government and other INGOs used PVC or other plastic pipe instead due
to the fact that Haiti’s high humidity and very wet climate led to fast rusting of non-galvanized
metal or metal not attached to a sacrificial anode. This information was freely available both
from the Haitian government, the UN cluster system and many UN agencies. Unfortunately, due
to the lack of coordination and enforcement mechanisms discussed earlier, INGO A either did
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Specifically, a shovel and a pickaxe.
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not know of these issues or chose to ignore them. In either case, the result was the same: the
metal pipe has rusted and broken repeatedly beyond the repair capacities of B5. According to
community resident B, INGO A asked for permission, but nothing else. A and B would have
asked for spare parts and some training, but the pump breaks at least once a year, producing
contaminated water as a result of INGO A’s incorrect installation and lack of knowledge of local
conditions. Community resident C stated that the residents of B5 were also instructed to sign a
contract by INGO A, of which they were not able to keep a copy of. A, B and C each stated that
they signed because they were desperate for a pump: the contract was not in Kreyol or French.
Instead, it was in English, a language that no one in B5 could read. This again reinforces the
disparity of power between INGOs, the communities they intervene in, and the lack of state
capacity itself: with no accountability regarding the INGO, B5 had no recourse of action. When
asked about taking the INGO to Haitian court over the contract, A, B and C all responded that it
would be a waste of their time: they did not know who the justice of the peace was, and they felt
strongly that the Haitian state would ignore their request for adjudication. Due to low state
capacity, the INGO was easily able to sidestep the state and vacate after the intervention was
done without repercussion for the pump breaking, which A and B stated happened on multiple
occasions.
Community B7 was also targeted by an intervention of INGO A. The unfortunate
intervention discussed previously repeated itself here: the INGO ordered B7 to buy cement, sand
and blocks to be used for the pump, and hired no local labor at all. Community resident A asked
on behalf of B7 for training and received none. Community resident B stated that B7 had
specifically sought INGO A out to build this pump, thinking that B7’s residents would get
training as well. INGO A had B7 sign a contract for the pump which again was written in
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English, a language that no one in B7 could not read and the INGO did not offer them a
translator, as happened with community B5. B stated that although they wanted far more from
the intervention and did not want to sign the contract, they, like B5, desperately needed the pump
and felt they had no choice but to sign the contract instead of taking their chances that the INGO
would simply leave, as there would be no negative consequences for the INGO to depart in this
manner. This reinforces INGO A’s lack of accountability to the communities it intervened in,
and again its ability to sidestep the weak Haitian state.
Community F7’s residents shared the story of an INGO’s intervention (also INGO A) in
2015 for a 2-week deployment. Community resident A shared that the INGO asked F7 for
permission to build a well and install a pump, and also for the best location to place the pump
which was a marked improvement over their intervention in B5 and B7. The INGO chose not to
use any local labor, according to A. Community resident B stated that F7 offered workers to help
dig the well and build the pump, but the INGO chose not to pay those volunteers, or use them at
all. B stated that the INGO chose not to leave any spare parts for F7 and did not give F7’s
residents any training in case the pump broke. The pump worked for 3 months and then broke. A
stated that the INGO would come back to fix the pump as per their promise. Unfortunately, they
did no such thing: although the INGO promised they would return, they did not. F7’s residents
had no means of contacting the INGO, and was forced to wait for them to return, of which they
had no guarantee. In an interesting request, B stated that they would have liked an electric pump
but also illumination around the pump. B shared that a lamp over the pump was necessary
because violent crime took place at the pump at night sometimes. This shows the lack of both
state and international capacity, given that internal security is one of the base marks of any state
or institution. The inability of the Haitian government or the UN to provide basic security
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underlies the fragility of the entire edifice. These three interventions clearly illustrate that INGO
A, on three separate locations, was able to work with impunity and without any state sanction at
all, marginalize the communities they worked with, and not be held accountable at all to said
communities, and leaving broken pumps that the low state capacity of the Haitian state were
unable to repair.

Community B2 had an intervention of both DINEPA and also an INGO, who left a sign
showing who they were in front of B2:

Figure 7: Sign detailing INGO intervention
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The INGO asked for permission from B2, and they said they would build a pump and an office
to store materials at. According to community resident A, the INGO said they would leave
building materials, but instead left only 2 shovels, which are not the correct tools to fix the pump.
The INGO trained community resident B in how to fix the pump if necessary and also built the
shelter and the pump. The INGO didn’t hire any local labor, nor did they give them any tools to
help with repair. The INGO, nor DINEPA, never asked B2 what they actually wanted and simply
built it without consulting B2. A and B, when asked, stated that they wanted a newer system, one
that was handicap accessible given some of the disabilities of residents of B2, and they also
wanted a water distribution system, preferably with an electric pump. The hand water pump has
already broken 3 times and A stated that B2 paid a technician to visit the pump and fix it. When
the pump breaks, which happens on a semi regular basis, B2 organizes itself to fix problems with
the pump when it is necessary. When asked if DINEPA had visited the community since the
intervention, after the translator finished the question, the entire group of people burst into
laughter. Community resident C stated that the reason the community was laughing was that they
never expected to see DINEPA again: the esteem that government officials are held in are very
low, according to A and C. The INGO was able to easily work with the state, but when the INGO
left, the state lacked the capacity to maintain or continue the work, and this led to the long-term
failure of the intervention itself.
Community B4 had an INGO intervention which lasted 3 weeks. The INGO gave B4
neither training nor spare parts in case the pump broke, which it did soon after the INGO left.
The INGO build the pump using no local labor, and they also asked B4 itself to pitch in money
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to build the well and pump. Community resident A reported that no questions were asked by the
INGO: instead A stated that they built the pump and immediately left. Community residents B
and C were adamant about the fact that the INGO failed to ask any questions due to the fact that
B and C felt the INGO had placed the pump in a very bad place: in the center of a road. A, B and
C stated that more than one person had gotten hit by traffic on the street attempting to get to the
pump. A stated that all of B4 was understandably upset by this issue, but the INGO never asked
B4 what its needs were, even though A and C attempted to converse with the INGO on multiple
occasions. A and C attempted to ask for training, spare parts and most importantly a better
location for the well, but they were consistently ignored. Their frustration was evident
throughout the entire interview: although B4’s residents stated their happiness at having a pump
installed, they were distraught over being marginalized and ignored by the INGO and felt the
state should have done something to regulate INGOs, but B and C stated they knew how Haitian
politics worked, and didn’t expect anything better from them, which speaks volumes about
accountability.
Community B6 had an INGO intervene which worked more closely with the community
than other interventions. The INGO built both a pump and an office for workers there, and the
pump took 6 months to build. Unfortunately, according to community resident A, there was still
no training or spare parts given to B6. The INGO had promised B6 that it would build 3 pumps,
but they instead only built 1, probably due to funding drying up, which although unfortunate is a
hazard that any INGO faces when they engage in field implementations as discussed in the
literature review. The INGO asked for permission from the beginning, and unlike the previous
example, community resident B stated that they asked for local knowledge regarding the
placement of the water pump. Unfortunately, the INGO did not give B6 any training, which B6
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consistently requested. A and B were very strident about the training: they had asked repeatedly
for training in case the pump broke, but the INGO ignored their request for unknown reasons.
The pump at the time of the research, according to B, had broken 5 times. This ties back into the
central issue that although it was easy for the INGO to implement without consulting with the
state, the long-term ramifications of the intervention are failure due to the INGO’s assumptions
about state capacity and its lack of involvement and training of the local community.
Community C3 reported that an American INGO intervened in 2013. The INGO chose
not to train anyone, according to community resident A. The INGO also did not give the
community spare parts, nor did they hire local labor at all. A well already existed in the
community without a pump, so therefore the INGO chose to place the pump on top of the
existing well as opposed to digging another one, in theory saving resources and time.
Unfortunately, over the C3’s local knowledge and their strident objections, the INGO made a
large mistake in the intervention: the pipe used was too short to reach the water table, and C3
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was no longer able to use the pump due to construction errors.
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Figure 8: Evidence of insufficient length of pipe

As can be seen, the pipe does not reach all the way into the water itself. The well had been dug
appropriately, but the INGO ignored the advice of the residents of C3. On further questioning,
community resident A stated that the well was dug to a depth of 180 feet, which was more than
enough to reach the water table. A stated that the INGO laid down a pipe to a depth of only 90
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feet, hence the picture above. Because of this issue, the pump is no longer used by C3:

Figure 9: Dry pump due to incorrect installation
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Although the pump is in working order, it is unable to reach the water table during most of the
year, making this intervention by the INGO almost worthless to the residents of C3. When asked
about government assistance, community resident B scoffed, stating that the water authority
never checked up on the community, and they wouldn’t even know who to talk to about having
someone look at it. A joined in, saying that C3 lacked the ability to improve the pipe length, so
they left it as is. Unfortunately, this again reinforces and illuminates the theoretical argument: the
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INGO had no accountability in regard to C3, and C3 had no recourse with the state due to low
state capacity, thereby leading to a short-term success and a long-term failure of the intervention.
Community C4 had a small consortium of INGOs build a pump in 2011. The vast
majority of pumps built after the earthquake in Haiti were of two varieties: either a hand pump or
a foot pump. Each type has their own advantages and disadvantages: hand pumps are easier to
construct, but they break down more rapidly. Foot pumps, on the other hand, last longer in the
field but the parts are more difficult to procure and replace, due to the fact that the parts are
imported: no one locally produces parts for foot pumps. When interviewed, almost all of the
communities specifically asked for an electric pump if that was possible. If not, they usually
opted for hand pumps, as most of those parts could be purchased locally even though the pumps
broke down more often. According to community resident A, C4’s pump was a foot pump
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instead of a hand pump, and it broke after 2 years.
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Figure 10: Broken foot pump

In a working foot pump, the small, circular piece would be approximately a foot to a foot and a
half off the ground: this is where the foot is pressed to push water through the pump out of the
spigot on the left. This pump is therefore useless: the metal rod inside broke, leaving this pump
unable to operate, even by hand. A replacement piece is required, and although the INGO
consortium left C4 a replacement gasket for the pump, they didn’t leave the crucial replacement
piece: the rod in case the original broke. A said that the INGO also used a pipe that was too
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short, even though they had consulted with DINEPA beforehand. Whether DINEPA gave the
INGO the information that was actually needed is not known. Community resident B stated that
the INGO did ask for permission to dig the well and also where installation would be best. They
did not use any local labor however, and the training was only 1 day. The training was rendered
moot, however, by the fact that spare parts were not left behind by the INGO. A and B both
lamented this fact, and openly wondered if DINEPA would ever come back to check on the
project. When asked if the INGO would return, both A and B shook their heads and stated that
they believed the INGO would not return, nor would the state. This again reinforces the concern
with weak state capacity and INGOs assuming that the state can do far more than it truly can
when the INGO intervention ends.
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Community C6 had an INGO intervene in 2010, and like the last community, the INGO
chose to use a foot pump instead of a hand pump as shown here:
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Figure 11: Second broken foot pump
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As can be seen, the foot pump has broken on this water pump, rendering it inoperable.
Community resident A stated that the deployment took 6 months, due to the fact that the well had
to be dug twice: the INGO dug incorrectly the first time. Although the INGO left pickaxes and
shovels for C6, these tools were worthless in regard to fixing the pump if the pump broke,
according to A. The INGO asked for permission from C6, and also asked where to put the pump,
but did not ask C6 what type of pump they would have liked. A foot pump was installed, and it
subsequently broke in 2013. Due to the lack of spare parts as discussed earlier, the pump
remained broken to the time of research. Community resident B stated that C6 would rather have
had a hand pump due to the difficulty of children pumping with a foot pump as opposed to a
hand pump, and also it would have been easier to find parts for a hand pump as opposed to a foot
pump. A stated that the INGO chose to give C6 no training, nor did they utilize local labor.
Because of this, the pump was nonoperational at the time of research as the community lacked
the training or the resources to fix the pump, again reinforcing the theoretical model that INGOs
can easily produce short term results, but without either strong community investment or a strong
state presence, the intervention will fail in the long term, as it did in C6.
Community D1’s residents stated that an INGO came in shortly after the earthquake in
2011 to engage in a water intervention. The INGO asked D1 for both permission and also the
best place to locate the pump, but they chose not to leave D1 with any spare parts, nor did they
give D1 any training. According to community resident A they did, however, hire Haitian labor
to help build the pump, but it was not labor drawn from D1 itself, something which bothered the
residents of D1 greatly. Community resident B stated that the community was very frustrated
with this specific aspect of the intervention: B shared that there were a number of laborers in D1,
but they were never asked to contribute, and the money was sorely needed. Here we have a new
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piece of evidence regarding strengthening local communities or an argument for increased state
capacity: DINEPA could have at the very least negotiated with D1 to hire laborers from the
community itself, but weak state capacity precludes that scenario. The intervention, according to
A, was not long, and the pump has broken 4 times since the intervention, and it was still broken
during the time of research. When it broke, D1 chose to pool its resources to hire someone to fix
it, as the INGO left no instructions on how to repair the pump nor any contact information on
who to get in touch with in case the pump broke. If D1 had been asked, A and B both responded
that they would have wanted a reservoir along with the pump, but those questions were not asked
by the INGO during the intervention. This again reinforces the issue discussed in the theoretical
section: with the INGO engaging in a short-term project, the state lacked the capacity to engage
in the maintenance needed, and the project failed in the long term, leaving D1 without a
functioning water system, and illustrates once again the lack of accountability that both the state
due to weak state capacity and the INGO have regarding D1 in particular and these interventions
in general. Communities D5, D7, E5, E8, and F5 had a very similar response and intervention as
D1 did, further strengthening this argument.
Community D2’s residents shared that an INGO asked the community only for
permission, chose not to ask about a good location for the well and pump itself, and intervened in
2012. In this specific case, the INGO built the pump, but D2 banded together and built a
structure around the pump and the well: the INGO did not contribute to this effort in any way.
According to community resident A, the INGO chose to use no local labor, did not leave any
spare parts for D2, and also gave no one in D2 any training in case the pump broke. The pump
itself has broken 5 times since 2012, and D2 lacks the means to fix the pump on their own due to
the INGO not giving them the tools or training required to do so. In this specific case, A told the
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researcher that they would have asked for some kind of filter if possible, as the metal is
becoming rusty and contaminating the water. As discussed earlier, using metal for piping is a
very poor choice for Haiti, due to fast rusting and corrosion due to the tropical environment. Due
to the factors listed earlier, these interventions achieved their short-term goals but failed in their
long-term goals, again reiterating the lack of accountability regarding the INGO and the lack of
state capacity hindering long-term success.
Community D4 shared details of the INGO intervention that took place in 2014.
Community resident A stated that the INGO stayed for two and a half weeks. According to A, no
local labor was used by the INGO at all, although they did leave spare keys and a rubber gasket
for D4. When questioned about the spare keys, community resident B shared that the spare keys
were for the lock on the pump, which many of the other communities did not have. A lock is
used so that children can’t play on the pump, possibly damaging or destroying it by vigorously
yanking on the pump itself. The INGO gave D4 a set of spare keys for the lock to allow D4’s
residents to determine the best times for D4 to use the pump itself, giving D4’s denizens some
small amount of autonomy regarding the intervention. The INGO asked D4 for permission to
build the pump and also the best place to build the well and the pump itself, and they trained
some of D4’s residents in how to fix the pump. Unfortunately, although this seems to have been
a more effective intervention than the others discussed previously, the pump at the time of
research had already broken two times and to repair the pump D4’s residents would hire
somebody outside of D4 to fix it, as the training was insufficient to fix the pump, a lapse on the
part of the INGO. The INGO used a metal pipe instead of a PVC pipe, and A and B expressed its
strong wish that the INGO had used PVC pipe instead as not only was the pipe rusting and would
probably break soon, but the water had a foul taste to it that discouraged people from drinking
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from it. A, B and those who had gathered around the pump to share their opinions expressed
their dissatisfaction with the INGO using a metal pipe, and when asked about the Haitian state,
the ring of residents laughed bitterly, stating that the government had never been out there, and
no one was looking out for D4’s interest in the state except for the community itself. The
insufficient training, using metal instead of PVC piping, and leaving no spare parts left D4 in the
same position as many of the other communities researched. This again reinforces the issue of
weak state capacity: if the state had some kind of regulatory authority and the ability to use that
authority over the INGO in question, it could standardize and coordinate deployments or at the
very least give information on local conditions and needs. However, weak state capacity
precludes this scenario, again leading to a short-term success and a long-term failure.
Site D6 was far different from the previous ones, as this intervention centered around a
water system for a school as opposed to a community. This system was built early in 2015 and
still had the look of a fresh, new apparatus. The system itself was different from most of the
others surveyed: instead of a well and a pump, this system was a large rain catching system for
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the school in question, as can be seen in the picture:
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Figure 12: Large storage tanks for water

The school’s administrator stated that lots of local labor were used to build the system, but that
the INGO did not give anyone training or spare parts in case the system broke. The school
administrator stated that the INGO chose to leave no contact information in case of breakage.
The school administrator also stated that he would have rather had treated water for the students
instead of untreated rainwater, but the INGO ignored the requests of the administrator and the
surrounding community, only installing the water collection and distribution system. This system
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could hold a great deal of water from precipitation: it had large, 1000-gallon tanks to hold
rainwater, and a system to distribute the water to taps placed throughout the school itself as seen
in the picture. Soap holders lined the sinks as well, so the administrator was asked if this was a
sanitation project instead of a water project. The administrator stated that the INGO wanted it to
be both: a sanitation project for children to keep themselves clean at school, and also water to
drink. The administrator felt that the first part was a qualified success, but the second part fell
short due to the lack of clean, treated water for the children to drink. There was no state
involvement, showing that even with education the government was unable to regulate, assist or
sponsor a school with a new water system due to the issues discussed earlier. Even though many
schools in Haiti are private schools, they still must follow Ministry of Education guidelines
regarding the school itself with respect to curricula and other education issues. The administrator
stated that the state was not involved with either the education or the water and sanitation side of
the school itself: the ability of an INGO to set up a water system with impunity, ignore the
wishes of the community regarding treated water, and then leave without any accountability to
either the community the school was based in or the state itself lends strong credence to the
theoretical argument of this research.
Community D8’s residents shared the story of the INGO which intervened in 2012 in
their community for a month. According to community resident A, no local labor was procured
by the INGO for the construction of the well and the pump, no spare parts were given to D8 in
case the pump broke, and no spare parts were left behind for D8. The INGO left after the pump
was completed, and the INGO chose to only ask permission from D8 and where to put it; no
other questions were asked, community resident B reported. D8 was large enough where one
pump was not enough for their water needs: D8’s residents asked for multiple pumps and/or a
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solar pump instead of a hand pump, but their requests were left unanswered and unfulfilled. The
pump since its construction has broken six times, and D8’s residents have been forced to hire
outside workers to repair the pump. The ring of residents around the pump stated on multiple
occasions that if more pumps had been set up in the community, the pump would not have
broken so many times, as it had been overused due to the number of people in D8. A and B
reported that they were happy there was an intervention in the first place, but due to the power
disparity inherent in this relationship, they did not want to push the INGO too much and received
an intervention that they considered dissatisfying. Here we have the other side of the
accountability equation: D8’s residents were afraid of asking for too much from the INGO, as the
INGO might simply not engage in the intervention and leave D8 with nothing: better to have
something than nothing, they stated. A and B both made their wishes clear regarding the
government: although they had very little faith in the state, the residents reported that only the
state had the ability to keep INGOs in check and ensure that issues such as what they faced
weren’t repeated. Again, this reinforces the research analysis: the INGO and the state both lack
accountability regarding D8, the former due to its lack of ties to D8, the INGO’s external funding
and ability to sidestep the state, allowing it to intervene at will where it so chose, and the state
due to its limited capacity outside of the capital. Both of these issues add up to create a shortterm success, but a long-term failure for this intervention.
Community D9’s residents reported on the intervention which took place for them for
one month in 2010, very soon after the earthquake. Community resident A shared that this
intervention took place while a tent city of earthquake victims had sprung up in the community.
Community resident B shared that the INGO chose to not use local labor at all, instead using
foreign workers to build the well and the pump. Here, it could be argued that the INGO did not
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have time to take the community’s needs into account, as the tent city of earthquake victims had
been created right after the earthquake, and time was of the essence to ensure that the well and
pump were able to pull adequate water for the residents. The INGO chose to not provide D9’s
residents with training, nor did they provide D9 with any spare parts. According to B, the pump
has broken three times since 2010 and D9’s residents pool their resources to hire an outsider to
repair the pump when it’s needed. In this case, however, the INGO’s objectives and what D9
desired directly clashed. According to A, the INGO chose, over D9’s objections, to build the
well and the pump closer to the tents erected by the temporary residents, but after the earthquake
victims left, the pump is in a disadvantageous position for the residents of D9. A and B, along
with others who were nodding while they spoke, specifically requested that the pump be placed
closer to the permanent houses of D9, but the INGO chose to build where it would be more
accessible to the temporary tent city instead of the community. This is a clear example of
attempting to balance short-term interventions with the longer-term needs of communities in
question. The temporary tent city erected after the earthquake required water and sanitation as
did D9 itself, but instead of involving D9’s residents in the discussion, the INGO unilaterally
decided to build the pump where it felt would be the best place for the temporary tent city, not
for D9. A and B stated their displeasure in the fact that they were now forced to use a pump that
was not in an optimal position for people who were no longer there. This is an excellent example
of the lack of coordination and accountability of these INGO interventions. A and B also stated
that they wished the INGO had dealt with some of the sanitation issues that the tent city
produced, but their requests were rebuffed by the INGO and that specific issue was not passed to
anyone else who could possibly help. D9’s residents also wanted the INGO to help construct a
cistern, but the request fell on deaf ears. Here again, a stronger state could have intervened on
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behalf of D9 and struck a compromise with the INGO, but with low state capacity, the INGO
was able to act with impunity, trading the short-term need for a long-term loss for D9. This exact
same issue took place in community F1 as well, lending further weight to the theoretical
construct.
Community D10 had an INGO intervene in 2013, and this intervention was at sporadic
times for a six-month timeframe. The INGO asked for permission from D10’s residents to build
the well and the pump, and also asked D10 what the best position was for placement of the
pump. The INGO, however, chose to hire no local labor. According to community resident A the
INGO trained three people in D10 in how to fix the pump if it broke down. Community resident
B reported that instead of spare parts, the INGO gave the residents of D10 an entire extra pump,
as opposed to specific spare parts for the pump itself. The pump had broken five times by the
time of this research, and D10 lacked the spare parts to fix it, rendering the training worthless.
Therefore, D10’s residents were forced to hire an external technician to repair the pump.
Community resident C expressed her severe frustration with the INGO’s intervention, as
although they were given an entire new pump in case the first one broke, they lacked the tools
and resources to install said pump if the first one broke, making it worthless to them, and
therefore leading the community to sell it instead. A and B said that D10 also wanted some kind
of water distribution system as the pump got very crowded when people attempted to use the
pump. In this case, although the INGO attempted to circumvent the weak state capacity issue by
working with D10’s residents and giving them what the INGO felt was necessary. Unfortunately,
by not engaging in a full, robust dialogue with the local community, the hurdle of weak state
capacity was too much for the intervention to overcome, as the state was unable to assist D10
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with their needs, even though D10 had the spare pump ready to be installed. This further
strengthens the theoretical framework.
Community E1 shared its intervention story with the researcher of an INGO arriving in
2012. According to community resident A, the intervention was only 4 days. Resident B stated
that the INGO asked for permission from E1 and also advice on the best location of the pump,
but they did not use any local labor in the construction of the well and pump. The INGO chose to
not give E1’s residents any training, nor did the INGO give E1 any spare parts for use if the
pump broke. According to A, the pump has broken seven times since 2012, and E1 lacks the
tools and the expertise required to repair the pump on their own. E1’s residents therefore collect
funds from itself to hire an outside contractor to fix the pump when needed. B stated that they
would have requested the INGO for a solar pump as opposed to a hand-held pump, but this
question was never posed to them by the INGO. When asked about any government assistance,
A and B simply laughed, stating that they hadn’t seen any government workers in years, and the
only people who had visited them, however briefly, was the INGO itself during the intervention
and no one else in any official capacity. As can be seen, the lack of state capacity is very clear to
the residents of these communities: they do not even expect the state to have a presence, yet
INGOs sometimes expect the state responsibility to pick up where the INGO leaves off, leaving
all frustrated with the results.
Community E3’s residents took a proactive approach to an intervention: they went in
search of an INGO, as no other INGO or the state had chosen to show up, and it had been two
years since the earthquake. Community resident A stated that this INGO intervened in 2012, and
only stayed for five days. A continued his recollection: the INGO used no local labor, left no
spare parts, and chose to train none of the locals regarding repair in case the pump broke.
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According to A, the pump at the time of the research had broken two times, and due to not
having the spare parts or the expertise to fix the pump on their own, E3 is forced to raise money
on their own to hire an outside contractor. Because they asked the INGO to intervene, E3’s
residents felt it wasn’t their place to ask the INGO for too much, but they would have wanted a
solar pump instead of a hand pump. At the very end of the interview, community resident B also
said they would have asked for more security. On further questioning, B stated that because the
INGO showed up in the first place made E3 more visible to other communities, and these other
communities felt jealous that E3 were getting resources and they were getting nothing, leading to
animosity and an increase in theft. Due to the massive lack of state capacity, the monopoly on
the use of force had failed here, and E3’s residents were rightly concerned that increased
attention would lead to increased crime. According to both A and B, that was unfortunately the
case, reiterating the point of an attempted positive intervention not taking other variables into
account, leading to a negative long-term intervention which depended on faulty premises for its
resolution.
Community F8 took a similar approach as E3: F8 sought out an INGO to intervene after
seeing other communities getting water pumps. This can therefore be seen as additional evidence
that state capacity was almost nonexistent: why seek out an INGO if the government was even
marginally responsive to its constituents? Community resident A shared that the INGO
intervened in 2012 for 1 month, and the INGO chose to ask F8 what specific location would be
the best to place the well and pump at. According to A, the INGO chose to use no local labor in
the digging of the well or the construction of the pump itself. F8’s residents were also given no
spare parts by the INGO in case of pump breakage, nor was F8 given any training regarding
pump repair in case it broke. Since the intervention, the pump has broken 3 times A reported. As
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with other communities interviewed, when the pump breaks, F8 collects money to hire an outside
contractor to fix the pump when possible. Although the INGO chose to ask F8 where the best
location for the pump would be, the INGO ignored this advice and built the pump where they felt
was best, a fact that A showed his bitterness toward. This again highlights the lack of
accountability for an INGO due to F8 lacking enforcement mechanisms, and the general
weakness of the Haitian state itself which also has enforcement issues as discussed in the
literature review.
Community E4’s residents gave the researcher data on an INGO intervention in E4 in
2012, which took approximately one month. According to community resident A, the INGO
chose to hire local labor from E4 itself, giving E4’s residents what they stated to be a muchneeded temporary economic boost during a trying time. However, the INGO did not give E4 any
spare parts in case the pump broke, nor did they give them any training in case the pump ceased
to function. According to A, the pump broke twice after this intervention, and was in the process
of breaking at the time of research. When the pump does break, A stated that E4’s residents
collect money to hire an outside repairman to fix the pump. E4 was not asked for permission
from the INGO, nor what location would be best for a pump. Although the hiring of local labor
was a slight improvement, this intervention failed due to the same problems as the others listed
in this analysis.
Community E6 chose to give the researcher the timeline and end product of a 2011
intervention by an INGO for a 20-day deployment, according to community resident A. The
INGO chose not to use any local labor for the construction of the well and pump, according to A.
The INGO chose to ask E6 for permission regarding the intervention itself and also asked for the
best location for the well and pump. The INGO chose to leave no spare parts with E6’s residents
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in case the pump broke. However, the INGO told E6 that they guaranteed they would return and
fix the pump if it broke up to one year after the intervention of the INGO. It turns out that this
was fortuitous for E6’s residents: the pump broke three times within a year after the end of the
INGO intervention, and the INGO came back and fixed the pump each time that they were
called, true to their word. Unfortunately, the pump broke 5 times, as opposed to only 3. Without
giving the community spare parts or training, after the year went by, E6 was trapped in the same
scenario that other communities were placed in: no ability to repair the pump in the long term
without help. A and B stated that if they had been asked by the INGO they would have asked for
the well to have been dug by machine as opposed to hand, and they would have also asked for a
way to purify the water instead of drawing water directly from the ground. At the time of the
research, the pump was broken, and A and B stated that E6 had no method of repairing it. This
intervention is in a similar vein to the others discussed before.
Community E7 agreed to share their experiences with the researcher, with community
resident A stating that an INGO built a well and pump over one week in 2011 in E7. According
to A, the INGO chose to ask the community for permission to build a well and pump, and also
asked the community for advice on the best location for the pump. Community resident B stated
that the INGO chose to hire local labor to build the well and the pump. The INGO did not leave
any spare parts for E7 in case the pump broke, according to A. The INGO did give E7 some
training, which involved not only teaching E7’s residents how to fix the pump in case the pump
broke, but also involved demonstrating how to collect money in a safe place to pay for repairs if
they were needed. The pump at the time of research had broken 3 times, but that was not E7’s
major concern. Instead, A and B both stated that their major concern with the INGO intervention
was the fact that the INGO had installed a pipe that was too small, and it did not have a high
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enough flow rate to pull enough water for the residents. A and B fervently wished that the INGO
had installed a large pipe, but the community was not asked. Again, this intervention shows the
ease with which an INGO can deploy due to a lack of state capacity, and also the difficulty of
holding them accountable for the work that they do with weak state capacity.
Community E9’s INGO intervention left a more drastic long-term conclusion.
Community resident A stated that an INGO chose to intervene in E9 in 2013, for a four-week
deployment. According to A, the INGO asked E9’s residents for permission to build a well and
pump. The INGO also asked E9 for the appropriate location of where to place the well and pump
and took E9’s advice into consideration when they placed them. Community resident B stated
that the INGO chose to give E9 no training in case the pump ceased to function, and also chose
not to leave any spare parts in case the pump broke. E9’s residents volunteered to help build the
well and the pump, but the INGO chose to use its own labor force instead, and this labor force
was not local. When asked why foreign labor was used, both A and B shrugged their shoulders:
they did not know why foreign labor was used, as E9 made it clear that several the residents were
skilled laborers. According to B, when the pump breaks E9’s residents collects money to hire an
outside contractor to repair it. The pump broke after the intervention ended, and neither the
INGO nor the state has visited the intervention site since. E9 has taken a unique approach to the
pump breaking: they chose to jury rig the system to allow for continued access to water. Because
the pump had broken, E9 dismantled the pump, ripping it out of the ground. The INGO chose to
build a structure around the pump as well, again using no local labor or materials to build both

203

the pump and the structure, as seen in the picture below:

79

Figure 13: Building constructed around pump

Due to the lack of return of the INGO, E9’s residents decided to use rubber tubes to siphon out
water from the well instead of attempting to repair the pump, which was beyond the capabilities
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of E9 to fix, as seen in the following picture:

Figure 14: Use of mouth siphons to retrieve water
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Again, due to the INGO having no accountability regarding E9, and the lack of state capacity for
enforcement, this has left E9’s residents with a short-term intervention that led to a long-term
failure, as many other communities dealt with as well.
Community E10 chose to share their story with the researcher, with community resident
A stating that an INGO chose to intervene in 2012 over four days. The INGO asked E10 for
permission to intervene, and also for their advice on the best location to place the well and pump.
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According to A, the INGO chose to use no local labor, digging the well by machine in 1 day, and
after 3 days installed a pump with externally sourced labor. The INGO gave E10’s residents
spare parts, specifically bushings in case they broke in the pump and keys for a lock for the hand
pump so that it could be unlocked when needed, extending the life of the pump. These were
entrusted to community residents B and C, respectively. The INGO chose to give E10’s residents
training, and taught 4 people how to fix the pump if it broke, including B and C. The pump has
broken twice, according to A. When it breaks, E10 buys spare parts and also collects money to
hire an outside contractor to effect repairs. The INGO chose to use a metal pipe instead of PVC.
Given that the Haitian government and the UN agency cluster system specifically announced the
need to use PVC instead of metal pipe, this is another example of an INGO not being held
accountable for its actions by the state due to weak state capacity. The metal for this specific
pump is rusting and the water had turned yellow. When the researcher asked B how yellow the
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water was, B pulled out a bucket and began to pump, producing this picture:

Figure 15: Discoloration of water due to metal pipe usage
The yellow contaminants are more than likely heavy metal ions, and the intensity of the color
speaks to a high concentration of them. A, B and C, along with others who at this point were
nodding in agreement, no longer feel it’s safe to drink this water, and neither the state, the INGO
nor the UN agencies in question have not returned to check on the intervention at all.
In one of the more positive interventions, community F2 shared the intervention which
took place in their community in 2011 with a week and a half deployment. Community resident
A reported that the INGO asked F2 for permission to dig a well and install a pump. The INGO
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also chose to train 4 people in F2, including A and community resident B, in case the pump
broke down. This training involved not only fixing the pump in case it broke, but also training to
repair flow rate problems. Because of this training, the pump only broke one time since the end
of the intervention, showing that local community support can help alleviate some of the weak
state capacity issue. The INGO also chose to give F2’s residents spare parts in case the pump
broke down. B reported that F2 contributed money for sand and concrete to stabilize and
permanently encase the pump so that it could not be stolen. The spare parts the INGO left for F2
were not enough to repair the pump, but the training given to F2 were enough to allow them to
purchase the spare parts needed to repair the pump. A and B stated that F2 wanted the INGO to
return, but the INGO left no contact information for F2 to follow up with them. Even though the
INGO managed to cover several the state’s functions, including planning more long term,
without fully dealing with F2’s needs, the state would still be unable to help F2 if the pump ever
broke again.
Community F3 reported that an INGO and DINEPA intervened in 2012 in F3 for a period
of 4 days. Community resident A stated that F3 was not asked for permission or for the best
location to build. According to community resident B, the INGO and DINEPA did choose to hire
local labor and in fact hired people from F3 itself to help dig the well and install the pump. This
is possibly a rare instance of state capacity working in favor of the local community: DINEPA
perhaps insisted that local labor was used. According to A, the INGO did not give F3 any spare
parts, but did attempt to give F3’s residents some training in case the pump broke. The pump was
a foot pump instead of a hand pump, and as discussed earlier, this has consequences regarding
repairs. Because of this, the pump has broken twice and F3’s residents lacked the means to fix it
themselves. A shared that F3 managed to hire technicians to fix the pump the first time, but the
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second time it broke F3 was unable to repair it, leaving the pump broken at the time of research.
Even though DINEPA was involved, the INGO nor the state have returned since the intervention,
again highlighting the low state capacity and how this drives long-term failures. It could be
argued that the INGO was expecting DINEPA to return to keep the pump in operation, as that is
DINEPA’s function, but the INGO overestimated the state’s ability, for DINEPA lacked the
capacity for coordination.
Even when local communities are asked the best way to help and even if the community
truly needs or wants the intervention, small mistakes can destroy a well-intentioned, well thought
out intervention, especially without state or INGO support. Community F11 stated that an INGO
deployed for one and a half months, and the INGO spent a great deal of time with the
community, according to community resident A. Resident B stated that the INGO asked F11 for
permission for the construction of not only a well and a pump, but also a structure that
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distributed water to faucets in a specially constructed building as can be seen here:
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Figure 16: Building constructed for solar water pump system

This included the INGO asking F11 for the best location for the well, the pump, and the
distribution system building. A and B reported that the INGO worked closely with F11’s
residents regarding the project, as they hired parts of F11 for the projects of digging the well,
installing the solar pump, and also erecting the water distribution building, a project that took
several weeks. The INGO invested a great deal of time and energy into this intervention, and
according to A and B, it was understood that after the construction of the water system, the
INGO would leave and not return as they would no longer be needed, given that the system was
self-sustaining: the solar panels on the top of the structure seen above would have easily taken
care of the electric pump’s power needs. Due to the nature of the intervention, the INGO chose
to give F11 no training in case of breakage, or spare parts. However, the INGO constructed the
project such that spare parts or training would not be required as long as the intervention was
finished appropriately. A reported that they were quite happy with the intervention itself: the
INGO hired translators for the entire deployment to ensure that F11’s needs were met to the best
of the INGO’s abilities. The solar pump, the electrical equipment and the water distribution
structure were all constructed with F11’s assistance and permission. After the intervention, the
INGO left, although the project was not completely finished. F11’s residents asked them to stay,
but the INGO stated that the intervention was completely finished, but they would be back to
check on the project in the near future. A and B stated that F11’s residents bid the INGO
representatives farewell, and the INGO left. According to the community, the solar pump worked
perfectly after the INGO finished the intervention. The setup of the water pump and distribution
system was much more complex than what was seen in almost every other community. The
81
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INGO’s intervention dug a deep well and placed an electric pump over the well, which was
powered by a series of solar panels that were placed on the top of the water distribution system
structure approximately 20 meters from the pump itself. This structure was a one-story building,
with a small room to hold the electronic components that converted and transferred power from
the solar panels into useable electric power to the pump, with the insulated wiring running
underground so as not to be corroded by the Haitian climate. The pump pulled water from the
well and pumped it into a set of cisterns which were connected to the building. This water would
then be distributed through a series of pipes, leading to 6 faucets, 3 on each side of the building,
from which fresh water could be pulled. These 6 faucets were over 6 sinks, and a drainage
system was installed to ensure stagnant water pools did not form and attract mosquitoes and
pests. The electric pump jutted out from the ground, an issue A discussed in detail with me.
Before the end of the intervention, the INGO discussed security measures with F11’s residents,
as the state and the UN could not provide adequate security for F11 as discussed throughout this
research, thereby entailing an alternate plan for F11. The INGO and the community did begin a
security setup, but it was incomplete by the time the INGO left. The security idea was to place a
small fence with a lock around the pump, but this was not enacted. This led to an unfortunate
circumstance: the pump worked very well after the departure of the INGO. However, A and B
reported that approximately 2 weeks after the INGO left, someone stole the electric pump from
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F11. Community resident C then pointed where the electric pump had been, as seen here:
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Figure 17: Location of stolen water pump

As can be seen in the above picture, a rock had been placed on top of the well to keep
mosquitoes out, and the well, along with the building and the entire system, were now worthless
to F11. B then showed the researcher what was left of the pump’s electrical connection: a
machete had been used to cut the pump out from the ground, severing the electrical wiring

82

Researcher’s photograph

214

connected to the pump, as seen here:

Figure 18: Cut wiring for electric pump
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The INGO never came back, and therefore is still under the false assumption that their

relatively large-scale intervention was a success. Because this small electric pump which cost no
more than a few hundred US dollar was stolen, this intervention became a complete failure
which cost a rough estimate of several hundred thousand US dollars. This intervention was
almost a well thought-out, long term solution to F11’s water issues. Instead, A and B reported
that F11’s residents dug other wells around the one the INGO dug, and use hand pumps to
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extract the water the community needed. Therefore, the INGO wasted a large amount of money
because of one small, crucial mistake. Because there was no accountability for the INGO, and
the inherent weakness of both the state and UN agencies, this intervention is an excellent
example of short term vs. long term tradeoffs. Due to the state’s weakness, the INGO was easily
able to work alone with the community without any assistance from the state. However, the very
weakness of the state makes the long-term progress of the intervention difficult, as the INGO did
not engage in any post-deployment return, although a return was promised to F11, and the state
was unable to help with respect to transparency and accountability, lacking the resources to
follow up on this intervention. The result: a well-thought out intervention with one mistake,
costing the donors of that INGO a great deal of money, and F11’s residents worse off than it was
before the INGO intervened in the first place.

